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 1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Manufacturing and related urban growth processes in the Great Lakes basin have
resulted in an estimated 3,000 significant spills of toxic contaminants annually. Many of
these spills contribute significantly tothe toxic burden in the Great Lakes basin and there
exists the potential for a catastrophic accident that might do permanent damage to one of
the lakes. Spills are often caused by a breakdown in the complex relationships between
humans and machines.
Two workshops were attended by experts in a diversity of related fields to assess
concerns at the human—machine interface. The workshop members discussed sources and
circumstances of accidental releases, jurisdictional responses, technological and human
considerations.
The workshop participants recommended improvements in data reporting, analysis,
programs and legislation and determined that special attention should be given to
communications, training, education and nuclear facilities. They recommended a code of
practice for prevention of spills and a specific research program.
THE WORKSHOPS
The first Human—Machine Workshop attracted participants from a wide variety of
occupations: the design and operation of nuclear power plants, associated nuclear control
agencies, government agencies concerned with labour and the environment, air traffic
safety, the petrochemical industry and the academic community. Nearly all were
knowledgeable about or expert in the human factors field.
The first workshop forwarded a number of preliminary findings to the Science
Advisory Board, including identification of the following needs:
° Inclusion of human design factors in the earliest stages of facility
planning.
Better education and training of those charged with operating the
facilities.
More comprehensive reporting and data collection from incidents
involving failure at the human—machine interface.
The need for regulatory agencies to encourage more effective
self—regulation, with appropriate safeguards and penalties.
The second workshop built on the preliminary findings of the first and augmented
a core of participants from the first workshop with further expertise from the nuclear
utilities sector, sewage treatment plant operations, labour and academic community.
In preparation for the second workshop, four working papers were commissioned.
The first of these, entitled SCOPE, attempted to estimate the impacts of spills or
accidental releases of contaminants in the Great Lakes basin from various sources.
The second, PROGRAM, reviewed the current and possible jurisdictional responses to
such releases. The third and fourth, TECHNOLOGY and PEOPLE, tried to determine
how elements of these two areas influence the occurrence of accidental releases.
FINDINGS
Spills can have a much greater impact than point source discharges.
There is a common misconception that the impact of spills, although a nuisance,
does not compare over the long—term with ongoing point source discharges. The
Canadian National Analysis of Trends in Emergencies System (NATES) database
reveals a unique example involving styrene spills into the St. Clair River; two spills
were found to be equivalent to the pollution loadings of 1,428 and 58 years of the
respective point source discharges. The comparison indicates that accidental releases
may significantly exceed the impact of regulated point source discharges.
0
Data bases on spills are inadequate.
Existing databases on spills from basin jurisdictions are incomplete and
inconsistent with respect to the data reported. Furthermore, they demonstrate a lack
of liaison among jurisdictions. Currently there is no precisely defined spill inventory
for the Great Lakes basin. In addition, information related to human factors, if
present at all in existing records, is usually not sufficiently definitive for an analysis
to'identify preventive actions.
Several of the U.S. databases, particularly those maintained by the National
Response Center (NRC) and the Hazardous Material Information System, are inflexible
and not amenable to the access and integration of data nor for the transfer of
information to the public. The Canadian federal system is of a more sound design;
however, a need to enter current spill data from the Province of Ontario into the
federal database was identified.
0
Progams designed to prevent spills are inadequate or nonexistent.
Any comprehensive effort designed to prevent accidental releases, particularly of
toxic substances, will require: inventories of hazardous and toxic substances and their
movements; research to analyze a range of questions from total systems approaches to
human factors; education and training for a wide range of responsibilities in the field
as well as technological fixes; and, legislation requiring prevention, reporting, program
coordination and right—to—know. There is a modicum of such program elements among
the jurisdictions in the Great Lakes basin but what exists is inadequate for the task
and lacks effective coordination.
The significance of spills remains difficult to determine because the term has not
been clearly defined. A common definition and a common approach are needed within
the Great Lakes basin.
0
Accidents or incidents arising from human errors are not adequately
addressed.
Human errors frequently arise from faulty human—machine interface design:
instructions can be difficult to read, machinery can be difficult to use, controls can be
inappropriate, workers can become inattentive, there can be inadequate supervision or
training, automation or high technology can be inappropriately used or the allocations
of functions between humans and machines can be inappropriate.
Social values play an important role.
As explained by a United State Congressional leader in 1985, the public perceives
a serious problem if there are 150 fatalities per year for air carriers, but exhibits little
concern if there are 50,000 fatalities per year on highways. This attitude reflects a
-2-
 
 difference
in
values.
Although
data
on
spills
are
sketchy,
there
appears
to
be
approximately 3,000 significant accidental releases of hazardous
substances per year
in the
Great
Lakes basin provinces and states.
More attention must be given to the
ways
in which a society,
through
its institutions and
values influences
attitudes and
conceptualizes science,
technology and human
life.
The values that are held by people
and
governments
regarding
spills
will significantly
affect
the
degree
of
success
achieved in addressing the deleterious impact of such releases.
RECOMMENDATIONS
All
participants
in
the
Human—Machine
Workshops
recommend
that
the
International Joint Commission:
1. Data Reporting and Analvsis
°
Urge the adoption of a uniform reporting format by all jurisdictions
and offer to coordinate efforts to achieve such a format.
Work with all appropriate jurisdictions to develop and use a uniform
definition of a spill for reporting purposes.
Monitor and report on the quantities, trends and causes of spills in
greater detail in reports on water quality, including advocating
adequate reporting of human factors data.
Promote the compilation of an inventory of all hazardous materials,
including hazardous wastes, in the basin. Such an inventory should
include the production, use and disposal of radioactive material and
the associated transportation activities.
2. PrOgram and Legislative Initiatives
°
Encourage a consideration of the question of responsibility and
liability in the event of disasters involving hazardous substances.
Encourage national and international emergency prevention plans
that would obligate Great Lakes jurisdictions to provide resources
and guidance to local communities. This would allow appropriate
authorities to take the lead in planning and executing emergency
responses and in developing plans that: a) prevent or minimize the
risk of spills; b) are proactive as well as reactive; and, c) collect,
using established or common procedures, comparable data with
respect to spills, hazard identification and response protocols.
3. Fostering of Legislation
° Define or at least outline the essential elements of acceptable
right—to—know legislation and advocate that all Great Lakes states
and provinces enact comparable legislation. Such legislation should
include, as a minimum, hazardous substance identification,
quantities, locations and chemical forms and modes of human health
impact.
Encourage the development of legislation to allow the worker or
operator to refuse to execute nonroutine tasks that could result in
the discharge of a deleterious substance into the environment.
-3-
 Encourage the appropriate jurisdictions to impose a statutory duty
to report all spills meeting an agreed basinwide definition (in some
jurisdictions legislation such as is proposed above has already been
enacted or is under consideration).
Special Attention Directed to Nuclear Facilities
° Given the prevalence of nuclear power generating facilities and
related activities in the basin, consider reestablishing the
Committee on Radioactivity to monitor developments in this sector.
Training, Education and Communication
° Ensure that various concepts of risk and methods of risk assessment
be debated publicly. The Commission, by advocating a public
component to risk assessment, could ensure that all risk discussions
consider societal as well as individual risks. The combined risk of
human and animal exposure by means of air, skin, food and drinking
water sources would thus be considered.
Promote the development of a uniform basinwide or North American
pollution hazard information system for use on warnings, labels,
placards, displays and material safety data sheets. For easy and
effective recognition, such warningsshould be nonverbal.
Advocate a total systems approach, including special attention to
human factors engineering, in the education of professionals both
early in the design of new systems or equipment and in the retrofit
of older systems or equipment.
Promote development of a formal communication system directed
at all potential polluters to assure that guidance information on
human error, prevention, human factors design criteria and
technology transfer would be considered on a timely basis.
Encourage the jurisdictions to engage in public education programs
related to the reporting and prevention of accidental releases. The
public should be further educated on the impact on the environment
of inappropriate personal waste disposal habits. Simultaneously,
viable options for the disposal of hazardous goods or household
products should be presented.
Urge that there be a provision for confidentiality where appropriate,
particularly in the investigation of a narrowly averted spill or near
accident. The focus should be on prevention rather than
remediation.
Code of Practice for Prevention of Spills
° Promote a Code of Practice for the prevention of spills in basin
facilities containing the following elements:
— Senior management or its equivalent must set standards for the
organization and must repeatedly reflect a commitment to those
standards. The evolution of a corporate ethic is crucial to an
effective pollution control and prevention program.
Knowledge
crucial to pollution prevention and control should be shared
freely within the organization.
—
Every attempt should be made to include the operators in the
design of equipment and facilities.
—
Training should encompass not only how a machine works from
an operator's perspective, but also how people interact with the
machine.
The importance of the operator should be recognized
and acknowledged through job enrichment and a diversity of
challenges. Training should be enhanced to communicate
broader pollution concerns, including the legal restrictions and
their rationale, and the collective consequences of individual
actions.
7. Research Initiatives
° Encourage the use of a total systems approach, including human
factors and socio—technical considerations, with respect to Great
Lakes pollution problems.
Sponsor or advocate research on selected pollution incidents, using
specialists in human factors and socio—technical systems to
determine causal factors in pollution discharges.
Study human factors data gleaned from upgraded databases and
initiate research on preventive measures and the development of
specific human factors design criteria. These criteria can be
applied to pollution alarms, pollution monitoring systems
annunciators and other instrumentation to ensure that releases of
pollution are controlled at the source.
Sponsor or recommend studies to ensure that new technology is
implemented only after a deliberate and effective allocation of
functions to both humans and machines. Appropriate information
about the system andcognitive support, in a form intelligible to the
user, should be included in the design.
Recommend and support research to determine the relative
contribution of accidental releases to the total pollution of the
Great Lakes basin.
On the basis of the findings and conclusions formulated in connection with the
Human—Machine Workshops and considering both long—term cumulative effects and the
potential disasters, the workshop participants and the Science Advisory Board
concluded that spills may, in some cases, have a greater impact on the Great Lakes
than the cumulation of all point source discharges. It concludes further that data on
spills and programs designed to prevent spills are inadequate or nonexistent. Also, the
contribution of human error to spill incidents is not adequately addressed and that the
lack of social perception of the importance of the problem is reflected in the
inadequacy of current preventive and remedial efforts.
In summary, the workshop participants and the Science Advisory Board
recommend that:
The Commission urges the Parties to adopt a uniform and
comprehensive reporting system for the spills of hazardous
substances and hazardous wastes, and should offer to coordinate the
attainment of such a system.
The Water Quality Board monitor and report in greater detail on the
quantities, trends and causes of spills.
A methodology to evaluate the ecosystemic effects of spills be
developed by the Science Advisory Board's Ecological Committee.
The Commission investigates the issues of responsibility and liability
in the event of a disaster resulting from a major spill in the Great
Lakes Basin Ecosystem, in accordance with Annex 9 of the Water
Quality Agreement. The Commission should ensure that there is a
unified international emergency prevention plan that encourages
Great Lakes jurisdictions to establish a clear delineation of
responsibility and provides resources and guidance to local
communities, thus minimizing the risk and impacts of spills.
The Commission encourages the adoption of right—to—know and
right—of—refusal legislation in jurisdictions throughout the basin.
The Commission also encourages research and the reporting and
prevention of spills and research, communication and training in
systems and human factors engineering, risk analysis, pollution
hazard information systems and the appropriate uses of automation.
The Commission promotes the development of a corporate ethic
with respect to the ecosystem and associated codes of practice for
persons involved in the design of technical systems, operator
training, human motivation and interaction in work situations.
2.0 INTRODUCTION
The Great Lakes are an enormous and fragile resource. Together, the Great Lakes
and the St. Lawrence River form the largest surface expanse of fresh water in the
world. With its 9,400 miles of coastline, the basin is home to 45—million Americans and
Canadians; 24-million draw their drinking water from the lakes. The volume and
associated retention time of the lakes ensure that persistent contaminants can linger in
individual lakes for periods from seven to 500 years. Hundreds of millions of tonnes of
materials, whose release would have a deterious impact on the environment, are stored
and transported by various means in the basin.
The infrastructure of the Great Lakes basin contains a diversity of old and new
technology in manufacturing, the generation of power, transportation and waste
management.
For the past several years, led by Walter Lyon, board member and former Water
Pollution Control Administrator of Pennsylvania, the Science Advisory Board has been
considering the impact of errors at the human—machine interface on the contamination
of the Great Lakes. Among the studies that piqued interest in this topic was an EPA
review of the operation of newly constructed sewage treatment plants. The review
indicated that poor staff training and by implication, design, had resulted in
performance of these plants being significantly below that which should have been
achieved. It was clear that, for those plants studied, the expenditure of many millions
of dollars had not reduced contamination of the waterways to the extent it should have;
full value for the public dollar had not been achieved.
A superficial review of this phenomenon might suggest that the source of the
difficulty was the frontline plant operators and recommend a wholesale review of their
performance and dismissal as appropriate. However, setting aside the infeasibility of
such a solution in many of the affected facilities, a more careful consideration of the
problem could indicate that the responsibility forfailure to achieve the defined goals
falls on a much wider population. Was the design of the plant as clear, concise and
comprehensible as possible, given the task? Was the background, knowledge, aptitude
and attitude of those who would work with this equipment considered from the first
stages of design? Were any representatives of the work force involved in the design?
Were procedures and manuals designed with the work force in mind? Was training in
the principles of sewage treatment offered to the staff? Were provisions made to keep
the operators continually interacting with the system, rather than responding only to
aberrant behavior or emergencies?
As those questions should illustrate, a breakdown at the human—machine interface
that has a deleterious impact on the environment should very rarely be viewed as the
failure of one individual at the lower or lowest echelon of the chain of responsibility.
Rather, in these workshops, failure at this interface will be considered as a systemic
breakdown whose roots may have been laid in the earliest stages of system design and
may thread up to the highest levels of the responsible organization. The
human—machine interface, far from being considered as the interaction of one person
and one device with one impact (one man, one valve, one pollution incident) is more
frequently concerned with the interaction between the entire technical process and the
entire responsible human hierarchy.
These two workshops drew together experts in the area of human factors and
socio—technical interfaces with individuals from the nuclear regulatory, occupational
health and environmental quality agencies, labour unions, public interest groups, sewage
treatment plant operations, and representatives of the Science Advisory Board.
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 The first one-day workshop, held on April 14, 1986, defined the general areas of
interest, including design considerations, operations and training considerations and the
role of the regulatory agency and arrived at a number of generic findings.
Building on the output of the first workshop, the second workshop focused on a
particular aspect of pollution of the Great Lakes that traditionally has been largely
associated with human error; the extraordinary discharge or accidental release of
pollutants within the basin. In preparation for this second workshop, four working
papers addressing four aspects of the human—machine issue, People, Technology, Scope
and Programs, were drafted by selected participants in this second event.
This
workshop, held over one and one-half days on March 17 and 18 of 1987, gave rise to a
number of specific recommendations regarding spill accounting
and management
practices in the basin.
 3.0 DESCRIPTION OF THE WORKSHOPS
3.1 THE FIRST WORKSHOP: LAYING THE FOUNDATION
The first workshop was held over one day (April 14, 1985) at the offices of
the International Joint Commission (IJC) in Windsor, Ontario. It attracted
academic and corporate experts in the area of human behavior/human factors, with
a particular emphasis on the nuclear power generation field, as well as
administrators from the petrochemical industry and the environmental and
occupational health agencies. A complete listing of participants and their
affiliated organizations is attached to this report.
After an introduction to the workings of the UC in the Great Lakes basin, the
participants highlighted what they considered to be the relevant and essential
items they had learned in their experience with the human factor. The ensuing
discussion can be summarized under the following topics.
a. Design Considerations
There was common agreement that, in the construction of many facilities,
human factor design, if considered at all, is often treated as an afterthought
or an appended item. A dramatic example was cited to illustrate this: a
maintenance worker routinely cleaned and reassembled a valve every few
days on an oil—drilling platform in the North Sea. One day, after cleaning, he
replaced the valve in a reversed position. The resulting petroleum leak was
ignited and damage amounting to several million dollars resulted. In the final
analysis, the fault was determined not to be with the maintenance worker
who had performed the task well, numerous times, but with the design
engineer who had failed to create a design that would make such a reversal
impossible.
In considering the deployment of human factors personnel, their placement in
a number of groups working directly on the design was considered superior to
their isolation in a human factors group serving as consultants to other units.
In the former situation, human factor considerations would be incorporated
into a number of areas from the outset and both the human factor and other
personnel would be encouraged to continually consider it in the construction
and operation of the unit. The use of human-reliability data was considered
appropriate as long as it would be treated as indicative and inexact.
b. Operations and Training Considerations
There was a consensus of the need for better training, education, monitoring
and data collection. All too often, organizations succumb to the belief that
anyo
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on t
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Although such training methods frequently offer insights into how the task is
actually performed, they can unnecessarily elevate the level of risk of
procedural failure. A proper amount of training with the assistance of a
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nual
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advocated as much more effective.
It was recognized that formal educational requirements should match the
demands of a given position. If a high level of education and intelligence
were to be prerequisites for a given position, there would be a responsibility
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 to continually involve the individual in that position in the broader aspects of
his work. A need for the inclusion of human factors as part of the scientific
and engineering education at the university level was also identified.
Incident reporting and data collection were considered essential for the
development of a database for the accurate assessment of risk and the
adequacy of safeguards. Feedback should occur in a positive environment and
operators should be offered anonymity to encourage responses. Data should
be collected on both the accidents and incidents that could have had
significant repercussions. It was considered important to review the data
collection methodology to ensure that, while remaining comprehensible to the
individuals being questioned, the information collected would be relevant for
as many applications as practical. These applications include procedural
corrections, design modifications, identification of significant (and
insignificant) factors. The need for adequate inventory and loss record
keeping was also noted.
Feedback should be accompanied by appropriate task analysis. Such task
analysis, while reducing the risk associated with an operation, also frequently
may yield significant reductions in cost.
In discussing the encouragement of feedback, the need to implant a proper
attitude within an organization was emphasized. The success of the Smokey
the Bear campaign in affecting such an attitude shift was noted as was the
relative failure of campaigns associated with the voluntary use of seatbelts.
A need to recognize cultural differences, even within states and provinces,
was also noted. It was considered crucial that the message and the priority
shift among the public for control programs be endorsed and disseminated
from the upper echelon or pinnacle of an organization. The link among lax
operations, poor maintenance, poor public relations, elevated risks and
increased incidents has been demonstrated again and again.
The Role of the Regulatog Agency
The workshop attendees were of the opinion that jurisdictions should foster
an environment where the regulated can respond positively. The objective
should be to encourage self—regulation, with the threat of significant
financial loss in case of failure. Public involvement would be an important
part of any regulatory activity. The regulatory method should be clearly
explained to the public so that they have some grasp of the goals and
techniques being used by the agencies to control facilities of concern.
Regulatory bodies should also consider when it is appropriate to do research,
when to regulate and when to take no further action.
In establishing
regulations, often it would be best to leave the selection of precise control
methods
to those regulated.
However,
the regulatory body should set
tolerance levels and allowable frequencies of excursion from control.
The
goals of any regulation should be clarified among the regulated community to
the extent possible before enactment.
The current development of a decision framework
for toxic chemical
management for the Quebec government was also reviewed.
In Canada, it
was noted that there are 70 agencies with an interest in toxic chemicals.
Thus it would be necessary to identify all the significant factors and
participants as well as postulate their responses to any particular initiative.
It is important as well to distinguish between those with a technical interest
in the regulatory development and those with a nontechnical interest.
-10-
 (1. Preliminary Findings
In the course of one day, the participants had only an opportunity to define a
common approach to the topic of interest, advance some general findings
that could have a bearing on the control of Great Lakes contamination and
further narrow the focus of any future activities. Further development of
the topic, accompanied by additional interaction with the industrial and
municipal sectors of the Great Lakes community to ensure that findings of
any future workshops could be considered for implementation, was
recommended. However, the following generic recommendations were
extracted from the summary of the workshop.
i. The need for further training and sensitization of those who have the
potential to accidently contaminate the Great Lakes should be
reviewed. Training is used in a comprehensive sense to mean a
thorough grounding in the specifics of a particular activity, as well as a
communication of the broader impacts of such activity. Individuals
with experience in human factors' studies should be involved in such
training to ensure that it is effective and adapted to the actual
execution of the task.
ii. Incident prevention is most effective when it is endorsed actively by
the highest level in an organization. There often is a need for task
analysis and technology transfer in the area of human factors in
organizations that have the potential to pollute the lakes.
iii. There is a need to develop an enhanced database of information on
pollution incidents including both those having a significant impact and
those that had the potential for significant impact in the basin. Such a
database would assist in the setting of priorities for future preventative
efforts.
The methodologies for collecting this information should be reviewed to
ensure that the responses are of use to the widest range of persons
within the organization — human factor specialists, design engineers,
environmental control personnel, production supervisors, senior
management, etc. A no—fault system of reporting often engenders the
best response. Hazard audits prior to incidents may distinguish between
minor and major hazards and can be an effective part of such a
database development. Enhanced data on the amount of material losses
associated with process and storage should be a part of this effort.
iv. Those organizations with effective internal communications,
maintenance and planning mechanisms and a conducive work
environment also frequently have an excellent safety record. It is
likely that the same relationship could be demonstrated with regard to
good environmental stewardship.
v. Regulators should devote more effort to human factors in engineering
design and reviewing the appropriateness of regulations that mandate
and thus restrict the application of technology.
3.2 THE SECOND WORKSHOP: FOCUS ON GREAT LAKES SPILLS
Following a review of the discussion of the first workshop, the Science
Advisory Board agreed to sponsor a second Human—Machine Workshop, which would
-11-
place issues raised at the first workshop in a Great Lakes context and develop
specific recommendations for the consideration of the Board.
The Goal
The goal of the IJC Human—Machine Interface effort remained the
assessment and recommendation of steps to the jurisdictions to document and
overcome difficulties or breakdowns at the human—machine interface,
difficulties that could result in serious or catastrophic adverse effects on the
Great Lakes ecosystem. It was determined that this goal could be best
achieved through consideration of a particular concern and the impact of
extraordinary discharges, including spills, was selected for this purpose.
Objectives
The objectives of the second workshop were to develop and rank topics in
need of further attention in the Great Lakes basin, using the following
categories and the example of extraordinary discharges as a framework. The
categories were developed based on discussions at the first workshop and the
preparation of working papers for the second workshop was assigned to
selected participants. These papers were circulated to the participants in
advance of the Workshop to allow them an opportunity to prepare their
thoughts prior to the event and thus enhance the level of the discussion. The
authors were provided with the following guidance in the preparation of their
papers.
i. People
° Screening. The selection of appropriate personnel for positions
associated with technology using criteria such as education, prior
training, experience and written or oral testing or both. The use
of human factors expertise in the selection process.
Training. How are new employees trained; what tools and
methods are conducive to effective training, including the design
of manuals and interaction with experienced personnel; how can
effective incentives for improved skills, abilities and vigilance be
put in place; how can high—seniority employees be best retrained
to work with new technology; and what can be done if the
aptitude of the senior employee does not match well with the
technology? Where government licensing is a requirement, how
effective are the licensing programs; and do the licensing
authorities have adequate mechanisms in place to regulate
continuing practices of the licensee, such as the length of working
shifts for truck drivers and commercial pilots?
° Management. How are signs of stress, instability, drug
dependence (including alcohol) best detected and managed; how
are effective lines of communication established; how is job
performance best assessed; how is the boredom and inattention
often associated with routine tasks combatted; and how is a sense
of responsibility and stewardship best communicated?
ii. Technology
The essential question to be examined is how can technology be
designed to effectively anticipate and prevent a breakdown at the
human-machine interface and ensure the continuing proper functioning
-12..
  
 iii.
iv.
of the technology. Points to be considered include: human interaction
with technology; display of data (e.g. the limits to the amount of
visually-presented data that can be absorbed by humans); type of
control (incorporation of manual control or feel); accommodation of the
differences in computer—based decision—making and human—thought
processes; the extent to which the controller should understand the
functioning of the technology; the need to involve the human in the
routine control/execution cycle; use of appropriate alarm systems; and
checks and balances, particularly with other humans.
Scope
A first attempt at preparing a list of priorities to guide jurisdictions,
industries and universities in further deliberations was required in this
area.
The relative impacts of the various sources of pollution incidents such
as trucks, vessels and other forms of transportation; fixed installations
such as sewage treatment plants, chemical plants and generating
stations would be considered.
Through research, correspondence and telephone interviews with state,
provincial and federal agencies having jurisdiction in the Great Lakes
basin, as well as other sources of information and opinion about the
prevalence of discrete pollution incidents, the relative severity of
discrete pollution incidents and suggested priorities for further
consideration were determined.
Program
To advocate for government, industry, the academic community and the
public a more substantial effort in the prevention of human—machine
interface failures that could have a serious or catastrophic impact on
the Great Lakes ecosystem, the dimensions of the current situation
must be examined.
Under this area, the management of data relating to environmental
catastrophies, such as spills, fish kills and other adverse events, and the
extent to which these data are available or need to be collected,
analyzed and reported, was reviewed.
Based on this review and associated evidence, consideration was given
to the kind of priorities and techniques that have been or should be
established in terms of programs designed to prevent catastrophic
environmental events.
This activity should attempt to estimate, at least in part, the potential
impact of extraordinary pollution incidents (such as spills) from the
following sectors or activities:
° The transport of hazardous goods by means of air, water, road and
rail in the basin and the accident record and severity of the
associated impact (local and lake-wide) of activities in this sector
as a source of toxic pollutants to the system over the last decade.
The industries discharging in the basin, including the type of toxic
materials discharged and their compliance records with regard to
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 the
occurrence
and
prevention
of
pollution
incidents.
A
preliminary
estimation
of
what
enhanced
training
and
communication might contribute toward the reduction of the
environmental
insult
from
these
incidents
should
also be
attempted.
Pollution incidents from municipal treatment works, bypasses,
overflows and emergency shutdowns in the Great Lakes basin.
Pollution incidents from other users of Great Lakes waters -—
especially from the generation of electrical power (nuclear and
nonnuclear). The importance of pollution incidents involving toxic
substances from this source segment should also be estimated.
Through a review of the above assembled information, a list of priority
sectors or categories for the consideration of the workshop participants
was developed.
Structure
All participants received all four working papers prior to the conference for
their review. The workshop was held over one and one—half days on March 17
and 18, 1987 at the Great Lakes Regional office of the International Joint
Commission in Windsor, Ontario. The first morning was dedicated to a
discussion of the four working papers, associated questions and the
establishment of four workgroups to consider and review the papers in further
detail. These workgroups met privately in the afternoon of the first day to
develop findings and recommendations for the consideration of the entire
workshop.
The following morning, facilitators for the individual workgroups presented
their notes on common and specific findings to all the participants.
Recommendations and findings to be forwarded to the Science Advisory
Board were agreed upon. A list of participants (for both workshops) is given
in the Appendix.
Proceedings
After a brief review of the history of the International Joint Commission and
the development of the Science Advisory Board, the the findings of the first
Human-Machine Workshop and the preparations for the second were
summarized.
The decision to develop a more precise focus on the
human—machine topic by emphasizing, where appropriate, the impact of
extraordinary discharges to the Great Lakes basin was noted. It was hoped
that, at the end of the day—and—a—half workshop, a consensus on findings and
recommendations from the four topic areas could be developed for the
consideration of the Science Advisory Board.
In response to a call for other comments, Dr. Vanderburg emphasized that in
considering the possibility of the most catastrophic events, such as accidents
at nuclear power facilities, his perspective extended beyond the traditional
human factors considerations. In his view, some of these systems were so
complex and beyond total and absolute rational control that a certain number
of system or normal accidents in such facilities was inevitable.
Mr. Rubin noted his concern regarding the exemption of the Canadian nuclear
power generation industry from total liability for the consequences of a
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 nuclear
accident.
Mr.
Rubin‘s
organization,
Energy
Probe,
is
challenging this exemption
in
the
Canadian
courts.
The
utilities
maintain there is no demonstrable correlation between the extent of
liability and the duty of the nuclear industry to operate safely.
People
Following these comments,
Mr.
Tinsley of the
Federal
Aviation
Administration (FAA),
US.
Department of Transportation, gave a
précis of his working paper, People. The complete text of his paper can
be found in Chapter 5.
In his remarks, Mr. Tinsley focused on the many factors which could
contribute to human error, which is given as the cause of a great
majority of the aviation accidents in the United States. Although he
acknowledged that the term has no set and common definition, he
defined human factors engineering as the study of the physical,
physiological, psychological, psychosocial and pathological variables
that affect human performance.
Mr. Tinsley was of the opinion that the concepts of human factors
engineering have not yet achieved an impact in the management of the
FAA that they deserve, given the prevalence of human error in the
accident data collected to date. The Administration has conducted
workshops in human factors engineering, but in his opinion, to be
effective, the concept must penetrate more thoroughly to the working
level.
On the subject of employee screening, he noted that many of the
commercial pilots have come from the military and have been subjected
to extensive screening and that controllers must pass through a
screening test for aptitude and motivation; however, civilian pilots
frequently are not subjected to the same level of scrutiny. He noted
that the FAA is now screening for drug use, with the focus being on the
hard drugs rather than alcohol and marijuana.
The use of flight simulators for reexamining commercial pilots has
changed recently to include, on occasion, the entire flight crew.
Inclusion allows assessment of the crew's interaction under emergency
situations. He observed that although the lessons of experience can be
passed on, the transfer of judgement is often difficult.
The FAA has been endeavoring over the years to establish a
methodology for measuring workload. Although physical workload is
easily characterized, mental workloads and associated stresses are not.
Automation of the cockpit has lowered the physical workload and
forced crews and regulators to continually combat boredom.
In considering the applicability of the FAA experience to the area of
pollution control, he noted that one of the factors that works in favor
of the Administration is the explicit public concern with safety in
flight. Standards are the most rigorous of any in the transportation
field and deviations and errors can receive a good deal of public
scrutiny. Further education and public stimulation to a similar extent
in the area of pollution control and prevention could have the same
positive effect.
-15-
ii.
 
Dr.
Chri
sten
sen,
Univ
ersa
l E
ner
gy
Syst
ems
, a
ske
d h
ow
resp
onsi
ble
pers
onne
l c
an
be
cont
inua
lly
moti
vate
d,
part
icul
arly
in t
he t
radi
tion
ally
less
pres
tigi
ous
jobs
such
as a
ircr
aft
mai
nte
nan
ce,
Mr.
Tins
ley
felt
that
lea
der
shi
p
by
man
age
rs
was
ess
ent
ial
to
this
tas
k,
not
ing
tha
t
man
age
men
t
is
app
rop
ria
te
for
inv
ent
ori
es
but
peo
ple
mus
t
be
led.
Tho
se
who
set
the
cor
por
ate
goa
ls
and
obj
ect
ive
s m
ust
ext
end
the
m t
o
inc
lud
e
saf
ety
and
a r
esp
ons
ibi
lit
y f
or
the
env
iro
nme
nt
and
mus
t
iden
tify
and
rec
ogn
ize
thos
e i
ndiv
idua
ls
at
wha
tev
er
leve
l i
n t
he
orga
niza
tion
who
se
per
for
man
ce
is c
ruci
al t
o th
e a
chi
eve
men
t of
thes
e
goals.
In
com
men
tin
g
on
the
pres
enta
tion
, W
alt
er
Lyon
,
Univ
ersi
ty
of
Penn
sylv
ania
, no
ted
the
man
y va
luab
le l
esso
ns t
hat
can
be
lear
ned
fro
m
the
avia
tion
expe
rien
ce,
whe
re
the
leve
l o
f t
rain
ing
and
asso
ciat
ed
mon
ito
rin
g a
re g
ener
ally
high
. H
e a
ske
d t
hat
the
wor
kgr
oup
assi
gned
this
topi
c a
ddre
ss
othe
r a
reas
in t
he
Gre
at
Lak
es
basi
n t
hat
are
not
subj
ecte
d t
o t
he
sam
e l
evel
of
scru
tiny
, s
uch
as
the
tran
spor
t o
f
haz
ard
ous
sub
sta
nce
s b
y r
oad
, r
ail
and
sea
, t
he
ope
rat
ion
of
ind
ust
ria
l
and
muni
cipa
l w
ast
ewa
ter
tre
atm
ent
plan
ts
and
the
gene
rati
on
of
electricity.
Technology
Mr.
Har
old
Pri
ce
of
the
Ess
ex
Cor
por
ati
on
nex
t s
umm
ari
zed
the
sal
ien
t
poin
ts f
rom
his
wor
kin
g p
ape
r o
n T
ech
nol
ogy
. T
he
com
ple
te
pap
er c
an
be
fou
nd
in C
hap
ter
6.
He
not
ed
that
, in
gene
ral,
regu
lati
on
usua
lly
stim
ulat
es
man
age
men
t,
at
leas
t i
niti
ally
, a
s c
lien
ts
(inc
ludi
ng
the
public) come to recognize the resulting enhancements.
As a member of the Human Factors Society, Mr. Price was concerned
with the socio-environmental aspects of the workplace, including
training, education, screening and communications. His experience
indicated that human error is often a complex phenomenon best
addressed through a combination of factors such as system design,
organization, procedural modification and leadership.
His work has focused on the effective integration of technology into
human endeavors. He noted that the wholesale application of
technology to such endeavors is not always positive, particularly when
the technology is not well suited to human capabilities for recognition,
reasoning and retention. Human error he defines as a situation where a
human does something that is inappropriate or fails to do something
that is required. Instances of human error, both those with catastrophic
and ongoing insidious impacts, are seldom the result of individual
clumsiness and stupidity. Much of this error is design induced and could
be reduced or avoided altogether.
Studies have demonstrated that the application of human factors
considerations have a positive impact on the operations of an
organization, including profits. These considerations can enhance skill
levels and reduce training costs while increasing user acceptance of
new technology. Sabotage, misuse and abuse can be minimized or
avoided and retrofit requirements can be reduced.
Technology can be viewed as an attempt to replace humans
(automation) or to enhance and extend human activity, or both. Its
deployment must not be driven by the availability of the technology but
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rather by the needs of the user. Automation without consideration of
some of these factors can be a major disappointment, particularly when
the great part of the responsibility of the humans is to observe the
machine. People are generally proactive and thus are more open to
adaptive control systems that allow for some ongoing interaction with
the operator.
The term computer error is an illustration of a superficial and mistaken
assignment of responsibility. In a great majority of cases, what is
referred to as a computer error is ultimately a human error in hardware
or software assembly or definition of task. As more complex tasks are
assigned to these machines through multi-authored, multi—layered
programs, the likelihood of bugs in the software evading detection
during the verification process becomes significant. The computer also
is a dedicated program executive; unless interrupted, it will continue
with the task beyond the point where a human operator could well
perceive something wrong.
The comments following this presentation emphasized the need to
ensure that technology is the servant of humans and not vice versa.
There was some discussion of significance of attitude at the work place
and it was agreed that, with the exception of attempts to create a
positive attitude through the appropriate use of technology, variation in
attitude was a difficult factor to incorporate into a design. Dr. Jones,
US. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, emphasized the differences in the
performances of humans, noting that error variances are a function of
differences in individuals. Mr. Rubin commented on the need to
engender an appropriate corporate culture and voiced his opinion that
vigilance in the nuclear power generating industry may be
subconsciously dulled by that industry's repeated reassurances to the
public of the safety of their operations.
Scope
Mr. Wisdom of Wisdom Research Associates reviewed the contents of
his working paper, Scope. Of all the working papers, this one examined
data generated largely in the Great Lakes basin and thus developed very
specific findings and recommendations. The complete text of the paper
is in Chapter 7.
In focusing on the impact of spills and other extraordinary discharges in
the Great Lakes basin, the definition of discharge used was the one
found in Annex 8 of the 1978 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement:
means the introduction of polluting substances into
receiving waters and includes, but not limited to, any
spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting or dumping; it
does not include continuous effluent discharges from
municipal or industrial treatment facilities.
Thus, for example, the bypassing of wastewater bysewage treatment
plants due to chronic undercapacity or severe atmospheric precipitation
events was considered as an extraordinary discharge.
The 1978 Agreement further emphasizes control of oil and its various
forms, including but not limited to petroleum, fuel oil, oil sludge, oil
refuse and oil mixed with wastes, as well as specific hazardous polluting
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 substances —— chemicals that are toxic, lethal to animal life and pose a
real risk of discharge into the Great Lakes. A list of specific chemicals
under this category can be found on page 91 of the Scope paper in
Chapter 7.
The collection of data for consideration under this topic proved to be
complicated. Reasons included the inflexibility and incompatibility of
most of the systems logging data on extraordinary discharges and the
lack of data collection systems confined to a part or all of the Great
Lakes basin exclusively. Only discharges from the State of Michigan
could be considered as entirely within the basin; the balance of
jurisdictions had boundaries that were in part outside the basin. The
ongoing surveillance performed by the Water Quality Board of the
International Joint Commission , which relied largely on a joint US. and
Canadian Coast Guard report, did not adequately convey the impact of
oil and hazardous substance discharges on the basin.
The Scope paper provided an indication of the magnitude of
extraordinary discharges through a review of a number of databases
that provided coverage of either the entire Canadian or US portion of
the basin. Emphasis was placed on four distinct sectors:
transportation, industrial, municipal waste water treatment and energy
generation.
Current efforts by the US EPA to incorporate spill data from the
National Response Center and regional EPA operations into a single
database (called Emergency Response Notification System (ERNS))
were noted, but concerns regarding system flexibility and
comprehensiveness remained. For the purposes of this examination two
databases were reviewed: the Hazardous Materials Information System
(HMIS), maintained by the US. Department of Transportation and the
database associated with the National Response Centre (NRC) and
maintained by the US. Coast Guard. A search of the NRC database for
all spills to water in the eight Great Lakes states for 1984 listed almost
2,000 spills. All spills in the states (including those to water) for 1984
totaled 18,000 for the same time period.
An examination of spills related to transportation accidents for the
state of Michigan from the HMIS database indicated 203 spills, of which
27 were in excess of 25 gallons. The total volume of these larger spills
was approximately 9,000 gallons. A review of this database by the
Office of Technology Assessment of the US. Congress has found that
not all significant transportation accidents are noted in this database.
The Canadian National Data Base, maintained by Environment Canada
under the National Analysis of Trends in Emergency Systems (NATES),
was determined to be more flexible than comparable U.S. systems.
There were concerns regarding the entry of the most recent data from
the Province of Ontario, which would include data from the Great
Lakes basin.
However, significant quantities of oil and hazardous
materials,
including
sodium
hydroxide,
sulfuric
acid
and
oil
contaminated with PCBs, ranging from several tonnes to several
thousand tonnes, were identified as spilled in the Great Lakes basin for
the year 1984.
With the evolution of the Ontario Spill Action Centres and a related
computerized spill reporting system (using an entry protocol tailored to
the provinces' needs rather than that of NATES), simple transfer of
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data between the provincial and the federal system was no longer
possible. A new arrangement for entry of the Ontario data in the
national database is now under development by the two levels of
government.
A separate search of the Ontario database for spills to water was
performed and information on approximately 1,500 spills was retrieved.
However, 518 of these reports did not contain any information on
quantity. The largest entries were associated with overflows from
sewage treatment plants.
A very limited and selective comparison was made for quantities of
specific chemicals spilled into the waterways versus quantities of the
same chemical continuously discharged in industrial effluent. The
selected chemical was styrene; in one case the amount spilled by an
industry in one incident was equivalent to that contained in
one—and—a—half years of continuous effluent. In the second case, the
amount was equivalent to almost 1,500 years of continuous discharge.
Although far from conclusive, this limited examination suggested that
the impact of spills could deserve the same level of examination as is
given to contaminant point sources in the basin.
Mr. Wisdom also examined extraordinary discharges from combined
sewer overflows of municipal sewer systems. He noted that such
overflows were a very significant contributor (in excess of 800 tonnes)
to phosphorus loadings in the Great Lakes. These combined sewer
overflows were also sources of toxic contaminants such as PCBs and
other organic and metallic compounds. Again, there were indications
that the record of such overflows and treatment plant bypasses was
incomplete.
In reviewing selected data on the power generation industry, Mr.
Wisdom found that this industry was the source of significant spills of
organic contaminants to the basin. With regard to the nuclear power
industry, he noted that the IJC has reviewed data on the release of
radioactivity since 1975. The US. emission data does not specify how
radioactive releases compare to allowable limits, whereas the Canadian
reports do. For 1981 and 1982, the amounts of radioactivity released
from Canadian facilities totalled less than 1% of the allowable limit.
The IJC also monitored incidents at nuclear power generating and
related facilities that resulted in unplanned releases of radioactivity.
Over the 1981—82 period, one incident was reported for the 13 US.
reactors in the basin and nine incidents reported for the nine reactors
at three generating stations in Canada. Six incidents were reported for
fuel processors and users. The IJC committee overseeing these
unplanned releases ceased to function with the completion of its 1983
report; a report is now under preparation by IJC staff using data
supplied by the jurisdictions. It should be noted that there is no
common definition between the two federal jurisdictions of what
constitutes an unplanned release; thus, the information offered on
releases should not be considered as indicative of the comparative state
of operational control within the nuclear energy sectors of the two
countries.
The working paper also reviewed the incident reports from the US.
nuclear safety information database and presented information on the
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number of License Event Reports at US. nuclear power facilities in the
Great Lakes basin. Specific events that increased the probability of
damage to the reactor core were also presented. The report concluded
that the IJC should become more active in their overview of these
facilities.
Program
Mr. Bissett of Environment Canada and Mr. Weaver, an environmental
engineering consultant from Cincinnati, Ohio, presented a synopsis of
their findings on jurisdictional efforts to prevent catastrophic
environmental events and reduce extraordinary discharges. The full
text of their working paper can be found in Chapter 8.
Mr. Bissett noted that the working paper was concerned with
mechanisms for the identification of hazards and the assessment of
risk. It also reviewed the adequacy of available record keeping and
information systems for dealing with unplanned or extraordinary
releases of hazardous materials into the environment. He noted that
major catastrophic or potentially catastrophic events such as those at
Love Canal, Bhopal, Seveso, Mississauga and the Rhine River have
largely motivated various regulatory programs, such as the Superfund
Program, the Ontario Spills Bill and recent action by the World Bank, to
include hazard analysis as part of their funding decision process.
Reference was also made to the Toxic Catastrophe Prevention Act,
passed by the State of New Jersey in 1986. This act requires
notification or registration of facilities involved in any way with an
extremely hazardous substance. A state agency will review risk
assessments and management plans of those firms dealing with such
substances. The Transport of Dangerous Goods Act of Canada was also
referred to in this discussion.
In reviewing initiatives of nongovernmental groups, the efforts of the
US. Chemical Manufacturers Association in their 1,500 Community
Awareness — Emergency Response (CAER) programs were noted. These
community outreach programs are sponsored by individual companies to
ensure that the community recognizes the potential hazards and
understands what is being done to reduce the risk and to provide
adequate emergency response plans and capabilities.
A parallel development in Canada is the Canadian Chemical
Manufacturing Association's Responsible Care program, which involves
senior plant management in development of a Code of Good Practice
for their operations, including transport and community response.
With regard to the question of spills response and inventories, the
working paper indicated that a number of organizations are active in
the collection of spill data. However, in addition to the difficulties in
retrieval and manipulation determined by Mr. Wisdom, there were
indications that a significant number of spill events may not have been
stored in appropriate database systems. Repeated reference was made
to the study done by the Office of Technology Assessment, US.
Congress, on the transportation of hazardous materials. This study
found that truck transport is the sector with the least complete
database, although it accounts for 86% of the incidents of accidental
discharge.
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 Mr. Weaver also noted that several states, including Illinois,
Pennsylvania, New York, California and New Jersey, are developing
inventories of hazardous materials, at least partly in response to
demands for a community right—to—know. There was a consensus that
legislation responding to this right—to— know issue would undoubtedly
become more common in various jurisdictions in North America,
including those in the Great Lakes basin.
In response to a query regarding the extent to which spills go
unreported, it was noted that the Office of Technology Assessment
study compared data maintained by the State of Washington to that
contained in the HMlS database and found that only 20% of the spills in
HMIS had been reported to the state. Only 18% of the spills reported to
the state were included in HMIS. Similarly, the 1986 Ontario data on
spills show a very substantial increase over that available from the 1985
NATES record and a good portion of this increase is undoubtedly clue to
the greater awareness of a reporting requirement on the part of the
responsible parties.
Discussion ensued regarding the use of human factors in the labelling of
hazardous materials and it was determined that there was a need to
apply the knowledge gained in this area to the development of such
labels.
It was also noted that the fragmentation of jurisdiction has an impact
on the quantity and quality of data collected. For example, the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission in the US. has control over the shipment of
most radioactive material, but does not regulate the less radioactive
isotopes, such as radium.
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4.0 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE WORKGROUPS
People Workgroup Members: Dr. J. Christensen, Guice Tinsley, Stuart Sullivan,
Dave Stephenson and John McDonald.
In his presentation of the findings of the People workgroup, Dr. Christensen noted
there was evidence that the selection and certification process had broken down in
the transportation sector, elevating the risk of accidental releases of hazardous
materials to the environment. He cited the current licensing practices for transport
drivers in several of the United States and noted concern with the chain of
responsibility and the extent of awareness of possible consequences associated with
the transportation of hazardous goods.
The group identified a need for appropriate selection and training methods, including
both initial and ongoing training to establish new skills and maintain proficiency.
Training procedures must recognize and allow for the fact that there is no one best
way of performing any task, but ratherthe individual will, to some extent, tailor task
execution to his aptitudes and personality. There must also be a recognition of the
capabilities of the audience addressed by training devices such as manuals. For
example, the average work force reads at approximately the seventh grade level and
some alteration in the content of any training manual or a workplace remedial
reading program may be appropriate. Positions requiring ongoing vigilance and skill
maintenance often benefit from the inclusion of simulation exercises as part of the
regular work program. For effective training, the organization must become
sensitive to the work force and their requirements.
Modern selection methods are now frequently adequate to predict the success of a
given applicant in a given task, providing the requirements of the task are accurately
defined. Consideration should be given to the more widespread use of such selection
methods. In summary, the workgroup offered the following recommendations:
a. Every attempt should be made to include the ultimate operators in the design of
equipment and facilities.
b. Training should encompass not only how the machine works, as described from
an operator's perspective, but also how people work; that is, a consideration of
interpersonal interaction. Training should be performed by people with a
demonstrated aptitude for teaching. The importance of the operator should be
recognized and acknowledged through job enrichment and a diversity of
challenges. Knowledge should be shared within the organization, not hoarded.
c. Senior management or their equivalent must set standards for a given
organization and repeatedly reflect a commitment to those standards. The
evolution of a corporate ethic is crucial to an effective pollution control
program.
d. Although good lines of communication among all levels of an effective
organization is an obvious necessity, there should be provision for
confidentiality where appropriate, particularly in the investigation of a
narrowly adverted spill or near accident. The focus should be kept on
prevention rather than on correction.
e. The IJC should encourage the development of legislation to protect the worker
or operator from reprisals for refusing to execute nonroutine tasks that would
pollute the environment.
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Training should be enhanced, particularly at the operational level, to
communicate the overall picture regarding pollution, including legal restrictions
and their rationale, and the consequences of individual actions.
The provision of an adequate scheme for product retirement and ultimate
disposal should be a part of the development and approval process of any
product. In particular, the public should be presented with viable options for
the disposal of household products.
Workgroup Members: Harold Price, Drs. William Vanderburg, Geoff
Wright and George Peters.
The recommendations of the workgroup were summarized as follows:
a.
Scope
Investigations and analyses of selected pollution incidents using specialists in
human factors and socio—technical systems should be conducted to determine
the related causal factors in pollution discharges.
The use of a total system approach, including human factors and
socio—technical considerations, to all Great Lakes pollution problems should be
encouraged.
Consideration of human factors engineering should be included early in the
design of new systems or equipment or in the retrofit of older systems or
equipment.
A uniform or standard pollution hazard information system should be developed
for use on warnings, labels, placards, displays and material safety data sheets.
Warnings should emphasize nonverbal or nonlanguage information. In addition,
human factors data, techniques and tests should be used to assure the
effectiveness of these pollution prevention messages.
The UC should sponsor research into the development of specific human factors
design criteria, as applied to pollution alarms, pollution monitoring systems,
annunciators and other instrumentation, to ensure that releases of pollution are
controlled at the source.
The 1.1C should perform studies to ensure that automation is only implemented
after a deliberate and effective allocation of functions between humans and
machines. Appropriate information about the system and cognitive support to
the user must be included in the design.
The IJC should develop a formal communication system directed at all potential
polluters to assure that guidance information on human error, prevention,
human factors design criteria and technology transfer will occur on a timely
basis.
A shift in regulatory emphasis away from precise prescriptions of required
actions and toward defining goals for management, with some flexibility in the
methods used to attain them, could be more productive in protecting the
env1ronment.
Workgroup Members: Mr. Ken Reeves, Dr. Harold Quinn, Prof. Ted
Manzig, Dr. Jack Vallentyne, Mr. Jerry Wisdom.
In an assessment of the problem of satisfactory delineation of the human factors
associated with spills to the environment, the major deficiency identified has been
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the inadequacy of the available databases.
jurisdictions are both incomplete and inconsistent with respect to the data reported.
Furthermore, any information related to the human factor, if present at all, is usually
not sufficiently definitive to allow analysis for the purpose of identifying preventive
action.
The existing databases from different
Findings:
a. There is no precisely defined spill inventory for the Great Lakes basin.
Currently available inventories follow jurisdictional boundaries and in the
majority of cases of computerized record storage and maintenance, the
supporting software is not designed to provide basin specific searches.
b. There is evidence of incomplete reporting of spills in the Great Lakes basin and
a lack of liaison among those charged with maintaining spills databases.
c. Several of the U.S. databases, particularly those maintained at the National
Response Centre and the Hazardous Material Information System, are inflexible
and not amenable to efficient and effective data retrieval. The federal
Canadian system is a more sound design; however, a delay in the storage of
current spill data from the Province of Ontario was evident.
d. With the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency moving to centralize spill data
in a database called Emergency Response Notification System (ERNS), the U C
should attempt to bring the Parties and jurisdictions together to design flexible,
efficient spills databases for the basin.
Recommendations:
.3. To enable the IJC to effectively use the databases, it is recommended that the
Commission work with all appropriate jurisdictions to develop and implement
use of a uniform definition of a spill for reporting purposes.
b. The IJC should encourage the appropriate jurisdictions to impose a statutory
duty to report all spills meeting the agreed upon definition.
c. The IJC should recommend the adoption of a uniform reporting format by all
jurisdictions involved and offer to coordinate efforts to achieve such a format.
(1. The above reporting format should include requirements for adequate reporting
of human factors data. The Nuclear Precursor Study undertaken by the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission could provide guidance in achieving such
reporting.
e. The IJC should study the human factors data gleaned from any upgraded
databases and initiate research on preventive measures.
f. Complementary to these activities, it is recommended that the IJC encourage
jurisdictions to engage in public education programs related to the reporting
and prevention of spills.
Workgroup Members:
and Mr. Norm Rubin.
Program Mr. Ed Piché, Mr. Leo Weaver, Mr. Wayne Bissett
To recommend and prioritize programs and initiatives that are designed to minimize
or prevent the occurrence of catastrophic environmental events, five areas of
activity are identified:
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 Encourage national and international emergency prevention plans by focusing on
and encouraging local leadership.
The
Commission
should
encourage
Great
Lakes
jurisdictions
to
provide
resources and guidance to the local communities so that they can take the lead
responsibility in planning and executing emergency response by advocating:
0
prevention and minimization of risk;
proactive as well as reactive planning initiatives; and
compatibility of data and procedures with respect to spill, hazard
identification and response protocols.
Effective local leadership would involve integrating the response of police,
firemen,
environmental
officers,
health
officials,
politicians,
industry
representatives, citizen groups, media and emergency planners. This
integration should be given a high priority, as this level may be tested first and
most strenuously in any given emergency.
Foster right—to—know legislation
The IJC should advocate that all Great Lakes states and provinces pass
right—to—know legislation. The Commission should define, or at least outline,
the essential elements of acceptable right—to-know legislation. Such legislation
should be consistent among jurisdictions to as great an extent as possible and
should include, as a minimum, hazardous substance identification, quantities,
location, chemical form and mode of impact, including physiological
implications.
The IJC should advocate the compilation of an inventory of all hazardous
materials, including hazardous wastes, in the basin. This inventory should
include both chemical manufacturers and users and nuclear power plants and
transportation activities linked
to both.
The
IJC
should encourage
consideration of the question of responsibility and liability in the event of a
disaster involving hazardous substances.
The IJC should continue to ensure that various concepts of risk and methods of
risk assessment are debated publicly.
The Commission should advocate a public component to risk assessment and
ensure that all risk discussions consider societal as well as individual risks. The
UC should not confine these discussions of risk to the water medium but rather
consider the combined risk of human and animal exposure by means of
inhalation, dermal, food and drinking water pathways.
The Commission should continue and enhance current communication initiatives.
The IJC should continue to foster communication and consultation on all
relevant issues at all levels by:
providing appropriate fora for professional
contacts; publishing annual reports; and providing library and information
distribution
services.
The
Commission
should ensure that objectivity is
maintained throughout such activities.
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4.5 Other
The workshop also recognized that modern technology is inextricably linked to human
beings, groups and organizations in the many socio-technical systems characteristic
of any industrially advanced society. It is recommended that those who design, build,
operate and maintain these systems be trained not only to achieve excellence in their
area of specialization, but also to appreciate how their specialization contributes to
the socio—technical performance of the whole system.
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INTRODUCTION
This background paper is prepared for the second Human—Machine
Interface
Workshop Planning Committee of the International Joint Commission. I will attempt to
address, in a limited way, the following five areas:
O
aviation human factors;
0
role of the human in future aviation systems;
0
regulatory climate;
. O
personnel practices; and,
0
recommendations on planning.
5.1 AVIATION HUMAN FACTORS
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) reports and other literature contain the
comment that human factors are the last unexplored frontier in aviation safety.
Whether it's the last frontier remains to be seen, but what is clear at this time, is
that too much of the field of human factors and its influence on safety have eluded
past study attempts, adequate documentation of study results or both. To make
matters worse, there are also indications that even the term human factors has no
set definition. For the purposes of this discussion, by human factors, I mean the
study of the physical, physiological, psychological, psychosocial and pathological
variables that affect human performance. The term human factors engineering is
the application of the knowledge of human factors to the design of devices,
systems and environments to optimize the safety, efficiency and the general
well—being of the persons who interact with them.
Certainly, consideration for human factors in aviation safety is not new.
Its
influence in systems design and operational procedures can readily be seen in all
elements of aviation. What is new, however, is the need to evaluate the effects of
rapidly changing roles of human operators interfacing with new technology systems
and changing operating procedures.
This need is vividly expressed in National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
accident data. For the period 1972-76, in 84% of all accidents, the pilot was the
causal factor. For this same period, the pilot was the causal factor for 88% of all
fatal accidents. In air carrier operations for the 10—year period 1968—77, the pilot
was the causal factor in 62.6% of all fatal accidents. In contrast, powerplant
failure accounted for 4.7% of all fatal accidents for the ten—year period 1968-77 in
air carrier operations.
This dramatic improvement in engine reliability resulted
from the adoption of new technology systems. A similar effort has not been made
to reduce human error or to analyze fully the human factors/safety relationship.
The earliest safety—related human factors data and criteria were empirically
derived from operational experience. Besides being very inefficient, this technique
has serious accuracy and documentation limitation.
Establishment of acceptable
workload levels and specifications with this technique is difficult at best.
Although recent approaches to human factor studies have identified new techniques
to improve the quality of crew work load assessment, it appears that there is no
single technique by which total work
load can be determined.
Work load
measurement techniques are even more elusive.
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5.2
This is a concern to the Agency for new aircraft certification, where
determinations must be made regarding the combination of work load measurement
techniques needed in the certification process. Additional complications arise
when considering factors associated with new technology aircraft systems.
The limitations and validity of available work load measurement techniques must
be understood and expressed so that we and the aircraft manufacturers clearly
understand the tools available. No documentation exists to provide this
information.
Furthermore, the traditional concepts of work load influence on safety have
associated high work loads with lower safety levels and low work loads with higher
safety levels. Strict adherence to these concepts is being challenged. Data
suggesting that work load that is too low or too high can be both detrimental to
safety is beginning to emerge.
In response to this challenge, the FAA must develop an understanding of the work
load/safety relationships. In assessing the work load safety relationship, there is a
need to develop new human factors criteria. The development of human factors
criteria will support the adoption of advanced technology such as innovative
aircraft systems, electronic displays and new flight operational concepts. These
developments are expected to generate new pilot functions and operational
considerations. The development of computer and computer graphic displays and
applications now outstrip our understanding of how controllers and pilots can use
this technology to achieve optimum performance.
ROLE OF THE HUMAN IN THE FUTURE AVIATION SYSTEM
To properly deal with this subject would require an iterative process that would
allow adjustments to the human role to occur as the new system evolves. However,
there are several important areas to consider. In defining the role of the human in
the future system, we need to evaluate:
a. Selection and Training Procedures for Controllers. The FAA has continued to
revise written tests and training techniques for control specialists. These
instruments and procedures have resulted in reduced attrition during training
and assisted in the orderly replacement of those controllers who were on
strike. For example, a recent before and after comparison of Academy pass
rate using new tests versus old tests indicates that the success rate improved
from 43% to 71%.
b. Proficiency Measurement Requirements. With large numbers of newly
trained controllers entering the work force, there is an increasing need to
develop reliable, valid and objective methods to certify their performance.
These measurement techniques will, of course, have to be revised when the
new, more automated, equipment is installed.
c. Pilot's Judgement Training. This topic appears to offer great promise in
lowering the numbers of pilot error accidents. The FAA, in conjunction with
the Canadian government and the General Aviation Manufacturer's
Association, has developed and is evaluating training manuals and procedures
for student and instructor pilots. We are also monitoring recent related
developments by NASA and some airlines in the flight deck resource
management area.
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d. Information Transfer.
Safety Reporting System suggests that communication and information
transfer between flight crew members and controller is a major problem.
The application of new technology should be of value here.
A review of the accident statistics and Aviation
e. Work Load Measurement and Control. The aircraft and the ATC equipment
designers continue to refine methods of measuring and controlling operator
work load. The FAA had to administratively restrict the National Airspace
System temporarily after the controller strike by reducing the total number
of flights and introducing flow control to avoid peak period overloads. This
resulted in, among other things, a reduction of the controller workweek from
a maximum of 50—p1us hours immediately after the strike to less than 44
hours at present.
e. The Effects of Fatigue and Desynchronosis. The economic necessity of
operating aircraft across time zones and control systems around the clock
produces concomitant problems for the operators. While the FAA, NASA and
others have not yet been able to establish with great accuracy the degree
that the phenomenon degrades human performance, the topic will continue to
be of great interest to all concerned.
f. Alcohol and Drugs. Although alcohol and drug abuse continues to be a factor
in about 7% and 5%, respectively, of general aviation fatal accidents, there is
little evidence that substance abuse is a growing problem in the aviation
community. We must, however, continue to develop and monitor drug and
alcohol use because of widespread acceptance of nonprescription drugs and
the relatively high incidence of substance abuse by the general public.
g. Human Relations. As a result of the controllers' strike, the FAA work
environment for all employees was examined by a group of outside labour
management experts. The FAA has undertaken a number of programs to
improve the work environment, particularly in areas of internal
communication training.
REGULATORY CLIMATE
I think you will be interested in a brief overview of the regulatory environment we
are creating in the federal sector to accommodate and respond to the challenges of
the future.
For the past several years, there has been concern over the growing pervasiveness
of the federal establishment. This concern came to focus on rules that intruded
directly into people's lives at nearly every level —— our families, their education,
our homes, our businesses and more. Forces that favored a stronger federal role
were countered by forces that sought to rein in pervasive government —— the latter
largely through indirect restraint on federal rulemakers. Through the '705,
lawmakers and chief executives put more and more discipline into the rulemaking
process. Congress passed various pieces of legislation designed to remove or
relieve regulatory burdens on the aviation industry and the public. The Airline
Deregulation Act, the Regulatory Flexibility Act and the Paperwork Reduction Act
are examples of such legislation.
President Reagan's Executive Order 12291, issued February 17, 1981, reflects the
clearly stated objectives of the current federal administration:
0
to reduce the burdens of existing and future regulations;
_32_
 to increase agency accountability for rulemaking actions;
to provide for presidential oversight of the regulatory process;
to minimize duplication and conflict of regulations; and
(most importantly)
to ensure well—reasoned regulations.
The Executive Order sets out five specific requirements rulemakers such as the
FAA must meet in proposing or adopting new rules or reviewing existing rules:
° Administrative decisions shall be based on adequate information
concerning the need for and consequences of proposed government
action.
Regulatory action shall not be undertaken unless the potential benefits
to society from the regulation outweigh the potential cost to society.
Among alternative approaches to any given regulatory objectives, the
alternative involving the least net cost to society shall be chosen.
Agencies shall set regulatory priorities with the aim of maximizing the
aggregate net benefits to society, taking into account the conditions of
the particular industry affected by the regulations, the condition of the
national economy and other regulatory actions contemplated for the
future.
The regulation must be clearly within the authority delegated by law
and consistent with congressional intent.
The factual conclusion upon which the rule is based has substantial
support in the agency record viewed as a whole, with full attention to
public comments in general and the comments of persons directly
affected by the rule in particular.
I have spent some time on what the federal government has done to reduce the
burden of regulation. Now, I want to share some of the guidance we have received
from the FAA Administrator. The purpose of the FAA is to provide for the
regulation and promotion of civil aviation. I
How do we do this? Again, the Administrator's words:
0
"We should control, but not constrain";
"We should regulate, but not interfere with free enterprise or competitive
- purposes"; and
"We should recognize that most air travelers do so by means of scheduled air
carriers. We have a responsibility to consider their priority, but not to the
extent that excludes the single individual from enjoying man's greatest
achievement —— solo flight."
I want to briefly touch on several aspects of the FAA's program to improve their
response to the safety regulatory aspects of the Federal Aviation Act and to
concurrently reduce the regulatory burden on the industry and the public, while
simultaneously providing a regulatory environment that fully complements our
system planning.
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5.4
° The FAA
establishing
air
transportation
safety
regulations.
Under
a
new
concept
entitled
Regulation
by
Objectives
(RBO),
the
FAA
would
substitute
broadly
stated
safety objectives
for
many
of
its detailed regulations.
is
considering
a
significant
change
in
its
method
of
Regulation
by
objective
has
two
major
goals:
°
to
continue
the
high
level
of
safety
that
has
made
the
United
States
Aviation
Regulatory
Standards
a
model
for
almost
every
aviation
regulatory body in the world; and,
to provide
regulatory
flexibility
so
that
the
aviation
industry
will
not
be
impeded
in
developing
innovative
methods
for
achieving
the
level
of
safety
thus
far
maintained
under
federally
established
safety
objectives.
The
"what"
portion
of
these
regulatory
parts
has
been
separated
out
and
cited
as
safety
objectives
that
have
been
incorporated
into
a
proposed
new
air
transportation
regulation.
The
old
regulatory
provisions
have
been
left
as
regulatory
guidelines.
The
proposed
rule
is
intended
to
provide
much
needed
flexibility
for
the
aviation
community
through
specifically
tailored
rules
as
desired
by
individual operators.
The
FAA
has
long
taken
pride
in our
nonadversarial
relationship
with
the
aviation
industry.
However,
with
the
increased
emphasis
on
reducing
or
eliminating
the
federal
regulatory
burden,
combined
with
a requirement
to do
more
with
less staff,
we
are
looking
for greater
emphasis
on
direct
participation
by
industry's
special
interest groups in the rulemaking and enforcing programs.
In
addition
to
the
major
overhaul
of
our
regulatory
structure,
we
now
have
a
comprehensive
plan
for
modernization
and
improving
air
traffic
control
and
airway
facilities
services
from
now
to
the
year
2000.
It
was
published
in December
1981
and is updated yearly.
The
plan
addresses
the
compelling
problems
of
how
best
to
accommodate
the
spiraling
demand
for
aviation
service,
constrain
costs,
recast
the
technical
framework
and
deal
with
aging facilities.
The
plan
also
delineates
specific
improvements
to
facilities
and
equipment
and
supporting
research
and
development
associated
with
the
National
Airspace
System.
Particular
emphasis
is
given
to
terminal
and
en
route
air
traffic
control,
flight
service
stations
and
weather
services,
ground-to—air
services,
inter—facility
communications
and
auxiliary
services
such
as
airway
facilities
maintenance
and
flight
inspection
of
navigational
aids.
The
recurrent
theme
throughout
the
plan
is
that
safety,
capacity,
productivity
and
economy
will
be
chiefly
realized
through
higher
levels
of
automation,
consolidation
of
major
facilities
and
the
application
of
rapidly changing and
lower
cost
technologies in telecommunications.
PERSONNEL PRACTICES
Regulatory
agencies
have
three
avenues
of
dealing
with
the
regulated
population.
These
processes
include
selection,
training
and
compliance
with
the
regulatory
documents.
Historically,
in
aviation,
the
selection
process
requires
that
specific
criteria
be
met
for
licensing.
Recently,
some
form
of
screening
has
been
additionally required.
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 The
government
is expanding the substance abuse control program.
The FAA
has
initiated a drug testing program that requires all employees who
normally take an
annual physical to submit to urine testing. Random tests are also conducted when
there appears to be just cause or in the event of accidents/incidents.
Prior studies in the Department of Transportation indicate that substance abuse in
the aviation industry is not much different from that in the general population.
Approximately 15% of the population involved in transportation may be considered
drug dependent.
Of these 15%, alcohol encompasses 90% of the users, with
marijuana usage at 8%. Other drugs that get a lot of notoriety (cocaine, PCP) are
only used by one or 2%
of aviation personnel.
The preferred drugs are not
randomly distributed but are age—related, which also puts users into occupation
categories. Pilots and mechanics are generally older than other airline employees
and alcohol is their major problem, while flight attendants are more likely to abuse
marijuana or cocaine. Some drugs are used on the job to improve performance and
alertness, while others are used recreationally.
Many companies conduct drug screening. In some skills, because of the shortage
and difficulty of obtaining new employees, some drug usage is allowed. Urinalysis
is the most common type of testing and does show evidence of drug usage but not
the amounts involved.
A successful screening program should consider the following:
a. The government/company should formulate a policy about drug abuse that
spells out why it is unacceptable and how it will be addressed;
b. It should communicate that policy to employees;
c. It should encourage and support supervisors in the active identification and
referral of problem workers and allow for self—referral, by peers and by
management.
d. It should locate treatment and rehabilitation resources for its employees;
e. It should institute follow—up procedures to ensure that the employee's
condition is being treated and that, insofar as possible, the workplace
supports the recovery process; and,
f. It should define enforceable and appropriate alternatives (reassignment, early
retirement, termination, disability) for those employees who are unwilling or
unable to successfully return to full function.
Training requirements can be very detailed and specific or in some cases can be
defined as a desired outcome. The FAA is now frequently legislating the latter by
imposing the phrase, "Train to a demonstrated performance level." The use of
flight simulators and the resulting training flexibility permitted with these devices
allows a realistic evaluation ofpilot performance.
Attaining the desired level of regulatory compliance is the most difficult act to
accomplish. Many times good regulations are misunderstood or intentionally
misinterpreted. Frequently, rules are violated because they create operational
inefficiencies that the operators elect to avoid. To create an atmosphere of a high
level of compliance, regulations must be valid, realistic, understood and a
control/injection mechanism is needed to measure the lack of compliance and
impose appropriate penalties.
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 5.5 PLANNING
In planning for improved safety and to enhance the environment in and around the
Great Lakes, I suggest a two part effort. The first phase would be a short term
effort (one to two years) to establish programs and efforts to resolve these
problems that are widely acknowledged and fall under some agency or government
jurisdiction for control. Also, establish a media campaign that highlights this very
important effort to avoid conditions that may adversely affect the Great Lakes
ecosystem. In the short term, relationships must be established with the people or
organizations who exercise control over sectors creating the problems. Human
behavior can only be changed by changing the pressures on the individual. In the
second or long term phase, a detailed plan should establish the approach to
determine the issues to be resolved, the process for resolution resource
requirements, schedule and follow—up action to assure that overall objectives are
being met.
Human performance enhancement deserves an elevated priority.
Increased
understanding and better application of present knowledge in human factors areas
will result in gains in safety. More time should be allocated to determine the root
causes of operator errors. If we can find out why the individual errs, we can ensure
future avoidance of operator errors by changing methods, practices or the
application of complex systems and hardware.
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 INTRODUCTION
Recent disasters such as Three Mile Island (TMI—Z), Bhopal, the Rhine River
pollution and Chernobyl have all resulted in accidental releases of hazardous materials
and have all involved human error. These and similar events have led to a growing need
to focus attention on current and potential contamination of the Great Lakes basin as a
result of breakdowns at the Human—Machine Interface (HMI). As a result of this
concern, the International Joint Commission (IJC) formed by the governments of the
United States and Canada to reverse contamination of the Great Lakes basin,
established a Human—Machine Interface Workshop to assess and recommend steps to
overcome HMI problems that may result in serious or catastrophic effects on the Great
Lakes ecosystem.
 
The next Workshop meeting is scheduled for March 17 and 18, 1987. This working
paper helps focus awareness of the HMI problem for the Workshop participants and
establishes priorities for further work. It deals with technology and addresses the
following question:
How can technology be integrated into system design to prevent a breakdown
at the human—machine interface that could result in adverse effects on the
Great Lakes ecosystem?
For those unsure of the boundaries of the Great Lakes basin, the following
definition is provided by Great Lakes United of Buffalo, New York:
The Great Lakes—St. Lawrence River basin contains the watersheds of Lake
Superior, Lake Michigan, Lake Huron, Lake Erie, Lake Ontario and the St.
Lawrence River.
° Together the Great Lakes—St. Lawrence River form the largest surface
expanse of fresh water in the world and 95% of the fresh water in the
United States.
The basin is home to 45 million Americans and Canadians.
The sports fishery has a regional economic benefit of 1.16 billion dollars
annually.
Twenty—four million people get their drinking water from the Great Lakes.
There are 9,400 miles of coastline in the basin.
Cargo shipped by vessel on the Great Lakes exceeds 100 million tonnes
per year.
a. Background and Premise
The first meeting of the IJC I-IMI Workshop was held April 14, 1986. The premise of
the Workshop follows.
Incidents such as Three Mile Island, the recent Canadian train crash in
Alberta and on a less acute level, the identification by the IJC and
others of the need to improve the performance of wastewater treatment
plants, all involve the interaction of humans and machines. Human
failure is often inadequately identified as the cause of the above and
related incidents.
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 What are the design and operating elements that could be improved to
enhance routine operations and avoid the catastrophic?
A summary of the proceedings from the first workshop was prepared and a decision
to conduct a second meeting of the workshop participants was made. In addition, a
decision was made to prepare four working papers, of which this is one.
The purposes of this paper are to first and foremost heighten the awareness of the
workshop participants and other readers about the importance of the HMI and how
it relates to controlling accidental releases of hazardous materials into the Great
Lakes basin. This paper will also attempt to provide background information for
the topic of technology and HMI effectiveness; technology and human factors
issues will be identified to help prioritize future work in the HMI area. Although
this paper concentrates on new designs, latent HMI problems (or human error) in
existing systems should notbe overlooked. The fundamental issues are the same.
The Problem
No attempt will be made to define the scope of the pollution problem in the Great
Lakes basin, as this is the topic of another working paper. However, on the
assumption that some people may read this paper without the benefit of the other
working papers or the Charter of the 1.] C, some eneral comments of the
magnitude of accidental releases of hazardous materials will be presented.
After the tragic accident in Bhopal on December 3, 1984, the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (US. EPA) decided to establish an Acute
Hazardous Events (AHE) database. The database is to be used to characterize the
kinds of events releasing acutely toxic substances in the U.S., the substances
involved and the causative factors leading to their release (see EPA Interim Report
560-5—85—029). The Interim Report, released in December 1985, describes the
database that contains 3,121 records which, through sampling, represent 6,928
separate events, mostly occurring in 1983 and 1984. The database is not considered
statistically valid and the summary statistics do not represent the totality of
potentially hazardous materials released. Nevertheless, the summary statistics do
give a feel for the magnitude of the problem. The following is excerpted directly
from the Executive Summary of the Interim Report (EPA 1985):
Events with Iniuries or Deaths
Human casualties occurred in fewer than 7% of the recorded events.
These events —— a total of 468 —— led to 138 deaths and 4,717 injuries,
ranging in severity from temporary respiratory problems treated on—site
to critical injuries and extended hospitalizations. Information on
causation was scanty in many records.
Four high—volume industrial inorganic chemicals (chlorine, ammonia,
hydrochloric acid and sulfuric acid) together were reported to have
been released in over 25% of the events recording human casualties.
Over 200 additional identifiable substances were recorded as released
during events associated with deaths or injuries.
Neither great quantity nor high inherent toxicity alone produce the
conditions for human casualties. When the characteristics of the
released substances are examined, toxicity appears to be the cause of
Hazardous materials are defined herein as those that pose exceptional risks to
 
human health.
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 most of the injuries recorded, while flammability and explosivity are the
mechanisms associated with most of the fatalities in the database.
Transportation releases account for 25% of all events in the database
and a somewhat higher percentage of death or injury events (33%).
Trucks are the predominant mode of transport in the death and injury
events. Among events with human casualties at fixed facilities, storage
vessels play a much larger role as release points than they do among
events not leading to deaths or injuries.
When viewed from an industry perspective, the chemicals and allied
products and the petroleum refining industries together account for 34%
of the reported injuries and more than half of the reported deaths. The
transportation industries account for 36% of reported injuries and about
one—fourth of the reported deaths. Industries that use chemical or fuel
products account for about 25 % of the deaths and injuries.
Substances and Quantities Released
For events reporting quantity released, the quantities approximate a log
normal distribution. Amount released exceeds 1,000 pounds for over
38% of the recorded events. Releases over 100,000 pounds occur in less
than 3% of the events, but these events account for 93% of the total
quantity of materials released. Over 80% of the events in the database
reported that at least one of the substances released was a liquid; 16%
of the events involved the release of a gas.
Causative Factors
Among events occurring at fixed facilities, spills are the predominant
end effect, followed by vapor releases, fires and explosions. Storage
vessels, process vessels and valves, or piping are responsible for nearly
equal shares of in—plant events, but storage vessels typically release
much larger quantities. Equipment failure is the cause most frequently
reported for in—plant events, followed by operator error. Causation is
difficult to assess for many of the events in the database, however.
Over half of the in—transit events involve trucks, another 36% involve
rail cars. Over 38% of the in—transit releases stem from a leak and
another 20% from collisions. Although few events were reported for
pipelines, those spills dwarf other in—transit releases in terms of total
quantity released.
While causation is difficult to assess, operator error was coded as the cause in
approximately 11.4% of the in—plant events. Equipment failures were coded as the
cause for 43.3% of the events, but as we shall see, many of these failures are due
to human errors.
In the Great Lakes basin, the two major system-wide environmental quality
problems of the lakes are eutrophication and toxic chemicals. These problems are
described in the Second Biennial Report of the IJC (1984) as follows:
Eutrophication
At the time the 1972 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement was being
negotiated, the major water quality problem of the Great Lakes was
considered to be man—induced or cultural eutrophication. The causes
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included phosphorus in household detergents, municipal sewage and
agricultural fertilizers. Advanced eutrophication is characterized by an
abundance of nuisance algae and other aquatic plants, turbidity and
oxygen depletion in bottom waters. These impacts can lead to clogged
water intakes and filters, taste and odour problems and changes in the
distribution and abundance of fish populations and other organisms.
Toxics
Unlike the efforts to control phosphorus, there has been limited success
in coming to grips with the overall problem of toxics in the Great Lakes
basin.
Specific regulatory measures have had an impact on controlling levels of
some targeted substances such as mercury and DDT. However, there
are many thousands of chemicals in use in the Great Lakes basin and
new chemicals are being introduced continually. Even if only a few are
known to be harmful, it is becoming increasingly apparent that their
individual, combined and long—term effects do present serious
environmental problems.
Most quantitative data about the extent of the problem is unavailable to the author
at this time. However, some feeling for the magnitude of the problem can be
drawn from the simple fact that the municipal phosphorus load in Lake Erie in 1983
(which accounts for about 50% of the load for the total basin) was about 2,500 tons
(2,268 tonnes) per year. While this load is still a considerable problem, it should be
compared with the load of over 14,000 tons (12,700 tonnes) in 1972.
Given that there is a problem of pollution in the Great Lakes basin, the question
presented earlier, "How can technology be integrated into system design to prevent
a breakdown at the human—machine interface that could result in adverse effects
on the Great Lakes ecosystem," returns us to the object of this paper. An attempt
will be made to answer the question using the following approach.
Approach
The primary emphasis for the approach taken here, to reiterate what was stated
earlier, is to heighten the awareness of the workshop participants and other readers
about the importance of the human—machine interface in controlling accidental
releases of hazardous materials into the Great Lakes basin. The first step will be
to review the relationship between human error and the human—machine interface
breakdown. This is addressed in the second section of this paper and should
establish the fact that most human error is design—induced and can be kept to an
absolute minimum through good human factors design.
The third section of the paper makes the case that technology has a human side
that must be considered in any application to design of the HMI.
The next step is to identify specific HMI or human factors design issues related to
various technology areas. This will be done in the fourth, fifth and sixth sections
of this paper that deal with automation, technology and computer error,
respectively. Automation is considered to be a subset of technology, but because
of its impact on human factors and the human—machine interface, it is treated
separately from the other areas of technology. Computer error is treated
separately because of the unique technical and cultural issues it raises.
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6.1
  
Finally, some conclusions are drawn with respect to the importance of the various
technology areas and issues identified to prevent a breakdown of the
human—machine interface. Conclusions will also be offered for related human
factors consideration. However, since this is a working paper for the HMI
workshop participants, the ultimate conclusions and recommendations will be left
to them.
HUMAN ERROR AND THE HUMAN—MACHINE INTERFACE BREAKDOWN
The problem of human error, its causes and its contributions to system malfunction
and accidents, became widely recognized with the Three Mile Island—2 nuclear
power plant accident. The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC)
and several independent commissions conducted detailed analyses of that accident,
which revealed that human error was one of the principal causes. More
importantly, these analyses showed that, had basic human factors principles been
applied to the design of the HM], training and operating procedures, the accident
could have been avoided.
Human error, as used in this paper, means that a human did something he or she
shouldn't have done, or failed to do something that was required. In this sense,
human error is a breakdown of the human—machine interface if that interface is
broadly interpreted as the interface between humans and control panels,
procedures or communication with other humans.
While the incidence of human error has been well documented in recent years, it
has also been recognized that the reason for human error may well have been due
to what another human did or failed to do. As stated by Parsons (1985a):
That another human may have been a designer of software,
hardware or some environmental condition that, had it been better
designed, would not have induced the human error. The human
might instead have been the trainer who failed to bring skills to
levels where there would not have been a human error or a
manuals writer whose product, if more intelligible, would have
provided the guidance needed to avoid the error. Or the original
human error might have resided in a management that arranged
motivational variables —— incentives and deterrents -— in a way
that made the ultimate human error more probable. This view of
human error is, to be sure, a crude kind of fault tree analysis from
a systems viewpoint.
a. Human Error and System Malfunction
Since the Three—Mile Island accident, numerous studies have shown that
human error causes or is a major factor in perhaps 50% of system
malfunctions in nuclear power plants. For example, Dr. Howard L. Parris of
the Electric Power Research Institute stated during his opening address as
Chairman of the IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers) Third
Conference on Human Factors and Nuclear Safety in 1985:
As evidence of the further improvements that are required, the
Office of AEOD (Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data,
NRC) and the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) have
independently conducted studies within the last year which
concluded that human error rates are still at an unacceptable
level. For example, INPO found, in an analysis of significant
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event reports issued in 1983, that human error was the root cause
in approximately 44% of them.
The AEOD figures were about 6%
lower.
While the precise number may be debated, the figures do
represent a challenge to the industry
Similarly, in December of 1985, a NRC report stated:
During 1981 to June 1984, 65%
of the loss of safety systems’
functional events were the result of human factors contributions;
for example, personnel errors.
Estimates for human error in other industries run as high as 80%. More
recently, human—computer interface errors have become a problem.
For
example, Shneiderman (1983) cited one study where novice users of a
15—command subset of a text editor made mistakes in 19% of their
commands; experienced users had 10% in error. In another study,
experienced professional users of text editors and operating systems were
committing errors in 31% of the tasks assigned them; another investigator
found that professional workers made mistakes in 7 — 46% of their
transactions in a challenging decision—making job. Since errors have occurred
in use of command names, choices within menus and other software features,
research efforts have been directed at preventing or reducing these errors by
creating effective error recovery procedures and on—line and off—line training.
Hyman Rickover, father of the nuclear navy, once said all errors are human:
human errors in design, construction or operation. While this may be true, it
does not follow that they are inevitable or incorrectable.
Human Error: Fact and Fallacy
Hardly a day goes by that one does not read newspaper headlines about some
accident that has been attributed to human error. Accident statistics
compiled by insurance companies on home, street, railway and industrial
accidents are full of causes such as carelessness, faulty attitude and
inattention. Although these causes appear to tell us something, they really
don't. Everyone is inattentive at some time or another and to say that an
accident was caused by inattentiveness gives no clue whatsoever about how it
could have been prevented. Yet, in examining these accident statistics, it is
easy to conclude that the human is a highly unreliable component. In fact,
the notion of human unreliability has long been part of popular wisdom,
possibly from the notion that "To err is human," as coined by the poet,
Alexander Pope.
The facts are that human errors are not random phenomena, nor are they
usually caused by the perversity of the individual involved. Rather, in the
majority of cases, the errors are attributable to factors external to the
individual, factors that can be identified and controlled. Human error is
induced by such factors as poor human—machine interface design (e.g.
difficult to read or use, inappropriate controls and displays, poor workstation
layout and, more recently, inappropriate use of automation and high
technology) and inadequate personnel support system (e.g. poor procedures,
supervision, communication, tools, job aids and training) or by environmental
factors (e.g. excessive noise, glare and poor illumination, excessive heat or
cold).
 
 As stated earlier, the high frequency of human errors in all systems is well
documented and varies from about 85% in automobiles/highway systems to
20% in the much simpler consumer product area. There are many root causes
of human error, ranging from inadequate aptitude on the part of an individual
to inadequate training or job performance aids. However, as stated earlier,
the majority of human errors may be attributed to deficient
equipment/system design or a lack of human factors considerations. These
design-induced errors can have results that range from a situation where
human performance is not possible (infrequent occurrence) to the situation
where a greater potential for human error exists than is necessary (frequent
occurrence). What we must recognize and deal with is that the causes of
human error in most systems can be controlled, although some factors (e.g.
work environment, equipment design and procedures) are more controllable
than others (personal health or well being, spontaneous random error).
Accidents in systems can usually be accounted for by one of two variables.
The first variable is the unpredictable manner in which the quality of human
performance can change or human error can occur. The second variable is
the unpredictable manner in which system demands change. If system
demands on an operator are high at the very time when the level of quality of
human performance happens to be low, the probability of an accident
increases significantly. However, another factor that influences the
occurrence of an accident is the lag time between the occurrence of the
error and the evident consequences of that error. For example, a steering
error when driving a car will typically result in a consequence in a very short
period of time. However, a steering error when piloting a large ship will
usually have a much larger lag time before the consequences occur. Thus, in
some cases the lag between a human error and the response of a system to it
can result in a delay period within which the operator can detect and correct
his error. Therefore, when dealing with human error we must be concerned
not only with the likelihood that an error will occur, but also with the
probability that the error will be detected, the probability that if the error is
detected recovery can occur and, if recovery occurs, an accident can be
prevented or minimized.
Finally, many designers will develop a model to analytically test the
hypothesis of the design. This technique builds confidence that the design
will not fail. However, if the design includes explicit operations to be
performed by a human, then most designers assume (frequently unknowingly)
that the reliability of the human is absolute. In fact, they assume that the
human will use the design, say a human~machine interface, exactly as the
designer intended and will perform correctly every time. This is fallacious,
as there are no perfect humans just as there are no perfect machines. Thus,
the human error problem cannot be eliminated by just assuming it away, but
it can be minimized by knowing the capabilities and limitations of humans
and accounting for them in the design.
HMl design can do something about reducing the likelihood of making an error
in the first place and can facilitate the detection of an error once it has been
made. Human engineers must work closely with systems engineering people
to develop design features that permit the system to recover from an error
and to reduce the vulnerability of a system to the consequences of an error
that has been made but not detected and not recovered.
Prevention of Errors
The fact that most human errors can be avoided, or at least their
consequences reduced, suggests that design of the HMI is not only a
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 technology concern, but a human concern as well. This is the domain of
human factors, and while it is beyond the scope of this paper to expound on
the value of human factors methods (such as task analysis, the application of
behavioral principles to control and display design and ergonomics), these
factors are well established techniques for reducing human error. The
remainder of this paper will address human factors issues in technology
concerned with the human—machine interface design. However, it should be
noted that good human—machine interface design will not only hold human
error to a minimum but will also:
0
decrease training costs;
possibly reduce the skill requirements of operators and
maintenance personnel;
increase users' acceptance of that system and of the job they are
required to do as part of it;
reduce the life cycle cost of a system (because it reduces the
need for costly retrofit);
increase system safety and availability; and
increase the productivity of personnel.
To conclude the discussion of human error, I would like to simply reiterate
that prevention and treatment exist for the human error illness and the
earlier applied, the better.
We will now examine the interaction of technology and the human factor.
6.2 THE HUMAN SIDE OF TECHNOLOGY
During a recent two—day meeting with many of my colleagues in human factors
engineering at the Essex Corporation, the question oftechnology and its impact on
the profession of human factors and the human-machine interface came up many
times. There seemed to be a general consensus on two points. First, we must learn
to use the technology we now have and will have in the future to support man and
the human—machine interface in systems. Second, we must ensure that designs are
driven by user needs and not by technological possibility. Both the advances of
technology and the associated risks of its uses are potentially awesome. We have
already discovered that just letting technology proliferate does not work (Bowser
1985). Left unconstrained, technology will force its way into every HMI that
affects our larger ecosystem and we may end up being the victims rather than the
beneficiaries of technology. Technology does have a human side that must be
considered when designing the human—machine interface. Before looking at
specific issues of technology and the HM], we will briefly examine the human side
of technology.
a. The Changing Role of Man
The earliest systems devised by mankind as an aid to survival made use of the
full range of human capabilities. People developed and implemented plans,
initiated and stopped action, provided muscle power, manually controlled
processes, monitored results and solved problems. These simple systems
merely augmented or extended human capabilities.
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 most of the injuries recorded, while flammability and explosivity are the
mechanisms associated with most of the fatalities in the database.
Transportation releases account for 25% of all events in the database
and a somewhat higher percentage of death or injury events (33%).
Tracks are the predominant mode of transport in the death and injury
events. Among events with human casualties at fixed facilities, storage
vessels play a much larger role as release points than they do among
events not leading to deaths or injuries.
When viewed from an industry perspective, the chemicals and allied
products and the petroleum refining industries together account for 34%
of the reported injuries and more than half of the reported deaths. The
transportation industries account for 36% of reported injuries and about
one—fourth of the reported deaths. Industries that use chemical or fuel
products account for about 25% of the deaths and injuries.
Substances and Quantities Released
For events reporting quantity released, the quantities approximate a log
normal distribution. Amount released exceeds 1,000 pounds for over
38% of the recorded events. Releases over 100,000 pounds occur in less
than 3% of the events, but these events account for 93% of the total
quantity ofmaterials released. Over 80% of the events in the database
reported that at least one of the substances released was a liquid; 16%
of the events involved the release of a gas.
Causative Factors
Among events occurring at fixed facilities, spills are the predominant
end effect, followed by vapor releases, fires and explosions. Storage
vessels, process vessels and valves, or piping are responsible for nearly
equal shares of in—plant events, but storage vessels typically release
much larger quantities. Equipment failure is the cause most frequently
reported for in—plant events, followed by operator error. Causation is
difficult to assess for many of the events in the database, however.
Over half of the in—transit events involve trucks, another 36% involve
rail cars. Over 38% of the in—transit releases stem from a leak and
another 20% from collisions. Although few events were reported for
pipelines, those spills dwarf other in—transit releases in terms of total
quantity released.
While causation is difficult to assess, operator error was coded as the cause in
approximately 11.4% of the in—plant events. Equipment failures were coded as the
cause for 43.3% of the events, but as we shall see, many of these failures are due
to human errors.
In the Great Lakes basin, the two major system—wide environmental quality
problems of the lakes are eutrophication and toxic chemicals. These problems are
described in the Second Biennial Report of the IJ C (1984) as follows:
mm 4
At the time the 1972 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement was being
negotiated, the major water quality problem of the Great Lakes was
considered to be man—induced or cultural eutrophication.
The causes
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The
introduction of
the high
technology of word processors into
our offices has led to a revival of handwritten notes and letters.
Whenever institutions introduce new technology to customers or
employees,
they should build a high-touch component;
if they
don’t, people will try to create their own
or reject
the
new
technology.
That
may
account
for
the
public’s resistance to
automation and electronic accounting.
High tech/high touch.
The more technology we introduce into
society, the more people will aggregate, will want to be with
other people: movies, rock concerts, shopping. Shopping malls, for
example, are now the third most frequented space in our lives,
following home and workplace.
High—tech robots and high—touch quality circles are moving into
our factories at the same time —— and the more robots, the more
circles.
When we fall into the trap of believing or, more accurately,
hoping that technology will solve all our problems, we are actually
abdicating the high touch of personal responsibility. Our
technological fantasies illustrate the point. We are always
awaiting the new magical pill that will enable us to eat all the
fattening food we want and not gain weight; burn all the gasoline
we want and not pollute the air; live as immoderately as we
choose and not contract either cancer or heart disease.
In our minds, at least, technology is always on the verge of
liberating us from personal discipline and responsibility. Only it
never does and it never will.
The more high technology around us, the more need for human
touch.
I have quoted so liberally from Mr. Naisbitt because he makes the point so
well about the need for human factors considerations in the utilization of
high technology. As we shall see, however, Naisbitt isn't the only one who
recognizes the symbiosis between technology and people.
Technolozv Driven or User—Driven Designs
Unfortunately, we are beginning to see more and more examples of complex
human—machine interface designs that are technology driven rather than
driven by the needs of users. There is a growing temptation to incorporate
some new technological pizzazz in a design just because it can be done rather
than because it is necessary. For example, during a recent conversation with
a design engineer who worked for a major corporation, he proudly told me he
was able to put 128 colors on the CRT (Cathode Ray Tube) display. I could
only respond, "What are you going to do with the extra 120? One person can
deal effectively with about eight colors." Because of the importance of the
technology versus user issue in preventing a breakdown at the
human—machine interface in future systems, the experience of a few others is
included below.
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Thus, the real progress in human—machine design does not, at this time,
depend on breakthroughs in hardware technology. Rather, it depends on a
better understanding of how to use what we have in a manner compatible
with the nature of the human in the system.
Finally, technology may also affect the organizational structure. Perrow
(1983) states:
Rather than technology determining organizational structure, it
would appear that machines and equipment are designed so that
they reinforce existing structures and reproduce these structures
in new settings. Organizational structures as well as
human—machine interfaces may contribute to accidents, a matter
of concern where catastrophic potential exists, as in so many of
the military and industrial systems.
In other words, organizational structures should not be driven by technology,
but rather be based on the safety, productivity and social needs of the
individuals and groups (or crews) in the work environment.
The next two sections will examine HMI issues related to various areas of
automation and technology.
6.3 AUTOMATION AND HUMAN FACTORS ISSUES
In 1985, a special issue of Human Factors (the Journal of the Human Factors
Society on Automation, Parson 1985a) was published. The editor of this issue, H.
McIlvaine Parsons, wrote about human factors and automation in the preface as
follows:
Our field concerns the interactions between modern technology's
processes or products and the individuals who use them and automation
constitutes a subset of that technology -— indeed, the largest. By
automation is meant not the state of automaticity, but rather any
technological development in which a device of one kind or another
replaces some human activity. Because automation in this sense has
been going on for a long time and will continue perhaps even longer, it
would seem to merit some explicit attention.
I, too, believe automation is a subset of technology that deserves separate
consideration from those areas of technology that are intended to enhance human
performance rather than replace it.
Ishall borrow liberally from the articles in the special issue of Human Factors on
Automation (including one I authored) to present arguments to support the
proposition that automation is not just a design engineering issue, but is also a
critical human factors issue. Returning to the preface written by Parsons, he
states:
The person in the street, interpreting the term either way, might view
automation as consigning human factors scientists and practitioners into
the ranks of the unemployed along with the operators whose activities
some hardware or software replaces. What need for human factors
without humans? We know better.- There still will be humans there,
doing less perhaps or doing new things. When the epitome of
automaticity came along, replacing the horse—and—wagon, the saddled
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horse and walking, humans had to operate and maintain it with
new and more complex skills. With the accelerating progression of
human performances in the technological world from motor to
perceptual—motor to verbal-imagerial (cognitive) emphasis, the
need for human factors involvements has grown, not lessened.
Following are some of the automation issues that will impact the performance of
humans in systems:
0
general considerations;
0
allocation of functions;
man as a monitor: cognitive support;
work load: more or less;
adaptive control systems; and
user acceptance: affective support.
Within each of the above areas, HMI issues are identified and presented according
to the following format:
° issue;
° argument;
° related considerations; and
O
conclusions.
The
argu
ment
, in
most
case
s, i
s an
exam
ple
or a
n op
inio
n fo
und
in t
he l
itera
ture.
The issue, related considerations and conclusions are my own. Each issue starts on
a separate page.
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 a. AREA: GENERAL AUTOMATION CONSIDERATIONS
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A case in point is aircraft cockpit automation, discussed by Wiener (1985):
Desig
ners r
espon
ded to
pilot e
rror a
nd the
increa
sing c
ockpit
work
load b
y atte
mpting
to rem
ove t
he err
or at
its source, that is, to replace humanfunctioning with devicefunctioning; in their view,“ to automate human error
out of the system. But there were twoﬂaws in this reasoning: (I) the devices themselves had to be operated and
monitored by the very humans whose caprice they were designed to avoid; human error was not eliminated, but
relocated; and (2) the devices themselves had the potential for generating errors that could result in accidents.
0verall, the movementtoward cockpit automation has undoubtedly enhanced safety, but newproblems havebeen
created that are only now being appreciated.
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And Perrow (1984) talked about the interactions in more complex systems:
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Additionally, in a 1985 article by Price:
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Price (1985) deﬁnes cognitive support as follows:
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Bainbridge (1982) discusses some general solution concepts, as follows:
In an
y sit
uatio
n whe
re a
lowp
robab
ility
event
must
be no
ticed
quick
ly th
en th
e ope
rator
must
be gi
ven a
rtiﬁc
ial
assi
stan
ce,
ifne
cess
ary,
even
alar
ms o
n al
arms
. In
a pr
oces
s wi
th a
larg
e nu
mbe
r of
loop
s, th
ere i
s no
way
in
whic
h the
huma
n ope
rator
can g
et qu
ickly
to the
corre
ctpa
rt of
thepl
ant w
ithou
t ala
rms,
prefe
rably
also
some
form
ofal
arma
nalys
is. U
nfort
unate
ly, a
proli
ferat
ion o
fﬂas
hing
red l
ights
will c
onfus
e rat
her t
han h
elp.
Ther
e
are
majo
r pr
oble
ms a
nd i
roni
es in
the d
esig
n of
larg
e al
arm
syst
emsf
or th
e hu
man
oper
ator
.
Displ
ays c
an he
lp th
e ope
rator
to mo
nito
r aut
omati
c con
trol
perf
orma
nce,
by sh
owin
g the
targe
t val
ues.
This
is si
mple
for
singl
e tol
eranc
e ban
ds,
but b
ecom
es m
ore
comp
lex
if to
leran
ces c
hang
e th
rough
out
batch
proce
ssing
. On
e pos
sible
solut
ion i
s to s
how
the c
urren
tly a
pprop
riate
toler
ances
on a
VDU
by s
oftwa
re
generation.
This
does
not a
ctual
ly ge
t aro
und t
he pr
oblem
s, bu
t onl
y rai
ses th
e sam
e one
s in a
diffe
rentf
orm.
The o
perat
or
will
not w
atch
the V
DU i
fther
e is a
very
low p
robab
ility
of th
e com
pute
r con
trol f
ailin
g. If
the c
ompu
ter c
an
gener
ate t
he re
quire
d val
ues,
then
it sho
uld a
lso b
e abl
e to d
o the
monit
oring
and
alarm
s. A
nd h
ow d
oes t
he
opera
tor m
onit
or th
at the
comp
uter
is wor
king
corre
ctly o
r tak
e ove
r ifit
obvio
usly
is not
? Maj
orpr
oble
ms ma
y
be ra
ised
for a
n ope
rator
who
is hig
hly p
racti
ced a
t usi
ng co
mput
er ge
nera
ted d
ispla
ys if
these
are n
o lon
ger
avail
able
in an
emer
genc
y. O
ne ir
onic b
ut se
nsibl
e sug
gesti
on is
that d
irect
-wire
d dis
plays
shou
ld be
used
for
the main process information and software displaysfor quantitative detail.
Catas
troph
ic br
eaks
tofai
lure
are r
elati
vely
easy
to ide
ntify.
Unfor
tunat
ely,
autom
atic
contr
ol ca
n ca
mouﬂ
age
syste
mfail
ure b
y con
troll
ing a
gains
t the
varia
ble c
hange
s, so
that t
rends
do no
t bec
ome a
ppar
entu
ntil t
hey a
re
beyo
nd co
ntrol
. Thi
s imp
lies
that t
he au
tomat
ics s
houl
d als
o mon
itor
unus
ual v
ariab
le mo
veme
nt
autom
atic
systems shouldfail obviously.
If the
huma
n ope
rator
must
moni
tor t
he det
ails o
fcom
pute
rdec
ision
-maki
ng th
en, ir
onica
lly, i
t is ne
cessa
ryfo
r
the c
ompu
ter
to ma
ke t
hese
deci
sion
s in
a wa
y, u
sing
crite
ria a
ndat
a rat
e wh
ich
the o
pera
tor c
anfo
llow
, ev
en
when
this m
ay no
t be
the m
ost e
fﬁcie
nt me
thod
techn
icall
y. 1f
this i
s not
done,
then
when
the o
perat
or do
es no
t
belie
ve or
agre
e wit
h the
compu
ter,
he wi
ll be
unabl
e to t
race
back
throu
gh th
e sys
tem's
decis
ion s
eque
nce t
o
see howfar he does agree.
One u
nique
aspect
ofcog
nitive
suppor
t ofte
nnot r
ecogn
ized b
y syst
em des
igners
is inf
ormat
ion th
at is r
elativ
e to th
e inten
tions
of the human and the computer. Bajnbn'dge (1982) refers to the important point made by other researchers:
that the human being must know which tasks the computer is dealing with and how. Otherwise the same
problems arise as in human teams in which there is no clear allocation ofresponsibility.
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“... when loads were light, the man appeared willing to let the computer carry most of the assignment
responsibility; when loads were heavy, the men much more often stepped in (and) over-rode the computer."
Evidently, quite apart from technical considerations, the design of computer aiding is a multi-dimensional
problem.
Shan't (1985) provides another perspective about human supervisory control of manufacturing systems, as expressed in the
excerpts below.
Although precise delineations ofthe human supervisory role infuture batch manufacturingfacilities depend on
the evolution of computing power andsoftware, one fact is clear: the impact of the development and
implementation ofC omputerAssistedManufacturing (CAM) on the human worker has been largely ignored
More speciﬁcally, we need to have aclearer understanding both of the cognitive demands associated with
supervisory control thatare imposed by the automated batch manufacturing environmentand ofthe supervisory
capabilities of the human with respect to those demands.
Although the potential exists for an active supervisory role, the job design philosophy assumed by most
manufacturers regarding supervisory control ...implicitly negates human decision-making functions. Most of
the human's actions result by default — that is, when something goes wrong. This makes the human’s
involvementmore passiveand in thepracess, violates various humanfactorsprinciples ofjobdesign. A coherent
role would demand a signiﬁcant portion of the human’s attention and abilities by requiring the properties of
display information to be studied instead of being only scannedfor problems. By not being actively involved
in system control, the human is less likely to be efficient in reacting to critical system events. The presence of
such events could, in fact, go entirely unnoticed. The human's supervisory role essentially reduces to
monitoring, a task humans may perform poorly over prolonged periods of time.
Sharit goes on to state that an interactive design strategy that acknowledges the best use ofthe human and the computer is
necessary.
RELATED CONSIDERATIONS: Bainbridge (1982), Price et al. (1980) and Price (1985) also remind us of the related
considerations ofmaintaining skill proﬁciency in systems where the operatoris primarily a monitor. It has been well established
for many years that manual-control skills need to be practiced to be effective. This results in an ironic situation, as stated by
Bainbridge:
When manual take-over is needed there is likely to be something wrong with the process, so that unusual actions
will be needed to control it and one can argue that the operator needs to be more rather than less skilled and
less rather than more loaded than average.
Cognitive skills likewise deteriorate without use and feedback. Additionally, the operator's knowledge of the current
state of the process may be limited or at least incomplete. As Bainbridge states:
The implication of thisfor manual take-overfrom automatically controlled plants is that the operator who has
todo something quickly canonlydo so on the basis ofminimum information; he will notbe able tomake decisions
based on wise knowledge of the plant state until he has had time to check and think about it.
Finally, user acceptance is a related area and as Price (1985) has stated:
Ifa system design is unacceptable to the user—regardless ofengineeringperformance and reliability—he will
under-use it, misuse it or even sabotage it.
Acceptance is highly dependent on the information available to the user or operator.
CONCLUSIONS:
Perhaps this issue can best be concluded by restating what I recently wrote (Price 1985) about tools
of cognitive analysis that must be developed. Speciﬁcally, designers must:
ensure that operator (or maintainer) and computer each know what the other is doing. The human must
understand the objectives of automatic control and the allocation of responsibility to human operation and
machine logic. 1n the same way, the automatic logic must be informedabout the actions and objectives of the
operator. Otherwise, the human and hardware/software systems may work at cross-purposes.
It is also important that the operator have the opportunity to practice manual intervention.
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 d. AREA: WORK LOAD: MORE OR LESS
ISSUE: AUTOMATIONTYPICALLY REDUCES MANUALWORKLOADBUT INCREASESMENTALWORK LOAD.
ARGUMENT:
Much has been studied and written about cockpit automation. One of the foremost authorities in this area
is Earl Wiener, who recently wrote (1985):
A principal rationale for cockpit automation has been the assumption that work load is reduced, thus
achieving the following three objectives: (1) Pilots prefer to be relieved of much of the routine manual
controlling and mental computation in order to have time to supervise the ﬂight more eﬂectively and to
perform optimally in an emergency; (2) at lower altitudes, especially in terminal areas, it is essential that
pilots spend less time with their heads in the cockpitand more time doing whatnopresently certifiedairborne
device can do, that is, scanfor other aircraft; and (3) airlines have demanded and are now receiving wide-
body aircraft that areﬂown by two-pilot crews. For two pilots to perform a task previously performed by
three, work load must be reduced. To achieve this, designers look to automation.
The mental work load dimension further compounds this issue. Pilots complain of more programming,
planning, sequencingand alternative selection and more thinking; in short, more cognitiveprocessin3. Field
studies by the author on the MD-80 indicate that pilots perceive some reduction in the total work load, but
probably less than that claimed by the manufacturers during the certiﬁcation process. Designersemphasize
reducing manual work load, not accounting adequatelyfor mental work load. Asfor more time to lookfor
other trafﬁc, pilots generally are unimpressed with the claimsfor automation. Their attitude is that the
automatic devices demand constant attention, scanning as they call it and although crews may be relieved
ofsuch head-in-the-cockpit duties as maintaining airspeed (which an autothrottle does quite competently),
each device creates its own scanning demand A 8-767 captain told me, "It is more complicated to direct
an automatic system than to do the job manually ..."
Following the same theme, Perrow (1984) discusses pilot work load.
All of these automatic systems make the craft more efficient in terms of commercial or military criteria.
Indeed, in thenewestjets, such as the Boeing 767, theﬂight crewhasbeen reduced to two anda large number
of knobs, switches and dials have beenreplaced by CRTs and buttons linked to computers controlling
computers. But with eachbit ofautomation, more diﬁ‘icultperformancein worse weather ortraﬁ‘ic conditions
is demanded. It appears, indeed, that work load has become more bunched, with long periods of inactivity
and short bursts of intense activity. Both ofthese are error-inducing modes of operation.
Finally, Ephrath and Young (1981) have reported a study in which system performance was worse with computer aiding,
because the operatormade the decisionanyway and checking the computer addedtohis work load (also reportedinBainbridge
1982).
CONCLUSION:
Automation has not resulted in anet work load reduction and may, in fact, cause periods of too little
demand with occasional bursts ofintense demand. Also, cognitive workload mayincrease due tohumanneeds tounderstand
and follow what is going on in highly automated systems.
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e. AREA: ADAPTIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS
ISSUE: WE NOW HAVE TECHNOLOGICALLY FEASIBLE ADAPTIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS THAT CAN BE MODIFIED
(MANUALLY OR AUTOMATICALLY) TO REDISTRIBUTE THE ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITIES TO MAN
AND MACHINE. HOWEVER, THIS DESIGN DECISION IS DEFINITELY AS MUCH A HUMAN FACTORS
CONSIDERATION AS IT IS AN AUTOMATION CONSIDERATION.
ARGUMENT: It would appear that adaptive control systems can solve many of the human factors issues raisedabout
automation. Indeed, there is unique potential here for both success and failure. This area is an excellent example of where
an and science must be considered together. If the design outcome is not acceptable to the user, then a costly or dangerous
mistake is possible. Discussions from three human factors professionals are offered.
Price et al. (1982) described the potential for adaptive allocation of function while investigating the context of nuclear power
plants:
An entirely diﬁ‘erent type offunctions allocation may be evolving withthe advent ofcomputers which now
have the ability to make certain types ofdecisions in a manner closely resembling that ofa human operator.
This is the conceptofadaptive computer aiding or adaptive allocation offunctions. In a system of this type,
allocations between the human operator and machine components (computers, in this case) are all or none
assignments. Both the operator providing direction and control at one time and for one event and the
computerproviding direction andcontrol at another timefor another event, represent a departurefrom past
systems in which man was hard-wired into a system with a rigid andﬁxed set of allocatedfunctions. With
adaptive computer—aiding, a form ofsharing has become possible that capitalizes on the strengths ofboth
man and computer but which introduces an altogether new perspective on functions allocation.
Research on systems ofthis type is still in its infancy. Crooks et al. (1974) report on a long-term research
project designed to explore this type ofsystem. Sinaiko (1972) gives an account ofan experiment on naval
antiaircraft systems which included one condition closely resembling an adaptive system. One point thatall
authors make when discussing this type ofsystem is the conviction that it is essential that theﬁnal decision-
making responsibility rest with the human operator. Therefore, the human operator should have, as part of
his role, the option to over-ride the computer when the operator determines that the situation warrants such
an action. The goal, then, if not to replace the human operator or to imply that the computer can take over
all the functions ofthe human operator, but rather to enhance system performance using the best available
resources.
Bainbridge (1982) provides a collaborative account relative to general complex systems:
There will always be a substantial human involvement with automated systems, because criteria other than
efficiency are involved, e.g. when the costofautomating somemodes ofoperation is not justified by the value
of the product or because the public will not accept high-risk systems with no human component. This
suggests that methods ofhuman-computer collaboration need to be morefully developed
Using the computer to give instructions is inappropriate #the operator is simply acting as a transducer, as
the computercould equally well act asa more reliable one Whenfollowing advice , theoperator" s reactions
will be slower and less integrated than ifhe can generate the sequence ofactivity himself; and he is getting
no practice in being intelligent. Thereare alsoproblems with the eﬁ‘icient display ofproceduralinformation.
A few practical points can be suggested. There should be at least one source ofinformation permanently
availablefor each type ofinformation which cannotbe mapped simply onto others, e.g. about layout ofplant
in space as opposed to itsfunctional topology. Operators should nothave topage between displays to obtain
information about abnormal states inparts oftheprocess other than the one theyare currently thinkingabout,
nor between displays giving information needed within one decision process. Research on sophisticated
displays should concentrate on the problems of ensuring compatibility between them, rather than ﬁnding
which independent display is bestfor oneparticularfunction without considering its relation to information
for otherfunctions. To end on a more optimistic note, software displays offer some interesting possibilities
for enriching the operator's task by allowing him to design his own interface.
 Wiener (1985) once again provides some excellent insight in the context of cockpit automation.
Itshould be clearby now that to discuss automation Wemust examine the rapidly changing nature oftheﬂyin g
task, which has resultedfrom two developments: (1 ) the increasing complexity ofthe environment in which
pilots ﬂy—an environment congested with aircraft, demands, regulations and procedures; and (2 ) a vast
number of computer-based devices at the pilots' ﬁngertips, replacing the demandfor manual control and
mental arithmetic. Also, modern aircraft contain an array ofwarning and alerting systems (the machine
monitoring the pilot), which are a subject of considerable controversy. These devices remind pilots to take
action (e.g. altitude alerters), warn them of deviations (e.g. the excessive airspeed clacker). suggest (or
demand) action (e .g. thepull up message ofthe groundproximity warningsystem), warn them ofunacceptable
configurations (e.g. ﬂap over-speedon the MD-80) and even take action on their own, such as autoslats and
stick pushers, which are designed to break stalls ifpilot intervention has not relieved the problem.
Machines Zhat lake Action
Not surprisingly, pilots are concerned. The last example is a good one,for it exempliﬁes what pilotsfear in
the automation movement, that decisions will actually be implemented without their consent.
Pilots and observers have been alarmed at the tendency of crews to attempt to program their way out of
trouble with the automatic devices, rather than shut them offandﬂy by traditional means ofguidance. Not
only are thepilots worried about a possible erosion ofskills due to overuse ofautomation, butthey are also
more concerned about their perceived loss of control — that the machines are taking over and making
decisions on their own, as in the case of the stick pusher. 0n the other hand, it could be argued that there
is nothing more serious than a stall and that the stick pusher is designed to save the aircraft when all else
hasfailed—the human crew has not respondedto the stall warnings and indications. The device takes over
by default. It is the ultimate backup.
Pilot fears may be justiﬁed, as we shall see in the section of this paper that deals with Computer Errors.
Wiener (1985) also talks abOut the ﬂexibility of soft displays that suggest the potential for adaptive control:
Equally important, soft displays permit the pilots to conﬁgure their instrument panels and displays as they
seeﬁt. With soft displayspilots can select or deselectfeatures according to their own style ofﬂyingand their
desire for information Myformer colleague Renwick Curry andIhave advocated allowing the pilotmore
freedom to fly the plane and use the automation in the manner he or she wishes, but surrounded by a
multidimensional warning and alerting system that informs the crewif they are approaching some limit. As
long as the plane stays well within the limits, thepilot has greatfreedom to conduct theﬂight according to
his or her individual style. We called the concept an electronic cacoon orﬂight management by exception.
RELATEDCONSIDERATIONS: The area of adaptive control systems is closely intertwined with the areas ofallocation of
functions and user acceptance, as well as computer error.
CONCLUSION: Adaptive control system design is more of a human factors problem than a technological one.
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 f. AREA: USER ACCEPTANCE: AFFECTIVE SUPPORT
ISSUE: “IFA SYSTEM DESIGN IS UNACCEPTABLETOTHE USER —REGARDLESS OF ENGINEERING PERFORMANCE
AND RELIABILITY— HE WILL UNDER-USE IT, MISUSE IT, OR EVEN SABOTAGE IT.“ (PRICE 1985)
ARGUMENTS: Ihave been aware of the effects ofuser acceptance on system perfomance for more than 20 years. In the
1960s, I conducted a study for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) ofpilot acceptance factors in the
design of all-weather landing systems (Price et al. 1964). NASA was looking into several approaches for automating all or
a portion of the tasks required to land an aircraft during conditions when visual contact with the runway would be virtually
impossible. Such a system could be feasibly solved from the engineering standpoint but posed a severe acceptance problem
on the part of the pilot. Table 1 shows several generalized principles of acceptance and automation that resulted from that
study and are still valid.
More recently (Price 1985), I referred to the issue of user acceptance as the need for affective support in system design.
Aﬂective support refers to the emotional requirements ofhumans, such as their need to know their work is
recognized foritsvalue, tofeel personally secure andtofeel thatthey are in control. Although such judgments
are difﬁcult to make, they can be estimatedfrom experience with similar systems, from self-report data or
from designfactors such as extent offeedback.
With the advent ofmore advanced forms ofautomation, others have recognized the necessity of considering user acceptance
' of affective support in the design of automated systems. Excerpts from appropriate authors follow.
Perrow, the author of Normal Accidents (1984), states:
Operators tend to resist the introduction ofmore general, high-level controls such as CRTs, which produce
a television screendisplay ofthe state ofa number ofunits or subsystems, because theyfeel they cannot make
selective interventions as easily. Only these hi gh—level controls can be manipulated; the selective ones are
more difficult to get because it is assumed they will not be needed. They may be out ofthe way or accessible
only by acomplicated series ofsteps thatinactivate the more general controls. On the other hand, operators
also complain about the arrangement ofless automated systems that allow selective intervention, because
they are confronted with 15-foot banks ofidentically designedswitches with tiny numbers above them. These
are not even grouped in any way that reﬂects operation, butonly in the way that reﬂects ease of installation.
One ofthe most common operator errors in nuclearplants is, understandably, operating the wrong switch.
Surely the choice need not be reduced discretion versus endless, identical displays.
Bainbridge (1982) writes about the importance of operator attitudes.
The writer knows ofone automated plant where the managementhad to be present during the night shift, or
the operators switched theprocess to manual. This raises general issues about the importance ofskill to the
individual. One is that the operator knows that he can take over adequately if required. Otherwise the job
is one of the worst types, it is very boring but very responsible, yet there is no opportunity to acquire or
maintain the qualities requiredto handle the responsibility. The level ofskill thataworker has is also a major
aspect ofhis status, both within and outside the working community. Ifthe job is deskilled by being reduced
to monitoring, this is difﬁcultfor the individuals involved to conte to terms with. It also leads to the ironies
of incongruous pay diﬁ’erentials, when the deskilled workers insist on a high pay level as the remaining
symbol of a status which is no longerjustiﬁed by the job content.
Wiener (1985) reports on ﬂight crew acceptance issues:
modern aircraft contain an array of warning and alerting systems (the machine monitoring the pilot).
which are a subject of considerable controversy. These devices remind pilots to take action ( e.g. altitude
alerters), warn them ofdeviations (e.g. the excessive airspeed clacker), suggest (or demand) action (e. g. the
pull up message ofthe ground proximity warning system), warn them ofunacceptable conﬁgurations (e. g.
ﬂap over-speedon the MD-80) and even take action on their own, such as autoslats and stickpushers, which
are designed to break stalls ifpilot intervention has not relieved the problem.
Notsurprisingly. pilots are concerned. The last example is a good one,for it exemplifies what pilotsfear in
the automation movement, that decisions will actually be implemented without their consent.
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 In my research on the MD-80 with a major airline, pilots have remarkedabout being along for the ride. The
problem is not one ofinsufﬁcient workload, although boredom and complacency are often mentioned, but
a strong sense ofbeing out ofthe loop. Pilots and observers have been alarmed at the tendency ofcrews to
attempt to program their way out oftrouble with the automatic devices, rather than shut them 017 andﬂy by
traditional means ofguidance. Not only arethe pilots worried abouta possibleerosion ofskills due to overuse
of automation, but they are also more concerned about their perceived loss of control— that the machines
are taking over and making decisions on their own An airline check captain made an unforgettable
statement to me about the DC-9-80: “I am willing to ﬂy it as long as it has the yellow button (autopilot
disengage). I can always turn it back into a DC-9."
Beltracchi and Lapinsky (1985) observe:
In summary, it is our beliefthata useful display is one that the operator can trust. This goal can only be achieved
by designing a system that’s reliable and provides valid information. In addition, the system credibility must be
maintained andprotected through routine maintenance and conﬁguration control, administrative controls and
security measures ifnecessary. The industry is making gains in the realm ofautomation ofoperator tasks— we
must strive to assure that we do not lose ground in doing so by destroying the operator’s faith in the system.
If users do lose faith in the system, we run the risk of the ultimate design rejection-sabotage, as reported in Time, September
20, 1982:
892mm;
As the Industrial Revolution gathered strength in the 19th century, English workmen attemptedto destroy new
textile machines because they seemed to be taking away their jobs. Nearly two centuries later, some
employees are using similar tactics against the new robots that are beginning to appear in more and more
plants.
Management Training Center in The Netherlands, has just concluded a study of the acceptance of the
automatons in his country, where 70 ﬁrms currently use robots. He found that the most commonform of
sabotage was to slow down the machines by feeding them parts in the wrong order, with the hope that
management would be disappointed in robotperformance. In other cases, employees repairedthe machines
incorrectly, mislaid essential spare parts or put sand into the robots' lubricating oil. In one metal
construction plant, production was reducedfor more than six months because of worker resistance. Other
companies are certain to face similar troubles, says Nijland, unless management encourages honest
discussion with workers about the eﬁ‘ect robots will have onthe jobs.
CONCLUSION: A number of attitudes, needs and concerns can affect acceptance of a system design with which the
user mu st interface. Acceptance can be negative even where the design engineering is excellent. It has been shown clearly
that user acceptance and affective support must be integrated into system design along with good engineering pratices.
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6.4 TECHNOLOGY AND HUMAN FACTORS ISSUES
The course of technology for the remainder of this century is fairly well known —-
particularly those areas of technology that will impact the effectiveness of the
human—machine interface. However, what has not been established is how
technology will be integrated into design of the HMI in effective ways to support
rather than overwhelm man. The one thing we cannot do is ignore the proliferation
of technology; it touches the lives of everyone. As stated by Van Cott (1985):
Technology helps bring us into the world, gives us jobs, shapes the way we
think, electrifies our homes, feeds us, entertains us and buries us. When a
major system malfunctions, nations are helpless. We have become utterly
dependent upon technology.
But we have only begun to experience the future. In the next decade
millions of jobs in factories, offices, hospitals, railroads, schools and stores
—— and in other workstations from submarines to space shuttle —— will be
reshaped or replaced by high technology. None of us will be immune from
the effect of high technology on human life.
With good planning and appropriate design, this high technology revolution
could be of great benefit to society. People could spend less time in the
arduous acts of survival that have characterized most of human history and
more in pursuing their lives' goals. But without adequate planning and
design we could be headed for a time of anguish and frustration.
Left unconstrained, technology will force its way into every HMI that affects the
larger ecosystem and may increase rather than decrease the risks of system
breakdown. The following are some of the technology issues that will impact the
integrity of the HMI in system design. The material is organized into the areas
listed below:
0 0
General Technology Considerations; Artificial Intelligence/Expert
Systems;
Computer-Driven Display;
Robotics; and
° CRT Color Displays;
Technology and Organizational
Data Input Techniques; Effectiveness.
Voice Input/Output;
Within each of the above areas HMI issues are identified and presented according to
the following format:
0
Issue;
0
Argument;
0
Related Considerations; and
0
Conclusions.
The argument in most cases is an example or an opinion found in the literature. The
issue, related considerations and conclusions are my own. Each issue starts on a
separate page.
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 a. AREA: GENERAL TECHNOLOGY CONSIDERATIONS
ISSUE: HIGH TECHNOLOGY MAY INDUCE GREATER RISK-TAKING BEHAVIOR ON THE PART OF THE USER.
ARGUMENT: Technological interfaces may induce risk-taking behavior as well as human error. Perrow (1984) discusses
the widespread use ofradar and other electronic navigator devices on ships and how they have failed to redUCe the number
of marine accidents. This failure is alluded to in an account provided by a ship’s captain to Perrow:
Instrumentsfor course keeping, positionﬁndin g, depth recording, have allimproved very considerably over
the last several years and the twin radar sets now commonlyﬁtted in tankers mean that there is data readily
available on theposition ofall other vessels in contact, regardless ofvisibility ;yet ships continue to collide,
to strand and occasionally to founder. It appears that one must conclude that improved instrumentation is
being used to enable navigators to prosecute their voyage with greater economical efficiency and certainly
with greater ease, but the risk per ship would seem to remain about constant.
Petroski (1985) introduces the idea that high speed computations by computers may also increase the risk that designers are
willing to take:
Because the computer can make so many calculations so quickly, there is a tendency now to use it to design
structures in which every part is ofminimum weight and strength, thereby producing the most economical
structure. This degreeofoptimization was notpractical to expect when hand calculations were the norm and
designers generally settledfor an admittedly over—designed and thus somewhat extravagant, ifprobably
extra-safe, structure. However, by making every part as light and as highly stressed as possible, within
applicable building code andfactor ofsafety requirements, there is little roomfor error— in the computer’s
calculations, in theparts manufacturers’ products or in the construction workers' execution of the design.
Thus computer optimized structures may be marginally orleast—safe designs, as the Hartford Civic Center
roofproved to be.
CONCLUSION: The question of whether automated systems and computers provide a false sense of security or
validity arises over and over again in the literature.
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 b. AREA: COMPUTER-DRIVEN DISPLAYS
ISSUE: THE EXTREME FLEXIBILITY OF SOFT DISPLAYS (SOFTWARE— GENERATED) INVITES TECHNOLOGY-
DRIVEN RATHER THAN USER-DRIVEN DESIGN.
ARGUMENT: Soft displays permit the designer to use symbols, colors, text, three-dimensional graphics, perspective
views, enhanced images, overlays and other techniques to provide information in formats never used before. However. in
modem aircraft cockpits, this technology is not proving as successful as expected. Wiener (1985) emphasizes this point in
his article on cockpit automation:
But with ﬂexibility comes problems. We have seen a tendency forproposed soft displays to become a jungle of
clutter, ofill-considered symbols and text and a dazzling presentation ofcolors. Little wonder that pilots are now
referring to the modern instrumentpanels as Pac Man andAtari. The attitude oftoo many computer experts is, “We
can do it, so let's throw it up on the display. It can'thurt anything." Titus it will fallto humanfactorspractitioners
topersuade designers to go back to the fundamental question: Whatinformation does the operator need andin what
form (or forms) should it be displayed?
Finally. we might take note ofthe striking similarity between the conceptualized cockpit and the ofﬁce of the future
The cockpit is starting to resemble an ofﬁce and the oﬁ‘ice a cockpit. This is an example of what biologists call
convergent evolution, whereby disparate systems beginto resemble each other over time. Why does convergent
evolution accur? Because the separate systems are attempting to solve the same problem using roughly the same
resources. What is the commonproblem here .7 Essentially itconsists ofinformation management, communication,
decision-making and supervisory control.
RELATED CONSIDERATIONS: The ﬂexibility of soft displays not only gives the designer a great deal more freedom in
dealing with information, but provides control ﬂexibility as well. This can result in an economy of cockpit space or panel
space in many work situations where panel space is valuable. Multifunctioncontrols and touch panel displays are impressive.
Nevertheless, as with information, the design ofcomputer-driven controls will demand careful attention fromhuman factors
engineers to maintain the user’s viewpoint.
Another potential advantage of computer-driven displays and controls is that they permit the operator (a
pilot, for example) to conﬁgure the instrument panels and displays as he seesﬁt. As Wiener (1985) states,
“With softpanel displays pilots can select ordeselectfeatures according to their own style ofﬂyin g and their
desirefor information “ Desires and needsfor automation will vary with operators andwith time,for any
one operator.
CONCLUSION: The ﬂexibility provided with automation and computer-driven controls/displays is indeed a
technological marvel. It is also an invitation for zealous designers to build in too much information and control function
without relating them to user tasks or needs, or human capabilities and limitations.
 c. AREA: COMPUTER-DRIVEN DISPLAYS
 
ISSUE: COMPUTER—BASED DISPLAY SYSTEMS MUST BE PROTECTED TO AVOID INADVERTENT CHANGES TO THE
DATA BASE.
ARGUMENT: Beltracchi andLapinsky ( 1985) report anexample of this protectionproblem foundin a nuclear powerplant.
in order to maintain credibility, a display system must be reliable and produce valid information; after
achieving that, credibility can only be maintainedby protecting displays and controlling access to them and
the database that feeds them.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission staffhas seen several systems in which this was not adequately done.
For example. one of the early prototypes was a system that had CRT terminals in the control room, the
Technical Support Center (TSC) andthe Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). The control room CRT was
partially slaved to the TSCterminal; that is, the control room operators could call updisplays on the control
room terminal, but the TSC had overriding control ofthe control room CRT. This potentialpre-emption of
control room displays by TSCpersonnel was unacceptable. The situation wasﬁtrther complicated by thefact
that the TSCwas usedas a trainingfacility and the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) was often used
as apart-task simulator. With this conﬁguration itbecamepossible to change the controlroom displaysfrom
the TSC andpresent simulated data in the control room without the knowledge or consent ofcontrol room
operators. The licensee involved has taken action to correct this situation.
RELATED CONSIDERATIONS: Data base or display integrity should be protected from unwarranted intrusion by
disgruntled employees or others bent on deliberately distorting the display information.
CONCLUSION: Software protection is a necessary design feature; particularly in situations where there are multiple slaved
(at least in part) displays.
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 d. AREA: COMPUTER-DRIVEN DISPLAYS
ISSUE: COMPUTER-DRIVEN DISPLAYS MAY NOT CONFORM TO USER EXPECTATIONS OR NEEDS.
ARGUMENT : Beltracchi and Lapinsky (1985) describe a classic example of this issue, as follows:
The trends ofcritical process variables during anticipated operational occurrences and accidents contain
importantinformation about the status ofthe plant' sprocess. Displays oftrendsfor criticalprocess variables
must be easily accessed, read and comprehended they are to be rapidly and reliably used by operators.
A common use ofcathode—ray tubes within control rooms is to display the time history and current trend of
a process variable. In general, the recent datafor the process variable is located in the right handportion
ofthe display screen with a time continuous trace of older data extending to the left portion ofthe display
screen. Thus, the scalefor time isfrom right to left. with current time on the right. Thisform of time scale
is directly related to the one used in the strip chart recorder.
However, the scalefor theprocessvariable is generally located in the left portion ofthe display screen, where
the oldestdatafor the process variable is displayed. With this locationfor the scale, itis notpossible to view
the scale together with the current real-time trend oftheprocess variable as each is located at opposite ends
ofthe display screen. An operator’s task to determine margin to a setpointfrom the current value and trend
ofthe process variable displayed is now more complex with the display screen thanfor the chart recorder.
In simulator tests of these trend display formats, operators have detected and noted these diﬁ‘erences.
CONCLUSION: Display designers should not overlook the good features of conventional displays and operator
expectations built up from using these conventional displays.
-55..
 e.
AREA: CRT COLOR DISPLAYS
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CRT
colors on a black background tend to be esthetically pleasing and thus provide their own reason for being; therefore, a user
may tend to color—code as many categories of information as there are colors available (usually seven or eight). This approach
tocoding probably will not improve the user'sperformance beyond that of a monochromatic CRT. Forinstance: (1) Different
subsystems of a larger system are often assigned different colors even though the different systems seldom, if ever, appear
on the same screen together, so coding by labeling is sufﬁcient; (2) Since there are often fewer colors than functions to be
coded, colors tend tobeused to code more than one function. Suchpractice greatly reduces,ifnot eliminates, the effectiveness
of a code and raises the possibility of misidentiﬁcation: and (3) The presence of several color—coded functions on a screen,
no matter howcarefully planned, runs the risk of colorclutter, a condition in which there is so much stimulation in the picture
that the intended information is obscured. In these conditions, color is working against, not for, the user.
An additional constraint is placed on the use of the color red for coding when process control data for electrical utilities are
displayed on CRTs. In most control rooms, red has two basic meanings or functions. First, when color is used for
prioritization, red signals a highvprion'ty warning or potential problem by means of the annunciator system. Second, red
signals that equipment is actuated or energized (i.e. water is ﬂowing through a pump or valve or a breaker is closed). When
a color is used to code two meanings, there is a likelihood that its coding effectiveness will be decreased and the desired or
intended response will be weakened because of a competition between the meanings. This problem may be alleviated
somewhat in thecontrol room because the wanting function and equipment actuation function are usually separated spatially.
The annunciators are on a high panel and the equipment indications are below the annunciators.
However, when both functions of red are displayed on a CRT, the spatial separation context is no longer present; the two
applications of red can appear not only on the same CRT but even in the same location. For instance, a running pump may
be represented as red on the CRT screen, but nearby is a bar chart or numerical value, alsoshown in red to represent a value
that is out of tolerance or beyond a limiting condition. Such multiple meanings of a stimulus often require time to double-
check the meaning andunder severe time constraints. thecolor may be misinterpreted. Oneeffective way to resolve the issue
is to use red for only one meaning (e.g. alarms). However, once a convention has been developed and in place, it is often
difficult to change.
CONCLUSION: The use of color in display designs should be made by a qualiﬁed human factors engineer in conjunction
with the display designer and representative users.
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If the user is close enough to the screen to allow adequate comfort for his arm, the eye may be too close to the CRT.
As one gets nearer the CRT, it becomes easier to see the graininess of the image on the screen.
Researchindicates a relatively higherror rate for touch-sensitive screens relative toCRT screens (Stammers and Bird,
1980). One contributing factor to this high error rate is parallax, in which the user tends to miss the point aimed at
and hits a nearby point. A second contributing factor is the inadVertent touching ofan adjacent area when the ﬁnger
is removed from the screen. This can be corrected, in part, by enlarging the size of the control area, although the
appropriate size will probably be larger than anequivalent hardwired button (Gaertner and Holzhausen, 1980; Pfauth
and Priest, 1981; Usher 1983).
Speech recognition systems are also becoming more popular. This technique is covered as a separate issue.
RELATED CONSIDERATIONS: There are numerous external factors that affect data input techniques, depending on the
work environment. Among these factors are illumination, noise, temperature, vibration, workspace and work station design.
CONCLUSION: Humanengineering of input devices would improve datainput time and accuracy, as well as alleviate
physical discomfort and health problems. Thus, overall HMI performance would improve.
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ARGUMENT: Applied interest in speech recognition and generation as an input/output technique for control systems
apparently started with concern about the military ﬁghter pilot work load. Speech input/output techniques provide an
alternative to the normally overloaded visual-manual channel. Like the use ofcolor, this technology can become overworked
without human factors considerations. Simpson et al. (1985) provide an excellent review of the status and considerations
necessary in system design for speech recognition and generation. The material that follows is largely adapted from that
article. Human factors considerations are organized by: (1) speech recognition; (2) speech generation; and (3) system
integration.
mm
Onecompelling reason to incorporate speechrecognition into complex systems is thepotential for reducing the visual-manual
work load. However, the decision to use speech for a particular task should be made only after a careful analysis of the
advantages and constraints of the manual mode versus the speech mode in the context ofthe taskto be performed. Research
comparing the speed and accuracy of voice with the speed and accuracy of manual keyboard input has produced conﬂicting
results. Speechinput is likely to improve system performance only for complex tasks that require a high degree of cognitive,
visual and manual loading. Once the decision is made to use speech for a particular task, a matching of speech mode features
with task characteristics is imperative. Characteristics of the speech recognition design must include the following:
0 Speech recognition algorithm. Currently, speaker-dependent (recognizes only the original speaker) word
systems can perform in the laboratory with vocabularies of up to 100 words with an error rate of less than
1%. However, high recognition performance in the laboratory oftendegrades dramatically under the effects
of noise, user stress and operational demands.
0 User characteristics. Researchhas indicatedthat a few peoplehave distinctproblems in speechrecognition.
0 Enrollment. This is the process of providing voice templates to the recognition system for the different
vocabulary items and is critical in speaker-dependent speechrecognition systems. For example, recognition
perfomiance is enhanced when enrollment occurs in an acoustic or motion environment similar to that of
operational conditions.
0 Adaptive recognition algorithms. This is one method for dealing with speech variability over time for a
given speaker in speaker-dependent systems.
0 System feedback. Feedbackby the systemto the user may enhance performance eitherby altering theuser’s
speech or by user error correction.
0 Error correction. Speech recognition system performance can be improved with two types of error
correction. The system canbe designed to detect illegal sequences automatically andcorrect them to themost
likely legal sequence or provision can be made for error correction by the user. Three documented types of
user errors include failure to remember the vocabulary set, failure to follow the speech cadence restrictions
and conversing with coworkers over an active microphone.
0 Environmental factors. Physical, physiological, emotional and work load factors can be expected to
partially determine the success or failure of a particular speech system design. The major environmental
factor, of course, is the effect of background noise on recognition accuracy.
Sgech Generag'on
Properly designed voice displays can reduce a user’s visual work load when he is performing visually demanding tasks.
Examples of such tasks are reading technical maintenance or operations manuals while operating or repairing a system,
checking multiple visual readouts from a process control station panel and simultaneously controlling a robotic arm and
multiple cameras. In these situations, not only is the user engaged in visually demanding tasks, but efﬁciency of task
performance also depends on the user being able to maintain visual contact with the task. A good deal of research has been
done to determine where auditory (speech or nonspeech) rather than visual displays are most effective. Applications include
the following functions:
-69-
 0 Warnings. This is a particularly effective application, since the auditory senses are omnidirectional.
However, the selection of particular words or phrases and the voice type can have a deﬁnite effect on
perception and response time.
o Prompts. If the systemprompts theuser for a reasonable next dataentry or control input, the user will assume
the previous input was correctly received.
0 Feedback. Feedback is another form of prompting. Additionally. feedback provides responses to user
queries.
0 Advisories. The utility of using speech to provide advisories depends on other functions for which speech
is being used. Just like visual overload, voice overload can occur and if too much information is presented
by voice; it may become annoying to the user. When something becomes annoying, there is a tendency to
ignore it.
o Commands. Cautionmust be used withvoice commands since theuser may sometimesbe reluctantto follow
a command without knowing the reason for it.
0 Simulation ofhuman communications. Another important speech display application is the simulation of
human speechcommunications; for instance , eliminate the need forhumanspeakers to play a role ina training
situation.
Speech generation characteristics such as synthesized speech versus pre-recorded human speech, sex, speaking rate, accent
and many other variables will affect intelligibility and comprehension.
S ste e ation
The third human factors consideration for a speech input/output technique is system integration. The critical human factors
issues are task design and human-system dialog design.
0 Task design. Speech is a discrete, single-channel, omnidirectional, familiar method for transmitting
information. It commands the user‘s attention and should not be allowed to deliver false information. Used
for the control ofsystems, speechcan, ifproperly implemented,reduce theneed for theuser to learn computer
programming languages and canprovide an alternative to manual control inputs. Speech requires time to be
spoken and comprehendedand may bemisunderstoodby human ormachine listeners in thepresence ofother
competing voice messages, oral signals or noise. Speechis also a single-channel mode in two senses: neither
humans nor current machines can talk and listen accurately at the same time and bothhave great difficulty
in processing more than one speech message at a time. Speech messages have a transitory existence unless
they are recorded for later playback. Finally, current speech recognition technology requires a vocabulary
that consists of acoustically distinct words and constrained syntax.
o Human-system dialogue design. Careful design of all of the interchanges between the human and the
system, not just the speech interchanges, will have major effects on the overall system performance. The
dialogue between the user and the speech system and the dialogbetween the userand all ofthecontrol display
systems must be considered in a mission-oriented, task-analytic manner.
CONCLUSION: Speech generation technology seems to be more advanced than speech recognition technology, but
human factors guidelines and standards for the application of speech technology have not been well established for either.
The application of this technology requires human factors engineers to: (1) identify appropriate applications of speech
technology; (2) select appropriate speechrecognition or generation algorithms and systems characteristics; and (3) integrate
speech subsystems within the context of the users’ work environment or tasks.
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h. AREA: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE/EXPERT SYSTEMS
 
ISSUE: HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING AS WELL AS COMPUTER SCIENCE IS REQUIRED INTHE SUCCESSFUL
DESIGN OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE/ EXPERT SYSTEMS.
ARGUMENT: Artiﬁcial intelligence (AI) is a term whose deﬁnition computer scientists and human factors professionals
casmot agree upon. In fact, one scientist has said that a deﬁnition in the usual sense seems impossible, because intelligence
appears to be an amalgam of so many information representation and processing talents. Hillman (1985) states, “There are
many different activities that collectively comprise AI. Theone commonthread is that all the activities involve complicated,
mostly ill—defined, multivariable problems that normally require human experience, expertise and sometimes intuition for
their solution." Most researchers do agree, however, that expert systems (or, more accurately, knowledge-based expert
systems) are one aspect of AI. As Hopkin (1984) states, “Expert systems are a development from artiﬁcial intelligence, in
which attempts are made to codify expert knowledge into a form compatible with other information in a database so that it
canbe made available foruse by experts and others." In simpler terms, anexpert system will capture the knowledge ofexperts
and organize it for presentation to a user at a later time. Expert systems have been under development by computer scientists
since the mid- 1960s. Recently, as these systems have come into limited use, theneed for human factors engineeringin expert
systems has been recognized. This need exists in two areas; the knowledge acquisition process and the user interaction
process.
Knowledge Acquisition Process
Hillman (1985) reports that several researchers agree that the process of extracting knowledge from experts and codifying
’ it for user interaction does indeedrequire human factors considerations. The human factors considerations of the knowledge
acquisition process have been summarized by Hamill (1984), based on the work of the Committee on Human Factors of the
National Research Council, as follows:
(1 ) ensuring a commonframe ofreference to ensure thatthe knowledge engineer andthe expert are talking
about the same thing; (2) matching questions to mental structures to ensure compatibility between the way
in which knowledge isorganized and the way in which thatknowledge is elicited; (3) clarifying andassessing
information quality, since people usually have only partial, incomplete appreciation of the extent of their
knowledge, a condition that expresses itselfin overconfidence that is impervious to most debiasing efforts
except intensive training;(4) ascertaining the ﬁdelity of representation produced by extant elicitation
systems and the conceptual systems they are intended to model, as by determining whether formally
equivalent ways ofeliciting the same information produce the same or different responses or by assessing
an expert's ability tojudge the completeness ofa representation; (5) detecting reporting biases reﬂecting
unintentional or deliberate misreports or wrong answers; and (6) detecting distortions in the reporting of
past events, since hindsight can produce exaggerations ofwhat could have been or was known inforesight
at the time of an event and since experts may have over-emphasized particular events, leading to
misinterpretations ofthe importance and generality of causal forcesinvolved.
Each ofthese issues has a potential impact on knowledge acquisition and must therefore be considered in
developing techniques and protocols for practical applications as well as for guiding analytical and
empirical research efforts.
Forknowledge to beused in a system, it must be represented in some fashion in the systems knowledge base. Hamill (1985)
says that this representation is essential psychologically, in that it requires the investigator to produce an explicit analytical
model of the process being used by the decision—maker in response to sets of situation requirements. Human factors
professionals insist on keeping theuserneeds inmind (throughtask analysis or someother technique) when designinghuman-
machine interfaces. Knowledge acquisition and representation must also be done with the end users of the expert system in
mind.
User Interaction Erocess
Hillman (1985) also reports that investigators agree on the need for human factors considerations in the user interaction
process. In general, this means that the interaction between the system and the user must be such that the user can easily
understand both what the system is doing and why. This interaction process is described by Hamill (1984) in the
following excerpt:
Knowledge utilization, Once knowledge has been acquired front experts and represented appropriately in the
system's knowledge base, it must be accessed and utilized in making decisions and solving problems. The manner
in which the system is to perform these functions inﬂuences the design of the control structure that drives its
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Training Arm Grip Design
The teaching mode or tele-operations mode can benefit from the great amount ofhuman factors tele-operation research and
development done by NASA; these methods will not be elaborated here. Sufﬁce it to say that known guidelines and standards
with respect to anthropometrics and perceptual-motor task design must beapplied if adequate transfer of training to the robot
is to be accomplished or if the robot is to successfully operate in a tele-robotic mode.
Software Interface Design
While design of the control panel and the training arm grip are straightforward human engineering problems, a unique set of
human engineering considerations must be applied when designing the ﬂat panel display that will represent the operator‘s
interaction with the system software. Some of these issues are discussed by Shulman and Olex (1985). In general, these
considerations will includethe use oftext, graphics and colorto provide a dialog with theoperator; hierarchical display design;
data input techniques; and other external factors affecting performance, such as illumination, noise and vibration.
Safety
Accidents may occur with robots that will damage the target object or surrounding equipment, the robot itself or personnel.
Parsons (1985b) indicates that accidents occurring in the tele-robotic mode may be called operator errors, but more cogently
' are designer errors that permitted the accident to happen. Parsons also notes numerous human factors considerations that
relate to safety, including: maintenance precautions; training of operators and others; operator workstation precautions and
operator intervention precautions; material/equipment protection precautions; on~line (teaching) programming precautions;
and, intrusion detection devices.
RELATED CONSIDERATIONS: Effective utilization of robotics will also require maintenance, skill requirements and
training and organizational/operational design considerations.
CONCLUSION: As the design of robots becomes more ﬂexible, the need for operator interface with the robot will
become more demanding. System performance and safety will depend to a large extent on the adequacy of human factors
considerations during design.
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 j. AREA: TECHNOLOGY AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS
ISSUE: TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEMS MUST FUNCTIONWITHIN SOMEORGANIZATION. THE APPLICATIONOFNEW
TECHNOLOGYTHEREFORE REQUIRESNOT ONLY CONSIDERATION OFTHE HUMAN-MACHINE INTERFACE,
BUT ALSO CULTURAL CONSIDERATIONS.
ARGUMENT: In 1949, Norbert Wiener, the father of cybemetics, wrote in his book The Human Use of Human Beings:
In my opinion, any utilization ofa human being is degradation and waste ifit asks for less and expectsfrom
him less thanhisfull capacities. Itis a degradation to chain man toa thwart anduse hint as a source ofenergy,-
but it is almost as great a degradation to set him in afactory to a perpetually reiterating task which claims
less than a millionth of the capabilities of his brain.
More recently, Margulies and Zemanek ( 1982) said thatwhere material needs to some degree and to some period of timehave
been overcome in the work force, mentalneed as expressedin the lack ofchallenge andcontent ofworkis all themore present.
They further state: “Thus technological needs andhuman aspirationmeet inthe search for new patterns ofwork organization
and for new relationships between man and machine.” Their article, entitled Man’s Role in Human-Machine Systems,
addresses many of the social andhumanistic aspects of technology rather well. The material that follows was excerpted from
that article:
opinions are expressed in a great number ofpublications by social scientists, trade unions, governments
and enterprise managements. They all strike the note that Humanization of Work and Productivity or
Economic Viability ofalternative work organizations need notbe contradictory or mutually exclusive. And
in fact over the last ﬁﬁeen years we have witnessed an increasing number of experiments and research
concerning alternative work organizations.
 
.
.
u
.
.
.
‘
'
u
—
“
A
n
a
‘
s
In fact, every man/machine system links two extremely contradictory structures. Take, for example, the
computer. It is an artiﬁcially created,formalized system with stable features. Once having been designed
and built, it canfail, but it can never change. Man, on the other hand, is a natural, nonformalized system.
He is never stable, he changes as long as he lives — even ifhe does not fail.
Ifinformation processing as a technology andprofession has already somany andimportant human aspects,
its impact on society must corresponding]y have many and important peculiarities. There is no nontrivial
g engineering innovation without an impact on society.
The worker should not continue to be consideredthe object ofdecisions taken by other people like designers,
, organizers, technologists, he should rather become the subject of work organization, participating in the
‘ design and in alldecisions to be taken. The optionsprovided by modern technology allowfor more autonomy
of the individual worker or of small groups of workers, they allow for work structures supporting the
t development ofone’s personality, they allowfor identiﬁcation with one’s work.
RELATED CONSIDERATIONS: User acceptance, which is discussed as an area of Automation in Control Systems, is
another psycho-social consideration in system design.
CONCLUSION: Social andhumanistic considerations, in addition to human-machine interface considerations, will
affect the total system effectiveness, particularly over the long run.
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 6.5 COMPUTER ERROR: DEDICATION CAN BE DANGEROUS
The notion of human error is firmly ingrained in our everyday lives. However, a
new and more insidious blunder —- the computer error —- may be infiltrating our newest
and most sophisticated systems. Moreover, a concomitant myth has been built up that
the computer can do no wrong and the mesmerism may be creating a monster —— a blind
faith in computers.
Computer errors can be categorized as:
1. Dedicated Program Execution: These are errors in the sense that
computers equivocally pursue their instructions, even though the system
that they control may be heading for a catastrophe (economic or
safety-related).
2. Software Bugs: These are programming errors that don't usually show
up until some unique situation is presented to the computer.
3. Truth in Computers: These are errors of perception in that we are
often willing to accept the results if it is done by a computer.
These computer errors, as I have called them, are, of course, human errors,
because the source of the error (in most, but not all cases) is a designer or programmer
error. As with other kinds of system errors, computer errors do not always show up
until the system is in operation and a specific set of circumstances prevails. In any
event, there seems to be more and more computer errors showing up in highly
automated systems that have been touted as technological marvels. Consider the
examples that follow.
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 a. AREA: DEDICATED PROGRAM EXECUTION
ISSUE: COMPUTERS, ONCE INSTALLED IN SYSTEMS, EXECUTE THEIR PROGRAMMED INSTRUCTION WII H
UNFLAGGING COMMITMENT — WIETHER IT BE RIGHT OR WRONG AT THE TIME.
ARGUMENT: The dedication with which computers pursue their programmed instructions is at once both awesome and
scary. Could they be programmed incorrectly or could data entry errors lead to some insidious result? Many incidents, such
as those cited here, prompt us to say yes.
Perrow
(1984') has many examples of computer error in his book, Normal Accidents. The excerpts below describe but a few
of those he has documented.
Perrow
Wiener
Foran unknown reason a short circuit occurred in some ofthe controls in the control room. The utility said
it could have beendue to a bent connecting pin in the control panel, so sensitive are these devices, or the
malfunction may have been caused by some maintenance work being done on an adjacent panel. The short
circuit distorted some ofthe readings in the control system, in particular the important and very sensitive
one ofcoolant temperature. The computerperceived the coolant was growing too cold, so itspeeded up the
reaction in the core. (The Babcock and Wilcox reactor operates within a very efﬁcient. but quite narrow,
temperature band.) The reactor overheated, the pressure in the core went upto the danger level and then
the reactor automatically shut down. The computer was apparently nowpuzzled and correctly ordered the
pressure reliefvalve (PORV) to open, but incorrectly ordered it to remain open until things settleddown. This
was an error on its part, because pressure dropped so quickly that it automatically caused high pressure
injection to come on and stay on,ﬂooding the primary coolant loop—including the core, steam tubes and
pressurizer. A valve stuck and 43,000 gallons ofradioactive water were dumped on theﬂoor ofthe reactor
building. Fortunately it was not worse; after several minutes an operator noticed the computer's error in
keeping the reliefvalve open and closed the valves manually. Had thefrequent injection beenfollowed that
the computer knows bestandthatthe (dumb) operators should keep theirhands oﬁ‘the system untilits routines
are carried out, the sump would have overﬂowed and we would indeed have had a wet reactor.
also cites a maritime incident:
Of course, the automation makes the ships vulnerable to small errors. An incident is described in Mostert’s
book in which the engine room was on automatic control and everyone was asleep. Alarms then went 017’;
the main boiler had tripped and the engines hadautomatically tripped in turn — a safety device, just as in
a nuclearpower plant. Emergency electricalpower was producedby the residual heat— twenty minutes of
it and then blackout. The crew couldn’tﬁnd the problem, so they started the boilers up anyway in order to
have power to search further.
It tooksix hours toﬁnd thata half-inch wide rubber diaphragmhad spliton a reducing valve. The valve used
high-pressure air to hold up aﬂap on aforced draftfan. The diaphragmfailure caused theﬂap to close, but
only momentarily, which told the computer that thefanshad stopped,although they hadn't. Thinking thefans
were stopped, the computer immediately put the boilerﬁres out, which stopped the engines and the ship.
Fortunately, the ship was not in busy waters orclose to the coast, or in a storm. As Mostert aptly puts it,
“automation is marvelous; it has a pretty, animated face. ” But automation depends upon a ship's
undependable power system, itself automated.
(1985) reminds us that unanticipated computer errors are appearing in the new automated aircraft.
In the lost two years, several accidents and incidents, rightly or not, were laid to automation. A DC-9-80
(MD-80) lost both engines due to fuel starvation because the center-tank pumps were not turned on after
takeoﬁ' (Aviation Week and Space Technology (AW&ST), 1983). Digitalﬁiel gauges were blamed Soon
after, another 767during descent, had to have both engines shut down andrestarted to bringthem outofidle
power. An over—eﬂ‘icient computer was seen as the villain (Beck 1983; Miami Herald 1983).
One airline captain warns of the danger of stick pushers. His fears may be justiﬁed by recent events. A
Fairchild Metro crashed in a steep nose-down attitude shortly after takeoﬂrfrom Terre Haute. The Metro
has a stall warning system that gives an aural alert upon recognizing an impending stall, then activates a
stickpusher with a 60-poundforce to lower the nose to avoid the stall. Two other incidents ofpilots having
to overpower ordeactivate stickpushers have recently been examined by the National TransportationSafety
Board (NTSB) (AW&ST I984).
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b. AREA: SOFTWARE BUGS
ISSUE: AS COMPUTER PROGRAMS GET MORE MASSIVE AND COMPLICATED, SOFTWARE BUGS WILL BECOME
ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO FULLY DETECT DURING PROGRAM TESTING AND VALIDATION,
AND THESE DEFECTS WILL SURELY SHOW UP AFTER OPERATIONS HAVE BEGUN.
ARGUMENT: A Wall Street Journal article in January 1987 vividly described some of the incidents from software bugs,
as the excerpts below describe (Davis 1987):
Verdon Kidd, an East Texas bus driver, was making progress against his skin cancer last spring when his
computerized radiation-therapy machine went haywire and killed hint.
Federaland state regulators say a defect in the machine' s software caused the machine toburn Mr.Kidd with
radiation 80 times more potent than the prescribed dose. Atomic Energy ofCanada Ltd., the manufacturer,
acknowledges that its equipment may have been partly to blame but says that it can't possibly catch every
bug.
The tiniest software bug can fell the mightiest machine— often with disastrous consequences. During the
pastfive years, software defects have killed sailors, maimed patients, wounded corporationsand threatened
to cause the government-securities market to collapse. Suchproblems are likely to grow as industry and the
military increasingly rely on software to run systems of phenomenal complexity, including President
Reagan’s proposed Star Wars anti-missile defense system.
“We have to be very careful what we trust to computers." cautions Peter Neumann, a computer scientist at
SRI International, Inc., a Menlo Park, California, Think Tank. "The vast majority ofsystems are deeply
ﬂawedfrom the viewpoint ofreliability, safety, security andprivacy.” AddsEdward Lieblein,formerly the
Pentagon's top software expert: "Software problems have reached crisis proportions."
Software bugs breed as quickly as cockroaches and are as diﬁ‘icult to stamp out. A computerized banking
system, for instance, may consist ofmillions oflines ofcomputer code, written by hundreds ofpeople who
each work on small segments of the program. Software experts say they can't ever know with certainty
whether all the segments will work in harmony; an error as tiny as a misplacedsemicolon can cause a system
to malfunction.
Sometimesﬁxin g a small bug can lead to greater problems. Two years before the ﬁrst launch ofthe space
shuttle, a programmer changed the timing on some shuttle software by one-thirtieth of a second. Unknown
to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, that miniscule change introduced a 1-in-67 chance
that the shuttle's ﬁve on-board computers wouldn’t work in sync. TWenty minutes before launch in April
1981 , the bug appeared, the computers couldn’t communicate andNASA scrubbed theﬂight.
NASA says that thousands ofhours of testing hadn't uncovered the bug. “It's as hard to predict software
failure as it is to predict whatyour poker hand will be in the next deal," saysJohn Garman, a leading NASA
software expert.
Bank ofNew York discoveredhow high the stakes can be in late 1985. A computer error blocked the bank
fromdelivering huge amounts ofgovernment securities to customers and acceptingpayment. As a result, the
bank wasforced to borrow $23.6 billion overnightfrom the Federal Reserve Bank in New York to cover the
shortfall andpay $5 million interest on the loan.
Though the bank resolved its software problem within two days,E. Gerald Corrigan, the president oftheNew
York Fed, says that the gavernment-securities market showed signs of unraveling even in that short period
of time. There was “a backup in the willingness and ability of some other market participants to transfer
securities among themselves," he told Congress.
Petroski (1985) also provides an incident that makes one wonder about the sanctity of computer programs:
Unfortunately, nuclear plants and other complex structures cannot be designed withoat the aid ofcomputers
and the complex programs that work the problems assigned them. This leads to not a little confusion when
an error is discovered, usually by serendipity, in a program that had long since been used to establish the
safety of a plant operating atfull power. The analysis of the many piping systems in nuclear plants seems
to be especially prone to gremlins and one computerprogram usedfor calculating the stresses in pipes was
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 c. AREA: TRUTHINCOMPUTERS
ISSUES: COMPUTERS USED AS DESIGN AIDS MAY INDUCE A KIND OF OVER-CONFIDENCE OR LACK OF HANDS-
ON EXPERIENCE THAT CAN LEAD TO ACCEPTING QUESTIONABLE OR EVEN WRONG RESULTS AT FACE
VALUE.
ARGUMENT: Petroski ( I985), inhis book ToEngineer is Human, discusses this phenomena as he describes the transition
from slide rules to computers:
The trend is clear that eventually no engineer will own or use a traditional slide rule, but that practicing
engineers of all generations will use -—- and misuse —— computers Now, a decade after the calculator
displaced the slide rule, we are beginning to ask these questions, but we are asking them not about the
calculator but about the personal computer. And the reason these questions are being asked is that the
assimilation ofthe calculatorand the computeris virtually complete with the newer generations ofengineers
now leaving school and the bad eﬁects are beginning to surface. Some structural failures have been
attributed to the use and misuse ofthe computer andnot only by recent graduates and there is a real concern
that its growing power and use will lead to other failures.
Now, the computer not only can perform millions of simple, repetitive calculations automatically in
reasonableamounts oftime butalso can be used to analyze structures thatengineers ofthe slide rule erafound
too complex. The computer can be used to analyze these structures through special software packages,
claimed to be quite versatile by their developers and the computer can be instructed to calculate the sizes
of the various components of the structure so that it has minimum weight since the maximum stresses are
acting in everypart ofit. Thatis called optimization. But should there be an oversimplification or an outright
error in translating the designer’s structural concept to the numerical model that will be analyzed through
the automatic and unthinking calculations ofthe computer, then the results of the computer analysis might
have very little relation to reality. And since the engineer himselfpresumably has no feelfor the structure
he is designing, he is not likely to notice anything suspicious about any numbers the computer producesfor
the design.
The computer does not work with ideas but with numbers and it can only solve a single problem at a time.
The pipe it looks at must have a speciﬁed diameter, a specified crack, a specified strength and a specified
load applied to it. Furthermore, the computer modelofthe crackedpipe must havea speciﬁed idea as to how
a crack grows as the postulated accidentprogresses.
All these speciﬁcations are madeby human beings and thus theresults ofthe computer are only as conclusive
about the safety of the system as the questions asked are the critical ones. Thus, while the computer can be
an almost indispensablepartner in the design process, it can also be a source of overconfidence on thepart
of its human bosses. When used to crunch numbers for large but notespecially innovative designs, the
computer is not likely to misleadthe experienced designer because he knows,front his andothers’ experience
with similar structures, what questions to ask. If such structures havefailed he will be particularly alert to
the possibility of similar modes offailure in his structure. However, when the computer is relied uponfor
the design ofinnovative structuresfor which there is little experience ofsuccess, let alone failure, then it is
as likely, perhaps more likely,for the computer to be mistaken as it wasfor a human engineer in the days of
the slide rule. And as more complex structures are designed because it is believed that the computer can do
whatman cannot, then there is indeedan increasedlikelihood that structures will fail,for thefurther we stray
from experience the less likely we are to think ofall the right questions.
CONCLUSION: Computer models and simulators can be excellent design aids, but the results from these analyses
should always be questioned andperhaps calculated or approximated some other way before being reliedupon. Just because
it was done on a computer does not make it right or righteous.
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WILL BE DEGRADED. It is imperative that we learn to use technology to support
rather than overwhelm the user. This consideration will be particularly important
for those technology areas that effect performance at the HMI, such as:
- computer-driven displays;
— CRT color displays;
— data input techniques; and
— voice input/output.
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° ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND EXPERT SYSTEMS CANNOT BE EXPECTED
TO BE A MAJOR APPLICATION IN CONTROL SYSTEM DESIGN FOR QUITE A
WHILE. Their successful implementation will require close harmony between
systems engineers, computer scientists, human engineers and of course, experts.
° ROBOTICS MUST BE CAREFULLY DESIGNED TO MEET USER NEEDS AND
EXPECTATIONS IN ORDER TO MAXIMIZE EFFECTIVENESS AND SAFETY. In
many cases, robotics are really a form of remote control and the HMI is still a
critical element in performance.
° SOCIAL AND HUMANISTIC CONSIDERATIONS WILL BE AFFECTED BY THE
APPLICATION OF TECHNOLOGY AND IN TURN WILL EFFECT THE ULTIMATE
PERFORMANCE OF SYSTEMS.
° APPLIED HUMAN FACTORS IS EFFECTIVE. It has been well established that
applied human factors will reduce human error, decrease training costs, reduce
skill requirements and increase user acceptance. These types of impacts improve
human—machine performance and thus system performance.
° r COMPUTER ERROR IS A NEW CAUSE FOR CONCERN. The digital computer is
another black box between the operator and the process. The computer also
represents a source of error from stored instructions or faulty elements (e.g.
microchips). Computers do make errors in the sense that they unequivocally pursue
their instructions, even though the system they control may be heading for a
catastrophic event. There are also perennial bugs in software and the real danger
is believing computer results without question.
Finally, I want to close with the conclusion that HUMAN FACTORS IS NOT
COMMON SENSE. Many of the horror stories in this paper and those that appear
almost daily in the news, are due to well—intentioned common sense. In complex
systems and facilities today, a common sense approach has produced marginally
acceptable systems (from a human factors viewpoint) based on the fact that the
hardware and the technology associated with that hardware have been around for some
time. Experience with technology has produced a level of knowledge that one might
term lessons learned —— whichmay really be what is referred to as common sense.
In periods involving such quantum leaps in technology, hardware and software
sophistication, and the changing role of man as we have been experiencing recently, this
common sense approach breaks down —— primarily because of the absence of lessons
learned that come with experience with a technology or method. Therefore, the
integration of technology into the interface of systems that will affect the larger
ecosystem must be done with the fullest utilization of the principles and philosophy of
human factors to avoid breakdowns at the human—machine interface that could be
catastrophic.
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INTRODUCTION
Recent accidents at Chernobyl and Bhopal and the sudden appearance of a blob in
the St. Clair River have heightened public concern about the impact of extraordinary
pollution incidents. Such concern is of particular relevance to the Great Lakes basin,
with its concentration of industry, chemical manufacturers, nuclear-power generating
plants and well—developed transportation infrastructure.
Massive catastrophic accidents are rare and because of their low probability, are
often dismissed as not being of real concern. However, the findings of the
investigations prompted by the perchloroethylene blob near Sarnia focused attention on
repeated, lower—level incidents that warrant further examination by the jurisdictions of
the Great Lakes basin.
A review of available records over the past ten years reveals a spate of regular
minor accidents, each releasing between tenand 4,000 tonnes of contaminants into the
St. Clair River, in close proximity to the drinking—water intakes for several
metropolotan areas. These contaminants are complex, man-made chemicals and many
of them are designated as hazardous.
Although efforts have been directed towards the prevention and cleanup of spills
and accidents, their significance as a source ofpollution to the Great Lakes has not
been determined with any precision. The purpose of this paper is to develop a first
indicative estimate of the impact of these extraordinary pollution incidents on the basin.
7.1 LEGAL FRAMEWORK
One reason why spills have been overlooked as a pathway of pollution is simple
confusion. Is the chemical spill from a truck tanker flushed down the sewer and
into the river the equivalent ofthe leaking pipe at the refinery, the spill from the
oil tanker or the occasional illegal dumping of oil into the sewers by the local gas
station or the individual citizen? Although some commonality of treatment of
spills is now being achieved, even now one incident may be reported to the fire
department, the next to the environmental agency, the next to the coast guard and
yet another, possibly not reported at all. Often each organization receiving these
reports will maintain discrete records, with the result being that no single annual
quantification of chemicals spilled is available that would allow us todetermine
their relative significance.
As agencies improve their focus on spills and increase their cooperation and
communication, there are some signs this confusion' of what constitutes a spill is
lifting. However, the International Joint Commission (IJC) could, and should, be
playing a more active role in dispelling this confusion.
The IJC Great Lakes office has a primary oversight role in the implementation of
the 1978 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement. This Agreement between Canada
and the United States considers spill incidents as discharges. In Annex 8 to the
Agreement, discharge is defined as:
. the introduction of polluting substances into receiving waters and
includes, but is not limited to, any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring,
emitting or dumping; it does not include continuous effluent discharges
from municipal or industrial treatment facilities; and discharges are
defined broadly to include everything that is not a continuous effluent
discharge.
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The Annex also defines where those incidents can originate in the broadest
possible terms. Facilities include:
. motor vehicles, rolling stock, pipelines and any other facility that is
used or capable of being used for the purpose of processing, producing,
storing, disposing, transferring or transporting oil or hazardous polluting
substances but excluding vessels.
This includes almost any type of mode of transport, factory or storage
facility. Vessels are covered in their own annex with requirements that are
more specific to shipping.
Under Article VI, section (h), the Agreement requires the parties to enact measures:
for the abatement and control of pollution from onshore and offshore
facilities, including programs and compatible regulations for the
prevention of discharges of harmful quantities of oil and other hazardous
polluting substances, in accordance with Annex 8.
The Agreement also requires the governments to review the operation of facilities
for their adequacy to prevent discharges and also very explicitly defines chemical
discharges of concern, specifying oil or hazardous polluting substances. Oil is defined
as:
. oil of any kind or in any form, including but not limited to petroleum,
fuel oil, oil sludge, oil refuse and oil mixed with wastes, but does not
include constituents of dredged spoil.
The Agreement has a separate Annex 10 to define Hazardous Polluting Substances.
For inclusion in this list, a chemical must be toxic, lethal to animal life and pose a
real risk of being discharged into the Great Lakes. Table l is a listing of such
chemicals as they appear in the 1978 Agreement. It should be noted that these
chemicals are distinct from the more high profile chemicals known as persistent toxic
substances, defined elsewhere in the Agreement.
METHOD
To arrive at a first estimate of the extent ofdischarges into the Great Lakes basin,
relevant International Joint Commission reports, selected government reports and
scientific literature were reviewed. Officials in the Environmental Protection
Agency, Environment Canada, the U.S. Department of Transport, the U.S National
Response Center, Michigan Department of Natural Resources and the Ontario
Ministry of the Environment were contacted; in' addition, a survey of several of the
most relevant government databases was undertaken.
Although there are individual state databases, due to time constraints it was decided
to concentrate only on those databases that provided coverage of the entire U.S. or
Canadian basin. Thus, some data will be omitted from consideration in this report;
these omissions would be corrected in any full—scale review of this issue.
Discharges from four distinct sources were examined:
0
the transportation sector;
0
industries;
0
municipal sewage plants and sewer systems; and
energy generators.
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Acetaldehyde
Acetic Acid
Acetic Anhydride
Acetone Cyanohydrin
Acetyl Bromide
Acetyl Chloride
Acrolein
Acrylonitrile
Aldrin
Allyl Alcohol
Allyl Chloride
Aluminum Sulfate
Ammonia
Ammonium Acetate
Ammonium Benzoate
Ammonium Bicarbonate
Ammonium Bichromate
Ammonium Biﬂuoride
Ammonium Bisulﬁte
Ammonium Carbamate
Ammonium Carbonate
Ammonium Chloride
Ammonium Chromate
Ammonium Citrate,
Dibasic
Ammonium Fluoborate
Ammonium Fluoride
Ammonium Hydroxide
Ammonium Oxalate
Ammonium Silicon-
ﬂuoride
Ammonium Sulfamate
Ammonium Sulﬁde
Ammonium Sulﬁte
Ammonium Tartrate
Ammonium Thiocyanate
Ammonium Thiosulfate
Amyl Acetate
Aniline
Antimony Pentachloride
Antimony Potassium
Tartrate
Antimony Tribromide
Antimony Trichloride
Antimony Trifluoride
Antimony Trioxide
Arsenic Disulﬁde
Arsenic Pentoxide
Arsenic Trichloride
Arsenic Trioxide
Arsenic Trisulfide
Arium Cyanide
Benzene
Benzoic Acid
Benzonitrile
Benzoyl Chloride
Benzyl Chloride
Beryllium Chloride
Beryllium Fluoride
Beryllium Nitrate
Butyl Acetate
TABLE 1. Hazardous polluting substances.
Butylamine
Butyric Acid
Cadmium Acetate
Cadmium Bromide
Cadmium Chloride
Calcium Arsenate
Calcium Arsenite
Calcium Carbide
Calcium Chromate
Calcium Cyanide
Calcium Dodecylbenzene-
sulfonate
Calcium Hydroxide
Calcium Hypochlorite
Calcium Oxide
Captan
Carbaryl
Carbon Disulﬁde
Chlordane
Chlorine
Chlorobenzene
Chloroform
Chlorosulfonic Acid
Chlorpyrifos
Chromic Acetate
Chromic Acid
Chromic Sulfate
Chromous Chloride
Cobaltous Bromide
Cobaltous Fomrate
Cobaltous Sulfamate
Coumaphos
Cresol
Cupric Acetate
Cupric Acetoarsenite
Cupric Chloride
Cupric Nitrate
Cupric Oxalate
Cupric Sulfate
Cupric Sulfate, Ammoni—
ated
Cupric Tartratc
Cyanogen Chloride
Cyclohexane
2, 4—D Acid
2, 4~D Esters
Dalapon
DDT
Diazinon
Dicamba
Dichlobenil
Dichlone
Dichlorvos
Dieldrin
Diethylamine
Dimethylamine
Dinitrobenzene (mixed)
Dinitrophenol
Diquat
Disulfoton
Diuron
Dodecylbenzenesulfonic
Acid
Endosulfan
Endrin
Ethion
Ethylbenzene
Ethylenediamine
EDTA
Ferric Ammonium Citrate
Ferric Ammonium
Oxalate
Ferric Chloride
Ferric Fluoride
Ferric Nitrate
Ferric Sulfate
Ferrous Ammonium
Sulfate
Ferrous Chloride
Ferrous Sulfate
Formaldehyde
Formic Acid
Fumaric Acid
Furfural
Guthion
Heptachlor
Hydrochloric Acid
Hydroﬂuoric Acid
Hydrogen Cyanide
Isoprene
Isopropanolamine
Dodecylbenzene-
sulfonate
Kelthane
Lead Acetate
Lead Arsenate
Lead Chloride
Lead Fluoborate
Lead Fluoride
Lead Iodide
Lead Nitrate
Lead Stearate
Lead Sulfate
Lead Sulﬁde
Lead Thiocyanate
Lindane
Lithium Chromate
Malathion
Maleic Acid
Maleic Anhydride
Mercuric Cyanide
Mercuric Nitrate
Mercuric Sulfate
Mercuric Thiocyanate
Mercurous Nitrate
Methoxychlor
Methyl Mercaptan
Methyl Methacrylate
Methyl Parathion
Mevinphos
Mexacarbate
Monoethylarnine
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Monomethylamine
Naled
Naphthalene
Naphthenic Acid
Nickel Ammonium
Sulfate
Nickel Chloride
Nickel Hydroxide
Nickel Nitrate
Nickel Sulfate
Nitric Acid
Nitrobenzene
Nitrogen Dioxide
Nitrophenol (mixed)
Paraformaldehyde
Parathlon
Pentachlorophenol
Phenol
Phosgene
Phosphoric Acid
Phosphorus
Phosphorus Oxychloride
Phosphorus Pentasulﬁde
Phosphorus Trichloride
Polychlorinated Biphenyls
Potassium Arsenate
Potassium Arsenite
Potassium Bichromate
Potassium Chromate
Potassium Cyanide
Potassium Hydroxide
Potassium Permanganate
Propionic Acid
Propionic Anhydride
Pyrethrins
Quinoline
Resorcinol
Selenium Oxide
Sodium
Sodium Arsenate
Sodium Arsenite
Sodium Bichromate
Sodium Biﬂuoride
Sodium Bisulﬁte
Sodium Chromate
Sodium Cyanide
Sodium Dodecylbenzene-
sulfonate
Sodium Fluoride
Sodium Hydrosulﬁde
Sodium Hydroxide
Sodium Hypochlorite
Sodium Methylate
Sodium Nitrite
Sodium Phosphate,
Dibasic
Sodium Phosphate,
Tribasic
Sodium Selenite
Strontium Chromate
Strychnine
 
Styrene
Sulfuric Acid
Sulfur Monochloride
2,4,5vT Acid
2,4,5-T Esters
TDE
Tetraethyl Lead
Tetraethyl Pyrophosphate
Toluene
Toxaphene
Trichlorfon
Trichlorophenol
Triethanolamine
Dodecylbenzene-
sulfonate
Triethylamine
Trimethylarnine
Uranyl Acetate
Uranyl Nitrate
Vanadium Pentoxide
Vanadyl Sulfate
Vinyl Acetate
Xylene (mixed)
Xylenol
Zinc Acetate
Zinc Ammonium Chloride
Zinc Borate
Zinc Bromide
Zinc Carbonate
Zinc Chloride
Zinc Cyanide
Zinc Fluoride
Zinc Formate
Zinc Hydrosulﬁte
Zinc Nitrate
Zinc Phenolsulfonate
Zinc Phosphide
Zinc Silicoﬂuoride
Zinc Sulfate
Zirconium Nitrate
Zirconium Potassium
Fluoride
Zirconium Sulfate
Zirconium Tetrachloride
    
   
   
  
    
  
    
   
   
  
   
   
 
   
 
Database Overview
a.
Article VI, Section (h) and Annex 8 of the Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement specifically require governments to prohibit discharges of harmful
quantities of oil and hazardous polluting substances and requires the UC to
monitor the progress of these efforts.
Under Annex 4 of the Agreement, the Coast Guards of the United States and
Canada provide to the IJC each year a review of discharges from vessels.
The latest report lists 94 pollution incidents in the Great Lakes reported to
the Canadian Coast Guard for 1985 and 478 reported to the US. Coast Guard
for the same year. However, it appears that there is no corresponding report
for Annex 8 discharges. No comprehensive or current review of data on
discharges or on efforts to arrest this type of pollution from all types of
facilities was available through the IJC library. The need for further scrutiny
of this issue was acknowledged in contacts with several IJC officials.
Government reports quantifying discharges in particular segments of the
basin for limited time spans were located; however, there are no unified
studies of the whole basin on either side of the border for immediate
comparison. For that reason efforts were concentrated on establishing what
data are available in the categories outlined above, in what form, how these
data could be accessed and if the data were available, what was the
significance of the information.
7.3 EXAMINATION: TRANSPORTATION AND INDUSTRY
United States — Database Review
In the United States, the Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) is the
federal agency with primary responsibility for all spills. However, at this
time it does not have an operational database covering spills on a multi—state
basis. The Agency is in the process of creating a database called ERNS
(Emergency Response Notification System). It is intended that this will
become the main national spills database in the United States. Initially, it
will receive reports from the EPA and from the National Response Center's
24—hour national spill hot linel, described below.
Outside the EPA, there are numerous national databases containing
information on spills and accidents, including those in the Great Lakes basin.
A report from the US Congress Office of Technology Assessment2 lists 12
US. spill databases. Some have been replaced by new versions and many are
too specialized to yield appropriate data for an initial overview.
The National Response Center (NRC) is staffed by the US. Coast Guard and
funded by a large number of US. agencies. Its role is to serve as a central
facility for reception of reports of emergency spills occurring anywhere in
the United States. It maintains a spill—information database; discussions
were held with numerous National Response Center officials involved with
that database to attempt to extract Great Lakes basin information.
Unfortunately, the database proved somewhat inflexible, necessitating
numerous redefinitions and restrictions on search activities. Further,
inadequate control had been exercised on the data input and complete,
comprehensive retrievals were impossible. For example, a number of names,
with a variety of spellings. This could be used to describe locations and
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 materials spilled. This thwarted any effort for complete retrieval based on
name parameters other than painstaking manual review of the printed data.
Eventually, as noted above, this National Response Center database will be
combined with the regional databases of the EPA to form the ERNS system.
At a later date the database will be modified to allow the adding of reports
on spill remedial action. This should allow the input of improved estimates of
quantities of materials spilled.
Many officials believe that this enhanced database will provide the best
coverage of spills in the United States when it is operational. However,
adequate inclusion of state data, which in many cases may be more extensive
than either that of the National Response Center or the EPA, remains a
concern. EPA officials noted that, at the time of this review, the details of
state cooperation had not been defined and agreed upon. Should these
matters go unresolved, the effectiveness of the database could be severely
hampered. The implementation of the ERNS database is now moving ahead
and the U C will have to move expeditiously to influence its final form.
A second database, maintained by the U.S. Department of Transportation,
was determined worthy of further consideration in this preliminary
examination. U.S. federal laws require that many transport related spills be
reported directly to the U.S. Department of Transportation. Such
information is maintained in a database called the Hazardous Materials
Information System (HMIS). HMIS lists information on spills from the level of
a quart of paint up to major tanker accidents. However, retrievals were
subject to the same level of difficulty detected in the National Response
Center database.
United States — Retrievals
A search of the National Response Center base retrieved all spills to water
for the eight states surrounding the Great Lakes for 1984. The search listed
almost 2,000 spills for the period; however, this database and the one by the
Department of Transportation can only be searched by state. Since the Great
Lakes basin as a geographic area does not trace state boundaries, only data
from Michigan were of immediate use in a basin compilation. The balance
required manual sorting of the printed retrieval, 3 laborious and time
consuming task.
This task would be even more strenuous if, rather than only those occurring
on water, all spill entries for the eight states for one year were retrieved for
review. The output would have been in excess of 18,000 references for the
eight states for 1984.
Although Canadian data will be examined in more detail later, a comparison
of the number of incidents reported in a year for Ontario and the number
reported to the National Response Center for Michigan suggest that the
National Response Center database may be lacking a significant amount of
data that may be available from state files. It is mandatory to report spills
in Ontario; in the United States, law requires the reporting of spills to the
National Response Center. Yet Table 2 suggests far fewer spills are reported
to the National Response Center than to the Ontario spills centre. Since
Ontario and Michigan are similar jurisdictions, they could be expected that
they would experience a similar number of spills. This points out a possibly
significant under—reporting to the National Response Center.
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TABLE 2. Comparison of the spills to water for
Michigan and Ontario.
Jurisdiction Year Number of Spills
Michigan 1984 98 — from the National
Response Center database.
Ontario 1986 1,500 — from the Ontario spills
database.
A preliminary retrieval from the HMIS of the Department of Transport was also
attempted. Again, no method of limiting the search to areas in the Great Lakes
basin was available. It was necessary to search for the eight border states and
then manually eliminate those locations that did not rest in the basin. Needless
to say, this method is highly inefficient and an eight state scan was beyond the
scope of this report. However, data extracted (Table 3) for Michigan, a state
entirely in the Great Lakes basin, are indicative of the magnitude of such
events recorded in this database.
TABLE 3. Volume of individual and cumulative spills in
Michigan, 1984.
Spills over Total volume of over
State Spills 25 U.S. gallons 25—gallon spills
Michigan 203 27 8,953 gallons
While this database nominally covers transportation accidents, the Office .of
Technology Assessment cautions that they have found significant traffic
accidents that did not appear in this record.
Canada — Database Review
Environment Canada has maintained a spills database for over a decade. Called
NATES (National Analysis of Trends in Emergency Systems) it has been revised
several times and now has 43 fields with many subcategories within those
fields. It has a precisely defined information format (see attached) that allows
easy and extensive searches. Among the information the database listed:
location; date; material; weight in tonnes; amount recovered; transportation or
industry; cause of spill; and cost and injuries. It will allow searches by river
basin; however, time constraints did not permit this. If this function were
available in the US databases, the UC could begin the efficient compilation of
data for the entire basin.
The data for the NATES database came primarily from Ontario, where it was
used to prepare periodic reports on spills in the province. Ontario has recently
passed a law, commonly called the Spills Bill. The Bill requires reporting of
spills, with sanctions for those that don't. It imposes a duty to clean up and
restore the environment on those that own the material. Since passage of this
legislation, the province has begun to keep its own computerized records and
has changed its reporting requirements somewhat from the NATES format. As
a result of this, Ontario data can no longer be transferred directly to NATES
and entry of Ontario data into the national record is being significantly
delayed. This is a significant blow to record—keeping in Canada as NATES is
capable of providing thebest overview of spills so far identified in the basin .
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Canada — Retrievals
A very crude first estimate from the NATES
database of spills from various
sectors
in
Ontario yields
the
following (Table 4).
Note
that the numbers
associated with the municipal sector include overflows of raw
sewage.
This
does suggest that on the basis of quantity, transportation may not be as large a
source
as the
various
fixed
sources,
although
this
finding
bears
further
investigation.
Further, more sophisticated data manipulation was not possible
due to time constraints.
TABLE 4. Selected spills in Canadian segment of Great Lakes
basin in 1984.
 
S P I L L S S P I L L S
Amount Amount
Chemical
Number Tonnes
Chemical
Number Tonnes
Oil 40 1,302 Sulfuric Acid 5 227.6
Sewage 7 32,948 Phosphoric Acid 1 13.18
Sodium Hydroxide 3 99.4 Oil— PCB 2 5.03
Uranium Slurry 2 5.05
TABLE 5. Comparison of approximate number and quantity of spills
from broad sources in Ontario in 1984.
Sector Number of Spills Tonnes
Transportation 30 310
Industry 62 2,000
Municipal* 8 132,000*
Energy 5 95
*largely raw sewage overflows.
The Ontario government has begun keeping its own computer database in
1986 to correspond with the implementation of the Spills Bill. It contains
approximately 6,000 entries for the year, indicating that reporting has
increased with the introduction of the new more stringent legislation.
The Ontario system allows some searches and a retrieval for spills to water
was performed. Of the approximately 1,500 spills reported in the retrieval,
518, or 34%, had no quantity attached to them. It is not known whether this
is a function of the search or the new reporting requirements. The NATES
data from Ontario previously had a great deal of information on quantity.
Canada — Impact of Discharges versus Continuous Effluent
There is a common perception that spills, while being nuisances, do not
compare over the long—term with ongoing effluent discharges. It is here that
the NATES database is particularly valuable. It provides records of the
amount spilled in kilograms and the amount recovered so that the amount
released into the environment can be determined.
It is difficult to find continuous effluent discharge figures that can be used
for comparison; they have often been measured in a very imprecise manner.
In Ontario, the permitted releases of industries are not well—defined for toxic
substances, particularly specific organic chemicals. Rather, these substances
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are often lumped together under categories such as Total Organic Carbon. In
other circumstances, while concentrations in tested effluents have been
determined to the level of micrograms per litre, total flow volume has not
been readily available to allow calculation of total loadings. This situation
has been alleviated to a degree in recent sampling along the St. Clair River.
Because of concern about pollution from the chemical industries there and
new concerns about the blobs, current loading measurements have been made
available. With this information it is possible to compare loadings of selected
chemicals from on—going discharges with those from spills.
The following table was prepared using measurements from a 1985
Environment Canada study by King and Sherbin3 on point sources of toxic
chemicals in the upper St. Clair River. As one of the compounds listed in the
Agreement as a Hazardous Polluting Substance and a substance for which
spill and effluent discharge data were available, styrene was chosen as the
basis for comparison. To estimate an annual release, the daily discharge has
been extrapolated over 350 days. This may overestimate the release, but the
method does allow some rough comparison with the amount of this chemical
spilled into the St. Clair River, as shown in the following table (Table 6).
TABLE 6. Comparison of selected accidental releases and
point source discharges.
Daily Weight of Equivalent
Company Chemical Effluent 350 days Spill (kg) Years*
Dow Styrene 5.04kg 1,7505kg 2,700 1.5
Polysar Styrene .16 kg 46 kg 80,000 1,328
*as compared to point source discharge, 350—day basis.
For one incident, the spill was roughly equivalent to over 1400 years of
continuous effluent discharge and for the other, it equalled a continuous
discharge of 1.5 years.
These results suggest that the loading from spills may significantly exceed the
amounts released into the environment through regulated pathways. This is not
only true for major spills but may also be true of relatively minor spills of under
0.5 tonne.
An unpublished study of the St. Clair River indicates many industries
have reduced their permitted releases to less than 1 kg/day per chemical.
Compared to this level, a spill of 0.5 tonne would be significant.
Canada — Municipal
Sewage and Phosphorus
The primary extraordinary discharge in volume from municipal sewer systems is
that from combined sewer and storm water overflows.
Data collected for US
discharges
by
GCA
Corporation‘ for the Environmental
Protection Agency
gives the following
loadings
for
phosphorus
from
combined
sewer
overflows
(Table 7).
As
with
all data of spills, data
on municipal
spills is only good if all spills are
reported.
On April
14,
1987,
The
Toronto Globe
and Mail
reported
that "thirty
to
forty
times
a
year,
after
heavy
rain
storms,
Fort
Erie
town
workers
pump
overflowing
storm
water
contaminated
by
sewage
into
a
creek
flowing
into
Lake Erie."
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 TABLE 7. Estimated annual discharges from combined sewer overflows
(CSOs) in the U.S. segment of the Great Lakes basin.
Amount of discharge
 
Lake (tonnes)
Lake Michigan 207
Lake Huron 33.8
Lake Erie 457.8
Lake Ontario 106.4
Total 805.2
A review of all spills to water in Ontario for 1986 revealed no reports of
these spills to the provincial government. It is not clear what this means for
the quality of reporting of municipal discharges.
Chemical Pollution
Sewage is not the only discharge from the sewer systems. Considerable
amounts of contaminants from urban runoff enter the sewer systems during
storms and are released into the Great Lakes basin. These contaminants
include oil, antifreeze and tire particles from automotive sources and other
chemicals used in urban areas.
Chemicals have always entered the sewer system from urban users, both by
design and by accident. Efforts have been made to reduce authorized and
unauthorized release of chemicals into sewers and these efforts have met
with some success. But research has demonstrated that small scale and
unauthorized contamination is occurring and it is having a significant effect.
A study of a selected section of sewers in downtown Ann Arbor, Michigan, by
Schmidt and Spencer7 showed a considerable discharge of hazardous
chemicals. A detailed survey found a wide variety of improper and illegal
discharges.
This type of urban user pollution can have a significant effect on the Great
Lakes basin. A study in 1985 by Oliver and Bourbonniere8 pointed out that
the western basin of Lake Erie had a high level of contamination from PCBs.
Recent unpublished data9 indicate discharges of PCBs from the Detroit
sewage treatment plant of between 0.4 and 1.1 kg/day and a large—scale
survey of the Detroit sewer system by Giffels/Black/Veetch Inc.10 in 1981
found that the treatment plant was a major contributor of chemical
contamination to the Detroit River, particularly during storms. Much of this
contamination was released through the storm and overflow bypass systems.
Further investigations into sediments in the Detroit sewer system by the
Michigan Department of Natural Resources (DNR)11 verified that "PCB
contaminated sediments were moving from the Carter industrial site into the
18th Street sewer and eventually into the Detroit River through a combined
sewer overflow (Kengga, 1986)." Concentrations of PCBs in these sewer
sediments were as high as 1.6 g/kg PCB in July of1986. These levels had
declined to .48 g/kg in January 1987, due both to clean up efforts at the site
and the flushing of the sewer sediment into the river during and after heavy
rainfall events.
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Further monitoring by the CNR revealed another source of contamination from
an area referred to as the Frederick Avenue PCB site. PCB contamination in
the sewer system near the site averaged .025 g/kg and was accessible to the
river through the Concord Street sewer. The DNR has now recommended that
other CSOs should be sampled in the Detroit sewer system to identify further
sources of PCB contamination.
7.4 ENERGY GENERATION
a. Conventional Pollutants
The energy sector is also a contributor of chemical discharges to the lakes. The
range of chemicals is more limited than other industries but in some
circumstances, quantities can be very significant (Table 8).
m
Since 1975, the UC has reviewed data on the emission of radioactivity from
nuclear power stations, mines and mills, fuel fabrication and conversion
facilities, waste management sites and other facilities in the Great Lakes basin.
TABLE 8. Selected data on incidents of three releases from the power
generation facilities in Ontario.
Amount
Location Chemical (tonnes)
Trent River transformer oil 2.48
Lake Ontario (10 ppm) hydrazine 91.00
Trent River transormer oil 2.45
In the United States, operators of nuclear power plants are required to report to
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission when releases, both planned and unplanned,
exceed what are considered conservative limits. These figures (Table 9) have
been published by the IJC in the Appendix on Radioactivity to the 1983 Report
on Great Lakes Water Quality. Data for 1981 and 1982 are included in this
Appendix. The data from the Nuclear Power Regulatory Commission does not
differentiate between planned and unplanned releases. As well, the Commission
does not specify how the releases compare to allowable limits.
Canadian figures for the release of radiation are also given in the Appendix. In
addition, the Atomic Energy Control Board in Canada provides a calculation
that relates the emissions to allowable limits. In all cases, for 1981 and 1982
the releases were less than 1% of the annual allowable limit. As in the United
States, the amount of radioactivity released from planned and unplanned
releases is not distinguished.
Specific Incidents
In addition to reporting on the release of radioactivity, the IJC report has also
noted incidents that led to an unplanned release of radioactivity. In both
countries, the UC relies on information provided by the regulatory agencies.
For the 1981—82 period, one incident was reported for the 13 operating reactors
in the United States and nine incidents were reported for the nine reactors at
three generating stations in Canada. Six incidents were reported for fuel
processors and users.
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TABLE 9. Discharges from nuclear generating stations.
 
A N N U A L R E L E A S E I N C U R I E S
G A S E 0 U S A 0 U E 0 U S
1 1 1 . FISSION AND:
1 131 1 1 3 ACTIVATION 1 3
S T A T I 0 N PARTICULATESI I lNOBLE GASESI H PRODUCTS 1 H
1 9 8 1
Big Rock Point 0.004 10.002 1 17,900 1 10.22 0.39 1 3.1
Bruce A 0.0025 10 0028 1 16,000 192,000 2.2 120,000
Cook 1 & 2 0.278 10.037 1 5,421 1 5.47 1.87 1 916
Davis-Besse 1 0.004 10.054 1 1,012 1 8.65 0.79 1 157
Doug1as Point 0.00098 10.12 1 32,000 111,000 0.2 1 2,200
Fitzpatrick 0.165 10 115 1 119,500 1 6.65 2.51 1 4.1
Ginna 0.00001 10.001 1 546 1 70.1 0.04 1 240
Kewaunee 0.00003 10.000091 118 1 4.01 0.82 1 251
Nine-Mile Point 1 0.008 10.006 1 611 1 63.4 5.35 1 5.1
Pa1isades 0.001 10.040 1 3,002 1 6.42 0.03 1 278
Pickering 0.0046 10.0017 1 6,800 116,000 0.21 1 7,500
Point Beach 1 & 2 0.0004 10.004 1 611 1 480 1.09 1 652
Zion 1 & 2 0.008 10.005 1 6,910 1 a 2.65 1 870
1 9 8 2
Big Rock Point 0.002 10.003 1 12,930 1 6.26 0.26 1 2.98
Bruce A0 0024 0.024 10.032 1 14,000 141,000 2.1 126,000
Cook 1 & 2 0.024 10.104 1 3,883 1 5.11 1.90 1 1,295
Davis—Besse 1 0.00003 10.005 1 535 1 35.5 0.22 1 57
Douglas Point 0.00045 10.092 1 62,000 1 8,600 0.50 1 3,300
Fitzpatrick 0.337 10.434 1 211,000 1 5.26 0.65 1 0.65
Ginna 0.0002 10.0008 1 1,955 1 96.6 0.62 1 308
Kewaunee 0.00003 10.000031 166 1 8.07 1.52 1 318
Nine-M119 Point 1 0.071 10.020 1 51.1 1 53.5 0.0031 5.82
Pa1isades 0.004 10.023 1 7,382 1 4.49 0.1271 179
Pickering 0.0027 10.0019 1 6,600 118,000 0.49 110,000
Point Beach 1 & 2 0.0002 10.008 1 993 1 1,017 2.95 1 503
Zion 1 & 2 0.082 10.007 1 16,090 1 a 5.25 190,753
    
a. Not avai1ab1e
b. Information from References (1) and (2)
Incidents that lead to a release of radioactivity are not necessarily the only
important incidents. Other incidents may point to a weak spot where an
accident may occur. Given the potential severity of a major release of
radioactivity, these incidents can provide an important preventative role.
Although some nuclear—power incidents can appear trivial, they can have
significant consequences. The Presidential commission investigating the
accident at Three Mile Island said, "The same problem of water leaking into the
polishe's valve control system had occurred at least twice before at TM 1—2.
Had Met Ed corrected the earlier polisher problem, the March 18 sequence of
events may never have begun." The key note these incidents can play is to
reveal a pattern so that a problem can be spotted and corrected before an
accident occurs.
In the course of preparing this report, a number of conversations were held with
the Nuclear Safety Information Center at Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
They maintain the US. nuclear safety information database. This database
contains incident information extracted from reports the nuclear power
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generating facilities are required to file with the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission. Data for these facilities in the basin have been secured.
The data are based on the US. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (National
Response Center) Licensed Event Reports (LERs). These reports essentially
describe any circumstance when a plant does not meet a standard demanded of
it. Incidents vary in their severity, from reports of instruments slightly out of
calibration to those concerned with major accident sequences.
For the 13 operating reactors in the Great Lakes basin there were 652 LERs for
the period January 1986 to November 1986.
Each report is coded by the National Response Center by reason for filing.
Categories range from a violation of a technical specification to an activation
of an emergency feature. Often one incident may have several codes if several
violations were involved. The following table (Table 10) shows the number of
LERs at the 13 operating reactors in the basin for the noted time period.
TABLE 10. Incidents reportable in LERs in operating US. nuclear reactors
in the Great Lakes basin January 1985 to November 1986.
 
Plant Number of LERs Plant Number of LERs
Davis—Besse 1 75 Zion 2 51
Fitzpatrick 46 Point Beach 2 28
Cook 1 94 Palisades 69
Cook 2 73 Ginna 29
Kawanee 36 Nine—Mile Point 54
Zion 1 88 Big Rock 15
As well as the National Response Center codes, the Nuclear Safety
Information Center codes the data as they are filed. The most significant
code is Possible Significant Event. There were eight incidents in this
category for this time period in the basin.
The Nuclear Safety Information Center also periodically releases a report
called Potential Precursors t_o Severe Core Damage Accidents. This report
extracts incidents that, based on an engineering analysis, could have led to
core damage or damage to the nuclear fuel. The latest report is for 1985; of
the 53 noted incidents for the entire United States, four were at reactors in
the basin (Table 11). This includes the worst accident of the period, which
occurred at Davis—Besse 1 in June 1985.
TABLE 11. Precursors to potential severe coredamage accidents in
the Great Lakes basin 1985, listed by probability”.
Rank Plant Date Failure Probability
1 Davis—Besse 1 Jun. 9/85 Loss of feedwater and 10—2 to 10"1
auxiliary feedwater
6 Davis—Besse 1 Jun.15/85 Loss of feedwater aux— 10“ to 10-3
iliary feedwater failure
40 Fitzpatrick Jan.19/85 Coolant system failures 10"5 to 10‘5
51 Fitzpatrick Feb. 2/86 Emergency power system <10’6
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 The previous report for 1980—81 cited seven incidents in the basin for the
period, including the fourth and fifth worst incidents of 1980 (again at
Davis—Besse).
The current report also notes a trend to accidents involving major feed water
systems that take heat out of the reactor. It notes that although these systems
are rigorously tested the failures are not showing up in tests but only during
full—power operation.
The Atomic Energy Control Board of Canada (AECB) also keeps nuclear
incident records and analyses significant events. The significant event reports
are available from Ontario Hydro; a monthly publication entitled Event Analysis
and Statistics is available from the AECB. This last publication includes
accidents trends identified by the AECB.
d. Current 1.1C Monitoring
The last report on Radioactivity prepared for the UC was released in 1983. A
new report is being prepared and will be included as part of the Water Quality
Board's 1987 Appendix B. In the past, staff at the UC have been aided in the
preparation of this report by a committee on radioactivity, but this committee
has been disbanded.
The IJC also depends on the agencies to select the information to review.
There is currently more than ample material for the UC to receive, review and
make its own determination as to what is significant.
. Since a major release of radioactivity from an accident at a nuclear power
plant would have a calamitous impact that could dwarf all previous incidents
and since the U C is the only independent international body with an overview of
the regulatory agencies in this area, the reduction of IJC activity should be
reconsidered.
7.5 FINDINGS
It appears that while there is an annual review of Annex 4 discharges there is no
corresponding annual review of discharges under Annex 8. Such a review would
require the examination of at least two national U.S. databases and all eight border
states data as well as at least two Canadian databases.
From my preliminary review of discharges into the lake, there is enough evidence to
conclude that extraordinary discharges into the lake from industry, transportation
and municipal sewer systems are a significant contributor to the pollution load of the
Great Lakes basin. Efforts to place these discharges into context with the
contaminant burden associated with continuous effluent discharges should continue.
Although all the data are not yet readily available, enough of a start has been made
by the various agencies that it should be possible to evaluate the question of
contaminant burden more completely.
The framework for understanding and pursuing this concern is readily available under
the current Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement.
In addition, since most databases are now on computer, it may be possible to
download data on to a disk and manipulate it at the I] C.
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 7.6 RECOMMENDATIONS
7.7
1.
The 1.1 C should monitor in more detail the quantity and trends of extraordinary
discharges in their reports on water quality.
The IJC should recommend research to determine the relative contribution of
such discharges to pollution of the Great Lakes basin.
The IJC should monitor the progress of the EPA to set up its new ERNS
database and should make use of the information when it is available.
The I] C should encourage efforts to make data on discharges in all jurisdictions
compatible and easily retrievable.
Environment Canada and the Ontario Ministry of the Environment should work
to ensure that the valuable federal NATES database is continually updated with
information from Ontario.
The UC should consider re-establishment of its committee on radioactivity to
monitor developments in the generation of nuclear power in the basin.
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 INTRODUCTION
This working paper aims to stimulate discussion on the kinds of programs that have
been or should be designed to prevent catastrophic environmental events and suggests
priorities where possible. Reference is made to those regulatory and non—regulatory
programs that are proliferating due to recent world—scale incidents such as Bhopal and
the Rhine River spill. Guidance provided by the chair of the workshop suggests that the
Program area should focus on examination of the management of databases. From this
documentation, directions for improved collection, analysis and reporting of incidents
can be recommended and priorities for prevention programs established.
8.1 EXISTENCE AND MANAGEMENT OF DATABASES
A detailed review of existing databases relevant to the Great Lakes ecosystem was
outside the scope of this particular Working Paper. Nevertheless it is necessary to
at least briefly refer to specific examples of database management in both Canada
and United States in order to draw on the current situation so that we might learn
for the future.
a. Canadian Databases
In Canada, at the Federal level, no formal mechanism requiring industry to
share information on accidental releases exists. As such, learning from
experience the causes of certain incidents is left to informal discussions
between technical experts. Companies are reluctant to share information
formally due to perceived liabilities should certain information be made
public.
With the implementation of the Spills Bill in Ontario, all incidents must now
be reported to the Ministry of the Environment. Whileno formal analysis of
reported data has yet been made public, there has been an increase in the
number of incidents reported since 1985. This increase is probably the result
of unfamiliarity with regulations including, the Transportation of Dangerous
Goods Regulations which became effective July 1, 1985 (reporting of spills of
inconsequential amounts of relatively innocuous substances).
The National Environmental Emergency Centre (NEEC), operated by
Environment Canada, has been compiling data on significant spills since
1974. Spills are listed as significant according to, among other things, the
type and quantity of material released, the implications for public safety or
environmental concern and media attention. Figure 1 shows that in the
twelve—year period from 1974 through 1985, on a national basis, some 4,942
spills of chemicals were listed, averaging out to more than one significant
spill per day.
Transport Canada also collects data on spill incidents as part of its Transport
Emergency Centre (CANUTEC) operation, providing 24 hr/day emergency
response information. However, as is the case with Environment Canada, not
all incidents are reported directly to Transport Canada's database.
United States Databases
Federal, state and local governments collect data to help set regulations,
plan for emergency response and accident reduction and guide enforcement.
Data and information systems are maintained by a number of federal
—107—
 Two notable examples of resource systems in the US. for information
pertaining to control and amelioration of spills and accidental discharges
are: l) the Chemical Hazard Response Information System (CHRIS), a
database of information on toxic and hazardous substances; and 2)
CHEMTREC, sponsored by the Chemical Manufacturers Association to
dispense advice from manufacturers on toxic substances. CHRIS is sponsored
by the National Response Center (US Coast Guard). CHEMTREC and CHRIS
both have toll free 24—hr. telephone numbers.
The databases listed in Table 1 cover four major freight modes - truck, rail,
marine and air. These databases are maintained by federal agencies, state
and local governments, trade associations, carriers, shippers and consulting
firms.
Separate, relatively complete databases are available for rail and marine
transport. Rail databases result from sample waybill data collected by the
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) and are adequate to determine rail
flows. The Train 11 data is the property of the American Association of
Railroads (AAR). It contains complete chemical data on at least 80% of the
rail shipments.
The US. EPA's requirements for hazardous waste shipments provide fairly
complete data on such material even though there are significant differences
in record maintenance between EPA Regions. Data on radioactive shipments,
as maintained by the US. Department of Energy (DOE), are also relatively
complete.
The Office of Technology Assessment found that the truck transport is the
sector with the least complete database, yet it represents the most
widespread public risk.
TABLE 2. Percentage of transportation incidents by mode
in the United States (1976—1984).
Highways 86.5 _ Air
Rail l 1.8 Other
O
H
m
i
d
Source: US. Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)
Discussion Points
There are some obvious similarities in both United States and Canada data
management systems. Some of these are:
° the lack of integration of government databases;
the need for improved reporting procedures by companies, i.e. causes;
lack of access to databases from outside government and transfer of
information to public;
lack of fora where learning from experience could take place; and
lack of mechanisms whereby industry/government/public can agree on
priorities for prevention activities based on these databases.
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8.2 PROGRAMS TO PREVENT CATASTROPHIC ENVIRONMENTAL EVENTS
Two Approaches to Prevention Priorities
There are at a minimum two approaches to setting priorities for prevention
activities.
perspective,
One is to perform an analysis of incidents from an historical
i.e. examining various incidents over a period of time to
determine causes, types and quantities of chemical involved and location.
The second approach is a more proactive approach using hazard identification
and assessment, followed by a determination of risk, to set priorities.
i. Historical Spill Perspective
Data compiled by the NEEC in Canada has been analyzed in various
ways to set priorities for activities. In Figure 2, the distribution of
chemical spills by cause is shown, while Figure 3 shows the quantity of
chemicals spilled by source.
Pipe Leak 515 (10%) Overturn 396 (8%)
   
   
Tank Leak 291 (6%) Overﬂow 670 (14%)
Fitting 459 (9%)
0th. Accident 182 (4%)
Discharge 518 (11%)
Oth
er
1,2
06
(24
%)
Der
ail
men
t 2
02
(4%
)
Cont. Leak 503 (10%)
NATES 1988 i
FIGURE 2. Number of chemical spill events by cause in Canada
(1974-1985).
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Sewer 1 299,046 (33%)
  
  
  
Storage 226,599 (6%)
Ind. Plant 1,604,008
Mine, Well 268,877 (7%) (41%)
Train 88,722 (2%)
Other 436,244 (11%) NATES 1988
FIGURE 3. Tonnes of chemicals spilled by source in Canada
(1974—1985).
In reviewing the data mentioned above, one might draw the conclusion
that there is a need to direct resources towards reducing the number of
overflows at industrial plant sites before addressing container leaks
from ships. However, the potential impact may still be higher in the
case of a shipping accident than a more readily containable on—site spill.
Environment Canada has also examined the data from another
perspective to determine what chemicals are spilled most frequently.
The data shown in Figure 4 indicate that ten chemicals account for 75%
of all materials spilled, whereas 150 chemicals account for 97% of all
spills. Having this list of chemicals allowed Environment Canada to
develop its ENVIROTIPS series of emergency planning manuals for
particular chemical substances in a prioritized way.
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FIGURE 4. "NATES" chemicals related to spill or supply volume.
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Although these examples are from a government perspective, there are
many examples from the industrial side as well. Historical information
is analyzed to direct resources to those areas or activity sectors most
in need of fixing. However, it should also be stated that where
incidents involve hazardous chemicals or dangerous situations, the fix
is usually made before any historical trend is allowed to develop.
ii. Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment
The whole area of risk assessment and decision—making is currently
growing so quickly that it is difficult for those not specifically involved
in the field to understand just how one can use these techniques to set
an agenda for action.
However, since Bhopal, there has been much literature of a general
nature, as opposed to detailed mathematical treatises, made available
to company and community officials to set priorities for action in their
areas. This working paper will not try to summarize this work but a
listing of pertinent literature will be provided at the Workshop.
In trying to identify the potential for accidents in Canada as part of the
Bhopal Aftermath Review Project, the Working Group established under
Environment Canada noted that there was a basic requirement to
classify the hazardous nature of chemicals. Fortunately the Canadian
Transport of Dangerous Goods Act identifies such criteria as toxicity
and flammability in its regulations. Knowing the quantities of
chemicals manufactured, transported or used in various locations, those
areas that present the highest risk potential can be identified. It
follows that priorities can then be set for a number of activities,
including risk reduction through inventory management, contingency
planning, community awareness and emergency response; all of these
activities can be accomplished through a mix of regulatory and
non—regulatory initiatives.
Regulatory Programs
Regulatory programs are almost always initiated in response to public
demand based on real or perceived considerations. The field of public safety
and protection is no exception. We have seen the regulatory responses in
Europe, as a result of Seveso, Italy in 1976, in Canada, with the Transport of
Dangerous Goods Act as a result of the train derailment in Mississauga and in
the United States, with Institute, West Virginia and other incidents at the
state and local level. In Ontario, the Spills Bill, while on the books for some
years, is now being implemented and events such as the St. Clair blob
encourage and drive this legislation as well as create other new programs to
deal with continuous releases of toxic chemicals.
Specific programs in certain areas will provide examples of increased
regulatory actions.
i. Identification of Locations Using Hazardous Chemicals
As a result of the Seveso accident and a subsequent directive within
countries of the European Economic Community, all countries have
developed legislation that requires companies to identify locations of
hazardous chemicals.
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Recent legislative changes in the United States, under the Superfund
Amendment and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), require facilities
that have certain quantities or storage capacity for chemicals on—site,
to report the presence of an extremely hazardous material to the local
community. Further, each state must now establish local planning
districts to deal with contingency planning and emergency response.
Local planning committees consisting of industry, government, public
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Areas of concern in impact assessment include minimum acceptable
buffer zones, public warning and transportation routes. Risk
quantitation methods remain a subject of debate by those skilled in this
field.
Other Associated Areas
Following most major accidents, media attention often focuses on the
need for more frequent safety inspections of industrial facilities. The
difficulty here is that safety inspections, as they are normally
conducted, are aimed at detecting hazards to health and safety of
employees from chronic exposure to chemicals or unsafe working
conditions pertaining to the equipment or buildings. Very seldom does a
safety inspector conduct a detailed review of a process design and
operation; these are processes often far too complex for the inspector
to fully understand based on his knowledge and day—to—day routine
experiences.
In the United States, OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health
Administration) and EPA have combined their resources to carry out
in—depth safety reviews at plant sites. Although these audits are
extremely expensive from a resource point of view, they do work well
in identifying areas for improvement. Unfortunately, the number of
plants that can be reviewed in this detailed manner has to be very
limited.
The insurance industry performs a quasi—regulatory role in safety
reviews through their independent safety audit programs. This has been
particularly truein the past few years as insurance rates have risen
significantly.
Considerations
In developing positions on the need for and focus of regulatory
activities in the prevention of accidents, the workshop participants may
wish to consider the following issues:
° Chemical process industries are complex, making it difficult to
maintain highly trained government inspectors, i.e. the problem is
resources plus knowledge.
Does acceptance of a company hazard analysis put the
responsibility foraccidents partly on the government's side?
Should governments require
community awareness programs?
companies to participate in
What motivating events will trigger further regulatory initiatives
in the Great Lakes basin and can we prevent those events from
happening?
Are government inspection programs adequate to ensure that spill
containment/mitigation measures are in place?
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 Non—Regulatory PrOgrams
It is a law of human nature to respond to a given stimulus. Major industrial
accidents have always involved some form of response, usually corrective
action to ensure that a similar problem does not repeat itself.
One could logically suggest that the Bhopal accident has generated a response
in the chemical industry, at least in North America, unlike any before.
Industrial associations, through their influential corporate members, have
been increasing the attention paid to the issues of accident prevention,
emergency response and information sharing. In turn, these programs are
being picked up byrelated industrial sectors and adopted for their use as
appropriate.
Specific results of the increased number of safety audits carried out by
individual companies include:
° process changes; for example, Methyl Isocyanate (MIC) is no longer
transported in large quantities in the United States;
reductions of inventories of hazardous chemicals; and
improved detection and alerting in case of spills.
The Chemical Manufacturers' Association (CMA) and its sister organization
in Canada, the Canadian Chemical Producers' Association (CCPA), have
embarked on some ambitious programs for their member companies. Many of
these programs have similar aims, but there are some structural differences
between the two groups:
i. CCPA has an overall program entitled:
Responsible Care — A Total Commitment
° This is a set of guiding principles to which each member company
must agree through its Chief Executive Officer.
The principles are implemented in practice through specific
programs that members adopt as self—regulatory Codes of
Practice. '
A particular program unique to Canada is the safety Assessment
whereby an annual review, conducted according to a detailed
questionnaire format and signed by the CEO for each plant site,
provides an on—going analysis of progress being made in safety
management.
ii. Communitv Awareness — Emergency Resoonse (CAER)
Both CMA and CCPA have instituted CAER programs across the United
States and Canada. CAER is "a community outreach program on the
part of a company to ensure that the community recognizes: the
potential hazards; what is being done to reduce the risk; and that
adequate emergency response plans and capability are being put in
place."
This program should motivate municipal and industry officials to
interact more positively to each other's and the community's benefit.
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 In the United States, there are nearly 1,000 CAER programs underway
and in Canada all member companies of CCPA have now appointed
CAER coordinators.
Other industrial associations are adopting CAER programs for their
members.
Acceptance of this kind of voluntary program will no doubt be helpful
to those communities that are not able, for whatever reason, to
institute legislative means for ensuring industry/government
cooperation.
Chemical Referral Centre
CMA has developed the National Chemical Response and Information
Centre (NCRIC) to provide the public and emergency response
organizations with information about chemicals and advice or
assistance during emergencies. Part of this program is CHEMTREC,
mentioned earlier.
In Canada, chemical emergency information is provided nationally by
Transport Canada through CANUTEC. Recently the CCPA has set up a
Chemical Referral Centre to work jointly with CANUTEC, i.e. sharing
resources in the same room to provide information on chemicals to
companies and the public.
The establishment of these centres will readily allow community
officials and citizens access to information that will help the dialogue
between industry and the community.
One might debate how this directly affects prevention priorities.
However, a more informed public should be in better position to judge
the initiatives taken by the chemical industry to prevent accidents.
Safetv and Accident Prevention Prozrams
Although all of the above programs are associated with CMA and CCPA
(representing the chemical industry), there are other highly—recognized
non—regulatory programs that individual companies can adopt. Perhaps
the most visible of these is the 5—Star International Rating System of
the Loss Control Institute in Atlanta, Georgia. Plant sites are ranked
against a series of detailed questions for some 20 elements ranging
from Management Training through Planned Inspections to Program
Evaluation and Off—the—Job Safety. In Ontario, the 5—star program is
made available through the Industrial Accident Prevention Association.
There are some 24 chemical and petroleum companies using this system
in Ontario.
m
To aid the workshop discussion, participants may wish to consider the
following issues:
0
Is the process of hazard identification and analysis adequately
understood and utilized by companies in the Great Lakes basin?
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Is self—regulation adequate both to prevent accidents and to
satisfy public concern in this area?
° Are company safety/operator training programs generally
adequate?
8.3 OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Without prejudicing the outcome of the workshop, there are several observations or
conclusions, or both, one might make based solely on events that have transpired as
a result of industrial accidents. Some of these follow:
I.
There exist a number of data management systems in both countries that are
designed to serve the needs of individual agencies but these systems are not
compatible and do not appear able to be interlinked.
There have been a number of serious spills in the Great Lakes basin that have
the potential to impact drinking water and public health directly.
Techniques such as hazard analysis are being used to identify problem areas
and develop solutions.
There is a mixture of regulatory and non—regulatory tools available to
increase prevention—oriented activities.
Emphasis will shift from non—regulatory (self—regulation) to a stronger
regulatory regime as the number and seriousness of catastrophic events
demands.
The authors hope that this Working Paper will assist all participants in their
discussions during the Workshop.
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